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Abstract 
 
Even though sexual violence has always been a part and parcel of conflicts and atrocities 
throughout the ages, it never found any interpretation by subsequent tribunals who were 
responsible for prosecuting offenders.  
 
The case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu was the first of its kind to give 
jurisprudential recognition and interpretation to sexual violence as war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide respectively. This case was important for the following 
reasons: 
1. It acknowledged that sexual violence can amount to an act of genocide; 
2. It acknowledged that sexual violence can amount to a crime against humanity; and 
3. It was the first case to define rape within an international context. 
 
Following the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu many tribunals gave 
recognition to the extent of which sexual violence takes place during atrocities by 
correctly convicting accused for either participating in sexual violence or aiding and 
abetting to sexual violence. Amidst the various interpretations on what constitutes sexual 
violence and how it is defined, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone all either conceptualised sexual violence as genocide, war crimes or/ and 
crimes against humanity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 x
At the same time, the development of sexual violence as either a crime against humanity 
or a war crime did not end with the courts. The case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul 
Akayesu sparked a fire in the international community, which led to it paying more 
attention to the place of sexual violence in treaty law. Taking into account that rape is 
listed as a crime against humanity in both the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda statutes, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court statutes both list 
more than one form of sexual violence as a crime against humanity. It is interesting to 
note that the latter two treaty developments took place only after the International 
Criminal Tribunal conceptualised sexual violence as a crime against humanity.  
 
Thus apart from merely listing rape as a crime against humanity, the Statute establishing 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, states in article 2(g) that sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence constitutes a crime 
against humanity. The Statute establishing the International Criminal Court states in 
article 7(1)(g) that rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilisation or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity constitutes a 
crime against humanity. The interpretation of these acts is further guided by the 
‘Elements of Crimes’ which are annexed to the International Criminal Court statute. 
Once again it is interesting to note that the ‘Elements of Crimes’ for these acts are similar 
to how the International Criminal Tribunals (both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
tribunals) conceptualised various acts of sexual violence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi
On the other hand, the definition of genocide remained the same as it was defined in the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. This 
definition does not expressly mention any form of sexual violence as a form of genocide. 
However, once again, the trial chamber in the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul 
Akayesu set the benchmark for sexual violence to constitute a form of genocide by way of 
interpretation. The definition of genocide did not subsequently change in the Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court.  
 
Based on these premises, this thesis attempts to investigate the similarities and 
differences in sexual violence as a form of both genocide and a crime against humanity, 
by addressing the following question: 
 
What are the essential and practical differences between sexual violence as crimes 
against humanity and genocide and what is the legal effect of the differences, should 
there be any?  
 
Chapter 1 highlights the historical overview and developments of sexual violence as 
genocide and crimes against humanity, while chapter 2 investigates how sexual violence 
can amount to a form of genocide. Chapter 3 assesses the advances made in sexual 
violence as a crime against humanity, while chapter 4 importantly draws a comparative 
analysis between sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity. Chapter 4 
draws this comparison by weighing up four differences and four similarities in sexual 
violence as genocide and a crime against humanity.  
 
 
 
 
 xii
Chapter 5 highlights the conclusion and provides an answer for the research question that 
is posed above. Here it is concluded that even though there exist multiple differences in 
sexual violence as crimes against humanity and genocide, there are also multiple 
similarities which could possibly amount to a better chance for conviction of an accused 
under a crime against humanity than genocide. Chapter 5 also provide possible 
recommendations for the consequences that might flow should sexual violence as a crime 
against humanity be fairly similar to sexual violence as genocide.  
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction, Historical Overview and Developments 
 
1.1 Sexual violence during armed conflict 
Although previously never regulated, sexual violence has always been a part of armed 
conflict and in most cases women and girls fell victim to this heinous crime. In her 
anthropological study into the use of sexual violence in warfare, stemming from ancient 
origins, Vikman argues that although armed conflicts have changed as far as weapons and 
arms are concerned, sexual violence has always been present during armed conflicts.1  
 
She commences her study by investigating how the Israelites used rape during armed 
conflict as a weapon of war and for symbolic reasons. Moses, ordered the mass rape of 32 
000 girls while waging war against the Midianites.2 Symbolically, breaking into a city 
was manifested and re-enacted by raping its citizens.3 In other words, not only just was 
the presence of the opposition known by the multiple rapes of women, but these rapes 
were also used as a method of war. Lastly, she states that Moses and the Israelites were 
not brought to justice for raping Midianite women and girls, because it was seen as a 
rightful act of vengeance for what the Midianites did to the Israelites.4 The Bible thus 
serves as a good indication, documenting the modern day wrongs of the Israelites, which 
                                                 
1 See Elisabeth Vikman ‘Ancient Origins: Sexual Violence in Warfare’ (2005) 12 Anthropology & 
Medicine 22.  
2 See E Vikman op cit note 1 at 23. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See E Vikman op cit note 1 at 24. 
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was justified by mere vengeance. Although vengeance was used to defend Moses and the 
Israelites, this story portrays a real image of how women are used as modern day means 
and methods of warfare.  
 
The raping of women, during armed conflicts did not end at the time of the Israelites. 
During ancient Greek times, Persian soldiers also raped women, successively, which led 
to the deaths of the women.5 The women were of Phocian origin and were caught near 
the mountains while being chased by the Persian soldiers.6 With regards to Ancient 
Rome, legend has it that Roman society was founded on the rape of Sabine women.7 
Based on Vikman’s study it is thus evident that raping women when used as a weapon 
during armed conflict was considered appropriate, as long as it was used on the enemy.  
 
Against this backdrop rape and the sexual abuse of women became a frequent occurrence, 
during armed conflicts. Sexual violence started slowly but surely raising its head out 
during conflicts of the twentieth century.8 Although sexual violence was not mentioned 
during the infamous Nuremburg trials, it was brought before the Tokyo Tribunal. 
However, the judge rejected this evidence, based on the difficulty of proving that women 
had not given their consent to sexual intercourse with the perpetrators.9 The mere fact 
                                                 
5 See E Vikman op cit note 1 at 25. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See E Vikman op cit note 1 at 27. 
8 For example, during the Rwandan, former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone conflicts, sexual violence was a 
common practice.  
9 See Annette Lith ‘The Development of the Legal Protection against Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts 
– Advantages and Disadvantages (2001) unpublished 4. 
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that this was not mentioned during the Nuremburg trials or a conviction secured based on 
this in Tokyo, does not mean that sexual violence did not take place during the Second 
World War, as a means and a method of warfare. Groundbreaking developments in this 
area of the law arose, when the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia10 and Rwanda11 successfully prosecuted and convicted accused for 
committing sexual violence against women during these conflicts. Ward thus rightly 
states that: 
“A growing body of data from the wars of the last decade is finally bringing to light one 
of history’s great silences: the sexual violation and torture of civilian women and girls 
during periods of armed conflict.”12 
 
Codifying sexual violence into international treaties’, as part of the definition of the 
international crimes,13 saw the light during the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively. The statutes establishing 
these criminal tribunals included rape into the definition of a crime against humanity.14 
The Statute establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereinafter referred to as the 
SCSL statute) went further and also stated that sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy and other forms of sexual violence, apart from just rape, constitutes a 
                                                 
10 The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991 (hereinafter referred to as the ICTY). Further light will be shed on this tribunal at a later stage.  
11 The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring 
States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the ICTR). Further light 
will be shed on this tribunal at a later stage.  
12 See Jeanne Ward, Christopher Horwood, Claire McEvoy, Pamela Shipman & Lauren Rumble The Shame 
of War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Conflict (2007) 11.  
13 I.e. war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  
14 See article 5 of the ICTY statute and Article 3 of the ICTR statute.  
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crime against humanity.15 The latest development came about with the Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court (hereinafter referred to as the ICC Statute). 
This statute incorporated sexual violence and rape into the definition of both a war 
crime16 and a crime against humanity.17 The definition of genocide, as contained within 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter 
referred to as the Genocide Convention) of 1948 is part of the jus cogens and enjoys 
customary international law status.18 Therefore the definition contained within the 
Genocide Convention has been copied verbatim into the statutes establishing the ICTY, 
the ICTR and the ICC. Although this definition makes no mention of sexual violence or 
rape, both the ICTY and ICTR interpreted this definition to include rape and sexual 
violence as means and methods of these crimes.19  
 
This study will only deal with the extension of sexual violence into the definitions of 
genocide and crimes against humanity. Therefore, I will only portray the historical 
developments of these two crimes and will not include war crimes and crimes of 
aggression in this study.  
 
                                                 
15 See article 2(g) of the SCSL statute.  
16 See article 8. 
17 See article 7. 
18 It enjoys customary international law status because it is currently ratified by 137 States, which includes 
South Africa. Please see www.preventgenocide.org (accessed on 10 March 2008) for further developments 
with regards to this convention. See also Gerhard Werle Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) 
191. 
19 An example of this would be the groundbreaking judgment of The Prosecutor v Akayesu ICTR 96-4-T, 2 
September 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the Akayesu trial judgment), where the ICTR convicted the 
accused of genocide, for raping and overseeing that women were raped in his commune. Further light will 
be shed on this case in chapter 2.  
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1.2 Crimes against humanity 
The definition for crimes against humanity was first formulated in article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Charter.20 This Charter was established following the attempted 
extermination of all the European Jews by the Nazi Government. Article 6(c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter defined crimes against humanity as: 
“Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated.” 
 
This definition of crimes against humanity contains the following components: (a) the 
material acts, (b) the broad scope of the crimes and (c) discrimination. The material acts 
are quite narrow, because they do not expressly cover detaining people (which was 
prominent during the atrocities committed against the European Jews) or rape and sexual 
violence. These grounds have to be read in and interpreted as ‘other inhumane acts’. On 
the area of applicability, this definition was quite broad, as it granted protection to all 
civilians and not just a specific group. However, this scope could have been narrowed, if 
it was shown that persecution took place on political, religious or racial grounds. From a 
feminist perspective it could be argued that the biggest flaw of this definition is that it is 
                                                 
20 After its victory over the Nazi occupation of Europe, the allied forces established a charter to prosecute 
war criminal during the European counterpart of World War II. This charter was known as the ‘Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg” (Hereinafter referred to as the Nuremberg Charter). 
Article 1 of the Nuremberg Charter reads: “In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th day of August 
1945 by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French 
Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall established an International Military 
Tribunal… for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis.” 
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not gender sensitive, as it does not make provision for the protection of women, as a 
specific group or against crimes of a sexual nature.  
 
The definition of crimes against humanity in the Tokyo Charter21 was more specific than 
that of the Nuremberg Charter. The Tokyo Charter defined crimes against humanity as: 
“Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
and other inhumane acts committed before or during the war, or persecutions on political 
or racial grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing 
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan.”22  
 
Although this definition is not prima facie gender sensitive, it is more specific in the 
sense that it includes ‘leaders, organisers and instigators’ under its scope of application. 
This definition also, expressly, criminalises conspiracy to commit crimes against 
humanity. Another interesting difference evident between these two definitions is that the 
Tokyo charter does not include religion, as a ground of persecution. Bassiouni here 
correctly argues that the reason for this difference is due to the fact that the Nazi crimes 
against the Jews did not have a counterpart in the Asian conflict.23 Even though this is 
true, the difference in the formulation of these definitions is problematic. It violates the 
principles of legality and also creates confusion in the area of legal certainty.  
 
                                                 
21 The establishment of the ‘International Military Tribunal for the Far East’ (hereinafter referred to as the 
Toyko Charter) took place 2 years after the Nuremberg Charter was established. For more on the 
establishement of the Toyko Charter you are welcome to read: Gerhard Werle op cite note 18 at 11 – 12. 
22 See article 5(c) of the Tokyo Charter. My emphasis added. 
23 See M. Cherif Bassiouni Crimes against Humanity in International Law 3ed (1999) 33. 
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After the allies took control of Germany, Control Council Law 10 was enacted. This law 
also contained a definition for crimes against humanity. It defined crimes against 
humanity as: 
“Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds, whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where 
perpetrated.”24 
 
This was the first definition where rape was included as an actus reus of a crime against 
humanity. This definition was not entirely gender sensitive as it still ignored other forms 
of sexual violence which legally did not constitute rape.25  
 
The definition of crimes against humanity came under scrutiny again when the United 
Nations Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the UNSC) had to enact resolutions to 
establish the statutes to create the ICTY and ICTR. These criminal tribunals were created 
to prosecute those persons who committed genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes during the conflicts that arose in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively. 
Although these statutes were created around a similar period in time, the definition of 
crimes against humanity in the ICTY statute is different, in relation to the one contained 
in the ICTR statute. Article 5 of the ICTY statute defines crimes against humanity as: 
“The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the 
following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in 
character, and directed against any civilian population: 
a) murder; 
b) extermination; 
                                                 
24 See article II(c) of Control Council Law 10 (hereinafter referred to as CCL. 10). My emphasis added. 
25 Examples of other forms of sexual violence would be sexual slavery, forced prostitution and enforced 
pregnancies.  
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c) enslavement; 
d) deportation; 
e) imprisonment; 
f) torture; 
g) rape; 
h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
i) other inhumane acts.” 
 
On the other hand, article 3 of the ICTR statute defines crimes against humanity as: 
“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or 
religious grounds: 
a) Murder; 
b) Extermination; 
c) Enslavement; 
d) Deportation; 
e) Imprisonment; 
f) Torture; 
g) Rape; 
h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
i) Other inhumane acts.” 
 
The first evident difference between these two definitions is that the ICTY statute 
requires that there be a conflict in order for a crime against humanity to be committed. 
The ICTR statute does not contain this requirement. The ICTR statute requires that a 
‘widespread or systematic’ attack has to take place against the civilian population, while 
the ICTY statute does not require this. The ICTR statute is more specific in that it states 
that the crime must be committed against a civilian population because they belonged 
either to one of the five groups mentioned.26 Article 5 of the ICTY statute is essentially 
quite broad and vague as any of those acts can also be a considered a grave violation of 
international humanitarian law. The reason why this definition can also be considered a 
grave violation of international humanitarian law is because there is no inherent, distinct 
requirement that would make any of the listed acts a crime against humanity. The 
                                                 
26 National, political, ethnic, racial or religious.  
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inherent, distinct requirement contained within the ICTR statute is the fact that the acts 
has to be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack.27 Both these definitions 
include rape as an individual act which can be committed as a crime against humanity. 
Although these definitions do mention rape as an act punishable, it still comprises of a 
lacuna as it does not cover any other forms of sexual violence, as a crime against 
humanity.   
 
On 14 August 2000, the UNSC adopted resolution 1315 which established the special 
court for Sierra Leone. This court is mandated to prosecute persons who committed 
crimes against humanity and war crimes during the conflict that took place in Sierra 
Leone. Article 2 of this statute provides the following definition for a crime against 
humanity: 
“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the 
following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population: 
a. Murder; 
b. Extermination; 
c. Enslavement; 
d. Deportation; 
e. Imprisonment; 
f. Torture;  
g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of 
sexual violence; 
h. Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds; 
i. Other inhumane acts.”  
 
Although this definition also requires that there be a widespread or systematic attack (like 
that in the ICTR statute), this definition expressly goes beyond mere rape by including 
more forms of sexual violence as listed acts.  
                                                 
27 This will be further analysed in chapter 3.  
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Crimes against humanity saw its penultimate development within the area of international 
treaties by the adoption and enactment of the ICC statute.28 This statute creates a 
permanent international court which has the jurisdiction to prosecute four crimes of an 
international nature.29 Article 7 of this statute contains a detailed definition and 
explanation of crimes against humanity. Article 7(1) states that: 
“For the purpose of this Statute, “crimes against humanity” means any of the following 
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectively on political, racial national 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are 
universally under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this 
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of this Court; 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) The crime of apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” 
 
Article 7(2) further explains what constitutes ‘attacks directed against any civilian 
population, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, 
torture, forced pregnancy, the crime of apartheid and enforced disappearance.’ Sub-article 
                                                 
28 The SCSL statute as mentioned above contains the latest version for the definition of crimes against 
humanity, as it was promulgated after the ICC statute was drafted. 
29 These crimes are: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.  
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3 clarifies what is meant by ‘gender’.30 Although the ICC statute gives such a detailed 
definition and explanation of crimes against humanity, no judgment has been delivered by 
this court (interpreting this definition). This, despite the fact that this court is running into 
its ninth year of existence. That said, I thus agree with Darryl Robinson when he states 
that “the ICC statute is more detailed than previous definition, [which] generally seems to 
reflect most of the positive developments identified in recent authorities.”31 
 
1.3 Genocide 
Unlike the definition for crimes against humanity, the definition of genocide has not seen 
so many different versions, or even developments, within the international community. 
The crime of genocide was first formulated by a Polish lawyer of Jewish origin, Raphael 
Lemkin after he heard a broadcast by Winston Churchill (four years earlier)32 who said 
that “we are in the presence of a crime without a name.”33 Winston Churchill made this 
statement in reply to the atrocities that the Nazi regime committed against the European 
Jews, Poles, Slovenes and Serbs. Lemkin went further and explained genocide34 to mean 
the following: 
                                                 
30 “For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and 
female, within the context of society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the 
above.” 
31 See Darryl Robinson ‘Defining “Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference’ (1999) 93 The 
American Journal of International Law 43. 
32 See John Quigley The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis (2006) 4. The radio 
broadcast by Churchill was made on 24 August 1941, which was 9 weeks after Germany invaded the 
Soviet Union.  
33 Ibid.  
34 See Raphael Lemkin Axis Rule in Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for 
Redress (1944) 79. Lemkin derived the term ‘genocide’ from the Greek word ‘genos’ (which means race 
and tribe) and the Latin suffix ‘cide’ (which means killing). 
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“Genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when 
accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended, rather, to signify 
a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations 
of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The 
objective of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions 
of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national 
groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and even the 
lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.”35 
 
This explanation given by Lemkin is very specific in that it only pertains to the 
destruction of national groups. It also requires that there be an intention to destroy the 
group. This intention is vital to establish whether an atrocity can be termed genocide. This 
explanation also does not state the methods of destroying the group. It only requires that 
the group’s essential foundations be destroyed. Sexual violence destroys the liberty, 
health, dignity and lives of individuals of a group. If the required intention can be proved, 
then it can be argued that sexual violence constitutes a method of destroying the group. 
Lemkin thus left a back door open to establish the means and methods of how a group can 
be destroyed. He did this by not recognising only certain acts punishable as forms of 
genocide.  
 
The first legal definition for genocide was later formulated in the Genocide Convention.36 
This convention defines genocide as: 
 “... genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children from the group to another group.”37  
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 United Nations Resolution 260(III), 9 December 1948.  
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This definition is quite specific as it narrows the groups down to only four, being 
national, ethnical, racial or religious. In the secretariat draft of the Genocide Convention, 
political groups were also considered as a protected group. In his book Axis Rule in 
Occupied Europe, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress Lemkin preferred to 
omit this group on the basis that it lacked permanence.38 Prima facie it is evident that 
women are omitted as a protected group. However, within all these protected groups, 
women serve as an important foundation for its existence. This therefore makes women 
vulnerable as possible targets in destroying a group.  
 
On the other hand, this definition is also quite broad in that it does not prescribe how the 
perpetrators can go about to commit the listed acts against a protected group. Although 
the conception of the transferring of children from one group to another is self-evident, 
there are multiple ways to cause serious bodily or mental harm. For example, in the case 
of The Prosecutor v Maki Muhimana,39 the ICTR stated that by raping a witness (who 
belonged to the Tutsi ethnic group), during the 1994 Rwandan conflict, the accused 
caused serious bodily and mental harm to a member of that ethnic group, which was 
protected under the definition of genocide.40 Another example of causing serious bodily 
or mental harm would be torture.41  
                                                                                                                                                 
37 See article II of the Genocide Convention. 
38 See William A Schabas Genocide in International Law (2000) 53. 
39 ICTR-95-1B-T, 28 April 2005. (Hereinafter referred to as the Muhimana judgment). 
40 Para. 302 of the Muhimana judgment. The added requirements needed to commit genocide were also 
proved in this case. 
41 The ICTR gave this example in the Akayesu trial judgment at para. 504.  
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Unlike crimes against humanity, this definition of genocide remained constant within the 
development of subsequent international treaties’. Both the ICTY and ICTR statutes 
contain this definition, as well as the Rome statute.42 The SCSL does not have the 
jurisdiction to deal with cases of genocide. It only has the competence to deal with cases 
involving the grave violation of international humanitarian law and crimes against 
humanity.43  
 
1.4  Conceptual framework 
 
Even though sexual violence is mostly perpetrated against women during atrocities where 
both crimes against humanity and genocide were committed, this study will attempt to be 
gender neutral. In other words, more focus will be placed on committing the crime of 
sexual violence, rather than the fact that it only takes place against women. That said, 
even though this study will not be a so called ‘woman’s study’ I will investigate whether 
taking a gendered approach might serve as an effective response to the criminal 
prosecution of accused persons who commit crimes of a sexual nature during an atrocity. 
This would then justify why, at times, I will also refer to feminist critiques and 
approaches as recommendations, where it serves as a workable solution in 
conceptualising the differences and similarities of sexual violence as crimes against 
humanity and genocide. Please note that there will be times when I refer to a victim of 
                                                 
42 See article 2(2) of the ICTR statute, article 4(2) of the ICTY statute and article 6 of the Rome statute, 
respectively.  
43 See articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the SCSL statute. 
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sexual violence as a woman and perpetrators of sexual violence as men. I do this because 
most of the victims of sexual violence during atrocities are women and most of the 
perpetrators are men. This does not necessarily mean that this study adopts a gendered 
perspective. 
 
1.5 Research question 
What are the essential and practical differences between sexual violence as crimes against 
humanity and genocide and what is the legal effect of the differences, should there be 
any?  
 
1.6 Rationale of the study 
The international community has seen countless sexual violence incidents committed 
against civilians during multiple conflicts and atrocities.44 However, not until judgments 
delivered by the ICTY and the ICTR, during 1996, have the international community seen 
justice served for committing these acts. 
 
This thesis is intended to draw a comparative analysis between sexual violence as a crime 
against humanity and genocide, respectively.45 Even though the biggest difference 
                                                 
44 See Ward et al op cit note 12 at 11.  
45 In other words, I will assess the differences and similarities of sexual violence as a crime against 
humanity and genocide, respectively. 
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between crimes against humanity and genocide is found within the burden of proof,46 I 
wish to investigate whether practically and legally the similarities outweigh the huge 
burden of proof difference. In other words, when indicting an accused for sexual violence 
(either as a crime against humanity or genocide); would the similarities between these 
crimes make it easier for the prosecution to indict the accused for crimes against 
humanity, instead of genocide (bearing the huge burden of proof in mind for genocide)? 
If the answer to this question is a positive one, then I wish to make helpful 
recommendations to ensure that these two crimes remain different in its jurisprudential 
development. If the answer to the above question is a negative one, then this study would 
confirm the bold steps taken by the criminal tribunals to give jurisprudential recognition 
to sexual violence that takes place during atrocities.  
 
1.7 Literature review 
Since the first judgments - in both the ICTY and the ICTR - convicting accused persons 
for sexual violence as crimes against humanity and genocide, multiple authors analysed 
these judgments and constructively criticised it.  
 
Apart from the debate by various authors around the various judgments where sexual 
violence was conceptualised as a crime against humanity and genocide, the ICTY and the 
ICTR also delivered opposing definitions for the crime of ‘rape’ in the international 
                                                 
46 Proving that (1) crimes against humanity took place as part of a widespread and systematic attack against 
a civilian population, while (2) genocide took place against a certain listed group in its definition, by way 
of specially targeting that group.  
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sphere. In the Akayesu judgment the ICTR adopted a broad approach, which placed 
emphasis on sexual violence that takes place in coercive circumstances and discarded the 
notion of consent.47 However, after this judgment, the ICTY in the case of The 
Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija48 dismissed this broad definition of rape and 
conceptualised a more mechanical definition that focused on body parts of the perpetrator 
and his victims.49 Authors such as De Brouwer correctly argues that the broader approach 
adopted by the ICTR serves as a better option as it does not require the victim to testify 
about body parts when she is called as a witness.50 MacKinnon also correctly argues that 
the definition adopted by the ICTY takes us back step by step to the notion of non-
consent.51 
 
Authors like Carpenter, for example, conceptualised her own feminist theory of justice 
after the genocide in Rwanda.52 Articles such as this one called for a more sex based 
approach when judging cases where sexual violence was one of the crimes for which an 
accused was indicted. In her article she criticises liberal feminism as “a strategy of 
assimilation of women to a standard set by men.”53 She does this because liberal 
feminism attempts to achieve equality between man and woman in the law. 
                                                 
47 Para. 688. 
48 IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998. (Hereinafter referred to as the Furundzija judgment). 
49 Para. 185. 
50 See Anne-Marie LM De Brouwer Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and 
the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR (2005) 107. 
51 See Catharine A MacKinnon Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogue (2006) 239. 
52 See Megan Carpenter ‘Bare Justice: A Feminist Theory of Justice and its Potential Application to Crimes 
of Sexual Violence in Post-Genocide Rwanda’ (2008) 41 Creighton Law Review 595-661. 
53 See M Carpenter op cit note 52 at 604. 
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Apart from just criticising and analysing these decisions by the international tribunals, 
authors such as Askin54 and Van der Poll55 welcome them as giving recognition to one of 
the most heinous crimes committed during conflict, which never found recognition by 
tribunals or courts.  
 
It was articles by authors such as Evans56 and McAuliffe deGuzman57 that led me to 
explore the differences and similarities between sexual violence as crimes against 
humanity and genocide. These authors investigate the inherent differences between 
crimes against humanity and genocide, broadly. This thesis, on the other hand, wish to 
investigate these differences, but only as far as they relate to sexual violence. One of the 
biggest differences between these two crimes is that the burden of proof for genocide is 
much higher than that for crimes against humanity. Sexual violence, as an individual act 
of both these crimes also requires that the prosecution prove that the perpetrator had the 
knowledge and intent to commit either a crime against humanity or genocide. Thus, this 
study, aims to use sexual violence as an example, when analysing the consequences that 
the similarities has on the differences between these crimes.  
 
                                                 
54 See Kelly Dawn Askin ‘Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan 
Tribunals: Current Status’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 97-123. 
55 See Letetia Van der Poll ‘The Emerging Jurisprudence on Sexual Violence Perpetrated against Women 
during Armed Conflict’ (2006) African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law 1-38. 
56 See Gareth Evans ‘Crimes against humanity: overcoming indifference’ (2006) 8 Journal of Genocide 
Research 325-339. 
57 See Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman ‘The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes against 
Humanity’ (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 335-403. 
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Apart from the plethora of research articles available around this topic, there exist 
multiple books written by prominent authors on international criminal law and sexual 
violence in armed conflict and international law. 
 
1.8 Research methodology 
This study will be of an academic nature, investigating the inherent similarities and 
differences of sexual violence as a crime against humanity and genocide. I will make use 
of feminist writings and thoughts, where it serves as a good recommendation for 
conceptualising the extent of the inherent differences. The primary sources will be, 
treaties, case law and legislation, where applicable. The secondary sources will be books, 
academic articles, journals and all related literature. In doing so, I will use both the 
library and the internet.  
 
1.9 Chapter outline 
Chapter 2 of this thesis will discuss how sexual violence can be committed as part of 
genocide, while chapter 3 will discuss how sexual violence has developed as a crime 
against humanity. These chapters are important to understand how sexual violence was 
and can be interpreted as the respective crimes. Chapter 4 will consist of a comparative 
analysis between sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity. In this 
chapter I thoroughly investigate the differences and similarities of sexual violence, as a 
crime against humanity and genocide. Chapter 5 contains the conclusion (which will also 
answer the research question) and recommendations and with that, it also addresses the 
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consequences of the similarities between sexual violence as genocide and crimes against 
humanity. 
 
In the end an argument is made that there indeed exist multiple legal differences between 
genocide and crimes against humanity. However, the factual similarities between sexual 
violence as these two crimes, creates an easier route for the prosecution to indict an 
accused for committing sexual violence, as a crime against humanity, even though, it was 
intended by the perpetrator to be part of a genocide campaign. 
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Chapter 2: 
Sexual Violence as a form of Genocide1 
 
Article II of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as: 
“Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” 
 
When comparing this definition to what Lemkin intended genocide to be,2 one can 
certainly argue that the international community covered most of its bases in fulfilling his 
wishes.3 Lemkin had the following two components of genocide in mind:  
1. The objective component, being the destruction of the essential foundation of the life of 
a group; and 
2. The subjective component, being the intention accompanied by a plan to annihilate a 
group. 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on a previous study by the author: Lorenzo Wakefield ‘Where does Rape find itself 
within the Definition of Genocide?’ (2007) unpublished research paper produced in partial fulfilment of the 
LL.B. Degree and also awarded the Butterworths Lexis-Nexis Prize for best LL.B dissertation written at the 
University of the Western Cape. Paper is on file with the author.  
2 See Raphael Lemkin Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (1944) 79: “[Genocide] is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different 
actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political 
and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of 
national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of 
the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and 
the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the 
national group.”  
3 See William A Schabas Genocide in International Law (2000) 104 – 106 for a summarised version of the 
debates which the international community entered into to establish the groups protected under the 
Genocide Convention.  
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Although the acts mentioned under Article II of the Genocide Convention are more 
specific, it does entail the destruction of the liberty, health, dignity and lives of 
individuals of a group. 
 
The development of genocide as an international crime did not cease with the adoption of 
the Genocide Convention. The ICTY and ICTR statutes also made provision for the 
prosecution of genocide.4 The most modern international statute that creates jurisdiction 
for the prosecution of genocide, is the one creating the ICC.5 The substance of the 
definition of genocide is exactly the same in these statutes as in the Genocide Convention. 
Therefore, the development of genocide was within the territory of the international 
community. More ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the ICC now have the 
jurisdiction to prosecute the crime of genocide.  
 
This chapter will investigate how sexual violence is used as a means and a method to 
commit genocide. Sexual violence is not specifically mentioned under the definition of 
genocide, but the ICTY and the ICTR has interpreted the definition of genocide to include 
sexual violence, under the listed acts. In order for the successful prosecution of sexual 
violence, as genocide, the prosecutor will first have to prove that the accused intended to 
annihilate or destroy a mentioned group.  
 
                                                 
4 See articles 4(2) of the ICTY statute and 2(2) of the ICTR statute, respectively.  
5 See article 6 of the ICC statute.  
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It should be noted that both the ICTY and the ICTR have delivered judgments where it 
convicted accused persons of committing sexual violence, as a form of genocide. The end 
question thus remains: after the judgments delivered by the ICTY and the ICTR 
(convicting accused persons of committing sexual violence, as a form of genocide) has 
the international community taken cognises of the tribunals’ indirect cries to expressly 
have sexual violence included as an act of genocide?  
 
This chapter will cover the different groups protected by the Genocide Convention. It will 
investigate how the international criminal tribunals interpreted sexual violence into the 
actions listed under the definition of genocide. Lastly, this chapter will also evaluate the 
intention that needs to be established in order for an act of sexual violence to constitute 
genocide. 
 
2.1 The listed groups protected by the definition of genocide 
Genocide can only be committed against the following groups of people: national, ethnic, 
racial and/or religious. The definition of genocide does not leave any backdoor open for 
genocide to be committed against more groups mentioned.6 The leading questions which 
this section tries to answer are why these groups were specifically chosen and why a 
group based on sex is also not mentioned as a listed group. In order to answer these 
questions the international criminal tribunals and academics sought to draw a distinction 
between objective and subjective factors which defines a listed group.  
                                                 
6 See article II of the Genocide Convention as mentioned above. 
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Lemkin initially started off his chapter on genocide7 by stating that the crime of genocide 
is intended to destroy the “essential foundations of the life of national groups”.8 In fact 
Lemkin made mention quite often of the destruction of national groups in this work. The 
term ‘national’ is quite broad as it can entail any group of people within a certain country. 
For example, it can include Jewish citizens living in Germany. These Jewish citizens 
might have German nationality, but they were persecuted in Europe by the Nazi 
government of Germany because of practising the Jewish religion. To give answer to such 
a problem, Lemkin stated that attack upon a national group, “must be upon the following 
elements of nationhood: Political, Social, Cultural, Economic, Biological, Physical, 
Religious and Moral”.9 In other words, if a national group is the subject of attack, based 
on the grounds mentioned above, then the perpetration can amount to genocide, provided 
that the other requirements for genocide are met.  
 
Although the listed groups for genocide seems clear, there has been some dispute on what 
exactly constitutes a national, ethnic, racial and/ or religious group. The dispute lies in 
whether to call for an objective10 or a subjective11 interpretation.  
                                                 
7 In his book Axis Occupied Europe. 
8 See R Lemkin op cit note 2 at 79. 
9 See R Lemkin op cit note 2 at 82-90.  
10 See John Quigley The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis (2006) 155. An objective 
interpretation requires that the group need to exist as a fact and the attacker attacked this group, based on 
that fact. An example of this would be people who profess the Jewish religion, who were the subjects of 
attack, because they profess to the Jewish religion.   
11 See also WA Schabas op cit note 3 at 109. A subjective interpretation, on the other hand, requires that the 
attacker defines his or her victim, as a person falling within the definition of one of the groups mentioned in 
the Genocide Convention. A hypothetical example would be if a Tutsi was attacked, because the attacker 
believed that the Tutsi constituted an ethnic group. Whether the Tutsi is an ethnic group is irrelevant. What 
is relevant is the belief of the attacker that the Tutsi constitutes an ethnic group. 
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Quigley argues that prima facie the definition of genocide appears to list the groups with 
an objective interpretation.12 In other words, the four groups listed seem to be interpreted 
as factual groups. This narrow interpretation of the groups thus adds to the high burden of 
proof which the prosecutor must establish from a factual point of view. In the case of The 
Prosecutor v Akayesu,13 the court seemed to take an objective approach in defining what 
an ethnic group constitutes. They stated that: “an ethnic group is generally defined as a 
group whose members share a common language or culture.”14 In other words, if the 
Tutsi population did not share a common language or culture then they would not have 
constituted an ethnic group, objectively. Thus, the perpetrators would have to be charged 
with committing another offence and not genocide. 
  
In the case of The Prosecutor v Kayishema & Ruzindana,15 the court adopted a more 
subjective interpretation in deciding what constituted an ethnic group. The court 
explained that and ethnic group is “one whose members share a common language and 
culture; or, a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self identification); or, a group 
identified as such by others, including perpetrators of crimes (identification of others).”16 
In this interpretation the court thus required that the group must have stable foundations, 
which is not just determined by the group itself, but also by the group’s attackers. The 
                                                 
12 See J Quigley op cit note 10 at 155. 
13 ICTR – 96 – 4 – T, 2 September 1998. (Hereinafter referred to as the Akayesu trial judgment). 
14 Para. 513.  
15 ICTR – 95 – 1 – T, 21 May 1999. (Hereinafter referred to as the Kayishema and Ruzindana judgment). 
16 Para. 98.  
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ICTY also seems to adopt a subjective approach to defining one of the groups. In the case 
of The Prosecutor v Jelisic17 the court stated the following: 
“Although the objective determination of a religious group still remains possible, to 
attempt to define a national, ethnical or racial group today using objective and 
scientifically irreproachable criteria would be a perilous exercise whose result would not 
necessarily correspond to the perception of the persons concerned by such categorisation. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or racial 
group from the point of view of those persons who wish to single that group out from the 
rest of the community. The Trial Chamber consequently elects to evaluate membership in 
a national, ethnical or racial group using a subjective criterion. It is the stigmatisation of a 
group as a distinct national, ethnical or racial unit by the community which allows it to be 
determined whether a targeted population constitutes a national, ethnical or racial group 
in the eyes of the alleged perpetrators.”18 
 
Here too, the court seems to be of the opinion that national, ethnic, racial and religious 
groups should be interpreted as to the perpetrators’ mindset. In other words, if the 
perpetrator genuinely believed that the victim is of a national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group that he or she want to destroy (even though the victim is not objectively), then he or 
she should be found guilty of committing genocide. A subjective interpretation of the 
groups, broadens the already narrowed application of genocide. Verdirame thus rightly 
argues that a subjective interpretation does not reinforce perilous claims to authenticity in 
the field of ethnic and racial identities.19 
 
2.1.1 Additional groups? 
To broaden the scope of genocide and to justify its narrow, objective interpretation of the 
listed groups, the trial chamber in the Akayesu judgment further stated that genocide can 
happen against any other “stable groups”, apart from those mentioned under the 
                                                 
17 IT – 95 – 10 – T, 14 December 1999. (Hereinafter referred to as the Jelisic judgment). 
18 Para. 70. 
19 See Guglielmo Verdirame ‘The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals’ (2000) 
49 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 594. 
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definition.20 The added requirement must be that an individual’s birth must have been 
established by this stable group.21 In other words, the tribunal read words into the 
definition of genocide. Werle argues that this is a violation of the principle of legality, as 
it does not conform to the wording of article 6 of the ICC statute.22 Schabas rightly argues 
that the intent of the drafters was only to allow protection to those four groups. He 
justifies his argument by stating that the drafters would have added ‘and any other stable 
groups’ into the definition if this was their intention.23 By interpreting the groups for 
genocide so vaguely, the ICTR encroached on crimes against humanity, which deals with 
atrocities committed against the civilian population, as a whole. It was not Lemkin’s 
intention for crimes against humanity and genocide to essentially be the same. Evidence 
of this can be found in the fact that he did not even want to include political groups into 
the definition of genocide.24 If the ICTR, in the Akayesu case, used a subjective 
interpretation to establish whether the Tutsi was a protected group, it would not have 
needed to explore the option of adding other ‘stable groups’ to the definition of genocide. 
The subjective interpretation would thus have served as sufficient evidence that the 
perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide attempted to annihilate the Tutsi group.25 
                                                 
20 Para 511: “On reading through the travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention, it appears that the 
crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting only “stable” groups, constituted in a permanent 
fashion and membership of which is determined by birth, with the exclusion of the more “mobile” groups 
which one joins through individual voluntary commitment, such as political and economic groups. 
Therefore, a common criterion in the four types of groups protected by the Genocide Convention is that 
membership in such groups would seem to be normally not challengeable by its members, who belong to it 
automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable manner.” 
21 Ibid. 
22 See Gerhard Werle Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) 198 – 199. 
23 See WA Schabas op cite note 3 at 132.  
24 See WA Schabas op cit note 3 at 134.  
25 See 2.1. above for an explanation of what constitutes a subjective interpretation. 
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2.1.2 A group based on sex 
Sex can be defined as the biological or physiological differences between men and 
women.26  
 
The question which this section tries to answer is whether creating a group based on sex 
in the definition of genocide would do justice to what Lemkin intended genocide to be. 
More importantly, would a group called ‘sex’ do justice to women or men who are 
persecuted in a state of genocide?  
 
It is a known fact that where there is war, mostly women are also raped and sexually 
mutilated at times. Or as MacKinnon puts it: “Every time there is war, there is rape.”27 In 
the same chapter MacKinnon argues that attacks on women cannot define attacks on 
people, because ethnic attacks cannot be gendered and vice versa.28 However, she argues 
further and states that when rape is an act of genocide, then it destroys people.29 
Therefore her concluding question is, “aren’t women people?”30 What MacKinnon is 
asking in conclusion is why there is no group that would give women direct protection 
under the definition of genocide? MacKinnon is thus arguing for a development of the 
definition of genocide to a group based on sex. This is also evident in one of her often 
used quotes:  
                                                 
26 See Cathy Albertyn and Elizabeth Bonthuys Gender, Law & Justice (2007) 21. 
27 See Catharine A MacKinnon in Alexandra Stiglmayer Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (1994) 188. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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“It is rape as an instrument of forced exile, rape to make you leave your home and never 
want to go back. It is rape not to be seen and head and be watched and told to others: rape 
as spectacle. It is rape to drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a society, to 
destroy a people. It is rape as genocide.”31 
 
Many authors and the international criminal tribunals have rightly acknowledged that 
mostly women are being used as a weapon of atrocity. Brownmiller describes this as: 
“Sexual trespass on the enemy’s women is one of the satisfactions of the conquest, like a 
boot in the face; for once he is handed a rifle and told to kill, the soldier becomes an 
adrenaline-rushed young man with permission to kick in the door, to grab, to steal, to 
give vent to his submerged rage against all women who belong to other men.”32 
 
In other words, during an atrocity sexual violence cannot be condoned, or looked upon as 
a ‘by-product’ of the atrocity. However, does the mere fact that mostly women suffer 
from sexual violence during a conflict, give sufficient reason to extend a specific group to 
sex in the definition of genocide?  
 
Van der Poll is of the view that the ICTR could have taken a more flexible and nuanced 
interpretation of the crime of genocide, by elaborating more on the specific instances 
where women were targeted, solely on the basis of their sex.33 She concludes her 
argument for a specific ground based on sex (or possibly gender) by stating that “due 
appreciation of the involuntary and permanent nature of the membership of a particular 
sex (and/or designated gender) as well as a careful assessment of the specific political, 
                                                 
31 See CA MacKinnon in A Stiglmayer op cit note 27 at 190. 
32 See Susan Brownmiller in A Stiglmayer op cit note 27 181. 
33 See Letetia Van der Poll ‘The Emerging Jurisprudence on Sexual Violence Perpetrated against Women 
during Armed Conflict’ (2007) African Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 27. 
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social and cultural context in question may well justify the inclusion of this particular 
category within the definition of the crime of genocide.”34 
 
It should thus be noted that mostly women are the primary targets of sexual attacks during 
genocide. In other words, because of their sex, mostly women are essentially targeted for 
crimes of a sexual nature. Evidence of this fact came to light in the Akayesu judgment 
when a witness testified that the accused encouraged the rape of Tutsi women by telling 
his subordinates they “no longer needed to ask what a Tutsi woman tastes like.”35 
 
Although women are the easiest target to overcome during a situation of genocide, it still 
does not give us sufficient recognition to create a stable group for sex in the definition. 
Women are mostly targeted because they belong to a certain national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group. The fact that they are women is an important reason why they are 
targeted, but not the direct, primary and ultimate reason for them being targeted. The 
direct and ultimate reason for the attack on women, are because they fall into either one 
of the groups mentioned in the definition of genocide. Their status as women serves as an 
indirect and secondary classification to a direct and primary goal of annihilating a listed 
group under the definition of genocide. In the case of The Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi36 the 
trial chamber of the ICTR shed light to this reality by stating that the accused instigated 
attacks on several women because of either their Tutsi ethnicity or their relationship with 
                                                 
34 See L Van der Poll op cit note 33 at 28. 
35 Para 422. 
36 ICTR-2001-64, 3 April 2002. (Hereinafter referred to as the Gacumbitsi judgment). 
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a person of Tutsi ethnicity, and that the order to rape Tutsi women was discriminatory in 
character.37 
 
2.2 The listed crimes mentioned under the definition of genocide 
The listed crimes under the definition of genocide are also known as the material 
elements, or the actus reus, of the crime. Under this section of the chapter, I will 
investigate how the international criminal tribunals went about to develop genocide by 
committing an act of sexual violence or rape. I will also be studying the response of the 
academia in this field.  
 
The definition of genocide allows only for the following five acts to be committed for 
genocide to take place: 
a) “Killing members of the group; 
b) Causing serious bodily harm to members of the group; 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”38 
                                                 
37 Para 325. 
38 See article II of the Genocide Convention. 
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It should be remembered that all the actus reus of the crime of genocide must be 
accompanied with the necessary intention that is needed to commit genocide. The 
necessary intention will be explained later in this chapter. 
  
2.2.1 Killing members of the group 
This is the first act that is mentioned within the definition of genocide.39 It should be 
noted that not the killing of the whole group is required for this section to find 
application. Werle states that article 6(a) of the ICC statute requires that the accused 
“must have caused the death of at least one member of the group”.40  
 
In the Akayesu judgment, the trial chamber found that many women who were subjected 
to sexual violence were murdered after such violence took place.41 In addition to this, the 
trial chamber also stated that there must be an intention to cause the death of the victim.42 
In these same paragraphs the trial chamber stated that the death of the victim must be 
accompanied by the ‘intent to destroy a group in whole or in part’. De Brouwer argues 
that this seems to imply that if there is no intention to destroy the group, then the 
subsequent death of the victim will be insignificant.43 De Brouwer basis her argument on 
the viewpoint of the subsequent death of the victim. In other words, if it was not the 
                                                 
39 See article 4(2)(a) of the ICTY statute; article 2(2)(a) of the ICTR statute; article 6(a) of the ICC statute 
and article II of the Genocide Convention. 
40 See G Werle op cit note 22 at 200. 
41 Para. 733. “… the rapes of Tutsi women in Taba were accompanied with the intent to kill those women. 
Many rapes were perpetrated near mass graves where the women were taken to be killed.”  
42 Paras. 500 – 501. 
43 See Anne-Marie LM De Brouwer Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and 
the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR (2005) 50.  
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accused’s intention to kill the victim, but she died nonetheless, should the accused be 
charged and prosecuted as (a) killing members of the group; or (b) causing serious bodily 
or mental harm to members of a group?44  
 
In the Gacumbitsi judgment, the ICTR found that where an act of rape was committed by 
the insertion of a foreign object into the genital organs of a woman, such an act can be 
punishable as genocide, under this heading. However, the woman has to die as a result of 
this insertion.45 
 
The Kayishema and Ruzindana judgment sparked an academic debate regarding the 
intention to kill a victim after raping her. The prosecutor argued that an accused should 
still be prosecuted under this paragraph, even if there was no intention to kill the victim, 
but the victim nonetheless died.46 The trial chamber held that ‘killing’ should be 
interpreted in favour of the accused and therefore the accused will not be liable under this 
heading, but merely under the actus reus causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group.47 De Brouwer argues that “article 6(a)-1 of the ICC’s elements of 
a crime requires that the perpetrator kills one or more persons” and “the footnote to this 
article states that the term ‘killed’ is interchangeable with the term caused death”.48 She 
argues that “the term ‘killing’ is thus synonymous with causing the death and the victim 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Paras. 200 – 204, 215 and 261.  
46 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 50. 
47 Paras. 102 – 103. 
48 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 50. 
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is in fact dead”.49 I agree with De Brouwer that a perpetrator should be prosecuted under 
the actus reus of ‘killing members of the group’, even if it was not his intention to kill the 
victim. Sexual violence, especially rape leads to the indirect killing of a victim, especially 
when it is committed during genocide or an armed conflict, because the ultimate intention 
of the perpetrator in this situation would be to destroy in whole or in part a group. Crimes 
of a sexual nature are in most instances also quite violent and even though the victim 
never dies, there is a great likelihood that she might. The perpetrator is normally aware of 
this possibility. I also seem to disagree with the trial chamber (in the Kayishema and 
Ruzindana judgment), as it seems like it is placing different grave substances on (a) 
killing members of the group and (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm. The end 
result is still that the accused should be found guilty of committing genocide. The actus 
reus of the crime should be interpreted to see whether the accused used any of these 
methods in committing genocide. The trial chamber’s interpretation of these two sections 
seems to suggest that causing serious bodily or mental harm is less grave than killing 
members of the group. This should not be the situation, as establishing whether the 
accused actually committed genocide is of more importance.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
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2.2.2 Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group 
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group is the second actus reus 
mentioned under the definition of genocide.50 Werle states that causing serious mental 
harm does not require a physical attack or any physical effects of mental harm.51 He 
argues further that “serious” harm does not require that the harm be permanent or 
irreversible.52 He explains that the damage must “result in a grave and long term 
disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life”.53 
 
Quenivet argues that “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group is 
the most relevant provision to encompass sexual offences”.54 She states that the reason for 
this can be attributed to the fact that sexual offences are considered as causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to the victim.55 
 
In the Akayesu judgment, the ICTR interpreted causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
mean torture.56 In the Kayishema and Ruzindana judgment, the ICTR interpreted this act 
as “harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any injury to the 
external organs and senses”.57 In the ICTY judgment of The Prosecutor v Radislav 
                                                 
50 See article 4(2)(b) of the ICTY statute; article 2(2)(b) of the ICTR statute; article 6(b) of the ICC statute 
and article II of the Genocide Convention.  
51 See G Werle op cit note 22 at 200. 
52 See G Werle op cit note 22 at 201. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See Noelle NR Quenivet Sexual Offenses in Armed Conflict & International Law (2005) 160.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Para. 504. 
57 Para. 109. 
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Krstic,58 the court held that the term ‘serious’ must be harm “that goes beyond temporary 
unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation”.59 Based on these interpretations of causing 
serious bodily harm, De Brouwer rightly argues that “the harm suffered may be physical, 
mental or both”.60 
 
In the Akayesu judgment, it was acknowledged that rape and sexual violence were 
committed against Tutsi women. Of these women were raped in public places, while 
some of them were raped several times. The ICTR held that these rapes resulted in 
“physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their 
communities”.61 In the case of The Prosecutor v Maki Muhimana,62 the accused was also 
convicted of committing rape as genocide, by causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of a group.63  
 
The case law above portrays the fact that sexual violence committed against women 
during genocide is normally preferred to be prosecuted as causing serious bodily or 
mental harm. This does not necessarily mean that it is less grave than killing members of 
a group. It only means that the accused did commit a listed act of genocide. That still 
remains the ultimate question for which the prosecution should bear the onus. However, 
                                                 
58 IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001. (Hereinafter referred to as the Krstic judgment). 
59 Para. 513. 
60 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 51. 
61 Para 731. 
62 ICTR-95-1B-T, 28 April 2005. (Hereinafter referred to as the Muhimana judgment). 
63 Para. 302. The accused attacked and raped Tutsi women at a refugee camp. He was found guilty of this 
based on the testimony of one woman whom he raped. 
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this actus reus does not require the death of the victim, like with killing members of the 
group. This essentially makes it easier for the prosecution to prove that genocide took 
place, as they can call the victims of the crime as witnesses.  
 
Sexually violent offences falling within the ambit of causing serious bodily or mental 
harm is currently entrenched within customary international law.64 A reason for this could 
be attributed to the amount of jurisprudence that exists for sexual violence as causing 
serious bodily or mental harm.65 The Elements of Crimes, annexed to the ICC statute also 
connects sexual violence to this actus reus.66 
 
 2.2.3 Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction, in whole or in part 
This provision prohibits so called slow death measures.67 In the Akayesu judgment, the 
trial chamber stated that the following examples can constitute conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction: “subsistence diets, reduction of essential 
medical services below minimum standards and systematic expulsion from their 
homes.”68 
 
                                                 
64 See NNR Quenivet op cit note 54 at 161. 
65 As examples one can read the following cases: Akayesu, Kayishema and Ruzindana as well as Jelisic, 
amongst other.  
66 I.e. causing serious bodily or mental harm.  
67 See G Werle op cit note 22 at 201. “Conduct that does not immediately kill, but that can bring about the 
death of a group of members over a long period.”  
68 Para. 506. 
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Many authors have found it difficult to interpret sexual violence as a condition of life 
calculated to bring about its (a group’s) physical destruction, when taking the above 
examples into account.69 I respectfully disagree with these authors as the ICTR in the 
Akayesu judgment merely gave examples of conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction. The trial chamber did not limit this clause to these examples and 
therefore adding more examples to this list is not impossible. An example of where sexual 
violence can amount to conditions that are calculated to bring about a groups physical 
destruction would be where victims are held captive while being threatened and promised 
that she would be raped or sexual violated. Women are the foundation of a group and in 
many cultures women are seen upon as less worthy of procreating if they were raped 
before. This could constitute a calculated condition to bring about a group’s physical 
destruction, as no more women would procreate after being raped. Surprisingly enough, 
Quenivet gives another example of where sexual violence can constitute a calculated 
condition to bring about a group’s destruction, after she found it difficult to interpret 
sexual violence into this category after the examples given in the Akayesu judgment. She 
argues that “rape can be a measure intended to prevent births when the person raped 
refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be led, 
through threats or trauma, not to procreate”.70 In other words, after being raped or 
                                                 
69 See G Werle op cit note 22 at 202. He argues that mass rapes can amount to inflicting destructive 
conditions of life, only if it is done systematically and repeatedly, in conjunction with any of the examples 
listed in paragraph 506 of the Akayesu judgment. Quenivet, on the other hand, outright argues that she does 
not see it possible how sexual offences could fit into this category, when looking at the examples given in 
the Akayesu judgment. See NNR Quenivet op cit note 54 at 163. 
70 See NNR Quenivet op cit note 54 at 164. 
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sexually violated, women who belong to one of the groups mentioned refuse to procreate 
and therefore the group will eradicate ultimately.  
 
In the Akayesu judgment, the ICTR stated that this ground requires that the perpetrator 
does not inflict measures to bring the life of members of a group immediately to an end. 
However, it must ultimately seek their physical destruction.71 In the Kayishema and 
Ruzindana judgment, the ICTR stated that “rape… and reducing required medical service 
below a minimum… constitutes conditions of life”.72 According to the ICC statute, 
“conditions of life” may include, deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for 
survival, such as food or medical services, or systematic expulsion from homes.73  
 
Another example of a possible condition of life to bring about a group’s destruction 
would be the intentional infliction of HIV, by means of rape.74 In other words, where the 
perpetrator, knowing that he is HIV positive, countless times rapes the victim, knowing 
that he will transfer this deadly disease, which will subsequently be transferred to other 
men of the group.  
 
I once again agree with De Brouwer when she argues that no actual destruction is needed, 
because the intentional infliction of the conditions is sufficient.75 The destruction should 
                                                 
71 Para. 505. 
72 Para. 116.  
73 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 56. 
74 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 57. 
75 Ibid. 
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only take place at a later stage. Therefore, if it takes place the ultimate goal of the 
perpetrator would have been reached. If it did not take place, then the perpetrator failed to 
reach his goal to annihilate the group.  
 
Thus far, no charge for sexual violence has been laid under this actus reus.  
 
2.2.4 Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group 
Preventing births within a group threatens the group’s biological existence.76 In the 
Akayesu judgment, the ICTR gave the following examples of measures intended to 
prevent births within a group: “sterilization, forced birth control, prohibition on marriages 
and segregation of the sexes”.77 In this same judgment the ICTR also stated that where 
woman are raped, with the intention that she becomes pregnant, so that the child can take 
on the identity of the father’s group, within patrilineal societies can also amount to 
measures intended to prevent births within the group.78 In other words, the ICTR was 
very progressive and liberal when interpreting this actus reus. They did just not limit it to 
measures that would not make women pregnant, but also measures that would make 
women pregnant and ensure that the offspring belong to the father’s group.  
 
The ICTR did not stop with those two examples of measures intended to prevent births 
within a group. The tribunal also went further and stated that these measures can be both 
                                                 
76 See G Werle op cit note 22 at 202. 
77 Para. 507. 
78 Ibid. 
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physical and/ or mental.79 They gave an example of where a woman who was sexually 
violated refuses to procreate in the future, because of the physical and mental trauma.80 
Quenivet adds to this by giving the following examples when sexual violence and rape, 
more specifically, can constitute measures intended to prevent births: (1) Mass rapes, 
where culturally women are abandoned because they were raped. This will lead to women 
not procreating and (2) women who are rejected by their husbands or partners, after being 
sexual violated will also not procreate.81 In Rwanda, Tutsi women were culturally 
rejected after being raped or sexually violated. They were rejected not just by their 
husbands or partners, but also by the community, as a whole. Muslim women who 
suffered from sexual violence by the Serbs, in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, were met 
with the same fate. 
 
In The Prosecutor v Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic rule 61,82 the ICTY stated that 
“some camps were especially devoted to the raping of women, with the aim of forcing 
then birth of Serbian offspring. The women were held in captivity until it was too late for 
them to undergo an abortion”.83  
 
Thus far, no charge for rape has been laid under this actus reus. Just like as in the case of 
‘inflicting destructive conditions of life’, so the result of ‘imposing measures of birth is 
                                                 
79 Para. 508. 
80 Ibid. See also NNR Quenivet op cit note 54 at 164. 
81 Ibid. 
82 IT-95-5-R61, 2 July 1996. (Hereinafter referred to as the Karadzic and Mladic rule 61 judgment). 
83 Para. 64. 
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not imperative. On the other hand, the intention that the perpetrator wanted to prevent 
births within a group is of paramount importance.84 
 
2.2.5 Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group 
Forcibly transferring children [just like all the other actus reus of genocide] should be 
done with the intention of destroying a group’s existence.85 Transferring children thus 
should be done with intending that the children adopt the identity of the group to whom 
they are being transferred.86 Werle goes further and states that the transfer of the children 
must be forcible, which can be either psychological or physical, because this ground 
requires it.87 The core intention behind this actus reus is to prevent the group’s children 
from adopting the opposing group’s identity and practices, at the cost of their original 
group being destroyed. Therefore, forcibly transferring children or just peacefully 
transferring children does not strike the core intention behind this actus reus. The fact that 
the accused did not forcibly transfer children should not thus serve as a defence against 
this actus reus. 
  
In the Akayesu judgment, the ICTR held that “the objective is not only to sanction a direct 
act of forcible transfer, but also to sanction acts of threats or trauma which would lead to 
the forcible transfer of children from one group to another”.88 The ICTR also adopted a 
                                                 
84 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 59. 
85 See G Werle op cit note 22 at 203. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Para. 509. 
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purposive interpretation to this actus reus by stating that the term ‘forcible’ is not 
restricted to physical force, but can include threat or coercion.89 Therefore apart from 
non-forcible measures being used to transfer children, the ICTR also progressively stated 
that a threatened or a coerced transfer would give purpose to this actus reus. 
 
De Brouwer argues that an example of rape or sexual violence under this ground would 
be, where a girl is abducted to serve as a sex slave or ‘wife’ for the soldiers, with the 
intention that the offspring of this ‘relationship’ belongs to the man’s group.90 Based on 
such an example, the prosecution would not only be limited to bringing such a case under 
this actus reus, but also the actus reus of causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of another group.  
 
Thus far no charge for sexual violence has been laid under this actus reus. 
 
 2.3 The mental element of the crime of genocide 
The mental element for the crime of genocide is essentially what causes this crime to be 
known as the ‘crime of all crimes’. The definition of genocide states “… intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part…”91 therefore, the mental element requires that the accused must have 
acted with intention. The mental element of genocide requires that the accused posses 
                                                 
89 Ibid.  
90 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 60. 
91 See article 2 of the Genocide Convention. 
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‘intent and knowledge’92 and the intention must be in the form of dolus specialis.93 The 
intention for genocide differs from other crimes, as for other crimes intention in the forms 
of dolus directus94 or dolus indirectus95 or dolus eventualis96 or dolus indeterminatus97 is 
required. The reason for a standard of dolus specialis for genocide can be attributed to the 
fact that genocide constitutes the crime of all crimes. The perpetrator must have special 
intention to annihilate a group mentioned under the definition of genocide.  
 
This part of the chapter will examine the intention required to commit genocide and how 
this will have an influence on sexual violence committed as a form of genocide. It should 
be noted that a distinction has to be drawn between the intention needed to destroy a 
protected group and the mens rea needed to commit one of the five physical acts under 
the genocide definition.  
                                                 
92 Intent and knowledge is only required in terms of article 30 of the ICC statute.  
93 See G Werle op cit note 22 at 207. The following terms are synonymous for dolus specialis and I intend 
to use them interchangeably: ‘special intention’, ‘specific intention’ and ‘genocidal intention’. See Bettina 
Ulrike Schaefer Genocidal Intent at the ICTR and ICTY – Problems to Indict for Genocide at the two ad 
hoc Tribunals (2006) 13: “Dolus specialis requires that the accused clearly intends that the result happens, 
implying that there is a psychological link between the physical result and the mental state of the accused”.  
94 See Jonathan Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2005) 461: “This type of intention will be present 
where the accused’s aim and object was to perpetrate the unlawful conduct or to cause the consequence 
even though the chance of it resulting was small”.  
95 Ibid: “This form of intention exists where, although the unlawful conduct or consequence was not the 
accused’s aim and object he or she foresaw the unlawful conduct or consequence as certain, or as 
substantially certain, or virtually certain”. 
96 See J Burchell op cit note 94 at 462: “This form of intention exists where the accused does not ‘mean’ to 
bring about the unlawful circumstance or to cause the unlawful consequence which follows from his or her 
conduct, bur foresees the possibility of the circumstance existing or the consequence ensuing and proceeds 
with his or her conduct”.  
97See J Burchell op cit note 94 at 463: “Where a person throws a bomb into a crowd or derails a train, the 
fact that he has no particular intention to kill a particular individual in the crowd or upon the train does not 
mean that he lacks intention. Since he knows or foresees that someone will die he has what is called 
‘general’ intention or dolus indeterminatus. Dolus directus, indirectus or eventualis may be general or 
indeterminate intention”.  
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2.3.1 Article 30 of the ICC statute and the elements of a crime 
Article 30 of the ICC statute stipulates the mens rea required for any of the crimes, 
covered by the statute. This article reads as follows: 
“1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for the 
punishment of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material 
elements are committed with intent and knowledge.  
2. For the purposes of this article, a person shall have intent where: 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; 
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence 
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.  
3. For the purposes of this article, “knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance 
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. “Know” and 
‘knowingly” shall be construed accordingly.” 
 
  In other words, article 30 stipulates that when a crime is committed under the ICC 
statute, the accused person must have possessed ‘knowledge’ and ‘intention’ to commit 
the crime. It should also be noted that article 30 applies generally to all crimes committed 
under the ICC statute. Von Hebel and Kelt thus rightly argue that the provisions on intent, 
relating to genocide, are quite different from the intent standard that flows from article 
30.98 In other words, the specific intent standard to commit genocide is not deviated from 
in the ICC statute. 
  
For an accused to posses knowledge, he or she must be aware of the fact that genocide is 
taking place and he or she must also be aware of the plan formulated to destroy a group. 
Schabas rightly argues that knowledge under article 30 is indirectly requiring that there be 
a plan to commit genocide, even though the Genocide Convention [and the ICC statute] is 
                                                 
98 See Herman Von Hebel and Maria Kelt ‘Some Comments on the Elements of Crimes for the Crimes of 
the ICC Statute’ (2000) 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 281.  
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silent on this.99 In the Kayishema and Ruzindana judgment, the trial chamber stated the 
following: 
“…although a specific plan to destroy does not constitute an element of genocide, it 
would appear that it is not easy to carry out a genocide without a plan or organization… 
the existence of such a plan would be strong evidence of the specific intent requirement 
for the crime of genocide.”100 
 
The trial chamber thus highlighted the point that a plan to commit genocide would serve 
only as evidence that the perpetrators intended to commit genocide. This plan however 
does become problematic in the context of sexual offences committed during genocide on 
a group which the perpetrators intend to annihilate. The problem lies in the fact that at 
times sexual violence is committed against members of the group to be annihilated, but it 
is not part of the overall plan to commit genocide. Schabas is of the opinion that in such a 
case, the circumstance of the genocide must be known to the accused.101 In other words, 
the accused must have committed the sexual violence as part of his duty to implement the 
plan to commit genocide. Therefore, the accused must have possibly had mere knowledge 
of the plan. One can thus safely argue that the substance of the plan is irrelevant when 
considering that the accused only had to know that there was a plan to annihilate a 
protected group.  
 
Apart from just knowledge, article 30 more specifically requires that the perpetrator act 
with intent. Schabas seems to be of the view that intent under article 30 should be read 
with article II of the Genocide Convention which requires that there be a special intention 
                                                 
99 See WA Schabas op cit note 3 at 207. 
100 Paras. 94 and 276. 
101 See WA Schabas op cit note 3 at 209. 
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to commit genocide.102 Werle argues that the prosecution would have to prove that the 
special intention above just by proving intent and knowledge.103 I am of the opinion that 
article 30 is just a general section which applies to all crimes committed under the ICC 
statute. When assessing the elements of crimes (especially relating to subsections (a)-(e) 
of article 6) it is evident that the drafters ‘wished-for’ that the specific intention to destroy 
the group should be the standard of proving intention. Under each act listed to commit 
genocide, the elements of crimes state that the perpetrator must have acted with the 
intention to destroy one of the protected groups, which should be interpreted as the 
specific intention to destroy one of the protected groups.  
 
2.3.2 Analysing intent 
According to Schabas three components should be analysed when establishing the 
intention required to commit genocide.104 They are the following: the offender must 
intend to destroy the group; the offender must intend that the group be destroyed in whole 
or in part; and the offender must intend to destroy a protected group under the definition 
of genocide.105 De Brouwer states that the following requirements are needed to establish 
the intention on the part of the perpetrator: The degree of intent; the destruction of the 
group; and in whole or in part.106 There are various similarities contained within these 
requirements of the different authors. I therefore come to the conclusion that the 
                                                 
102 See WA Schabas op cit note 3 at 214. 
103 See G Werle op cit note 22 at 207. 
104 See WA Schabas op cit note 3 at 228. 
105 Ibid. 
106 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 60. 
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requirements needed to establish the intent are: (1) measure of intent; (2) the destruction 
of a group; and (3) the extent [in whole or in part] of the destruction of the group.  
 
2.3.2.1 The measure of intent 
The measure of the intention lies within the dolus specialis required to destroy one of the 
protected groups.107 Schaefer rightly argues that problems arise when the mental state of 
the perpetrator is not directly focused on the destruction of a protected group.108 If the 
specific intent to destroy a protected group is not present, then genocide could not have 
been committed. In other words, the degree of intent requires that the accused clearly 
projected that his or her actions would lead to annihilating one of the groups mentioned 
within the definition of genocide. I will continue this discussion in relation to where 
multiple perpetrators committed an act of genocide.  
 
• The liability of superiors for the actions of subordinates 
In terms of article 6(1) of the ICTR statute and article 7(1) of the ICTY statute, “a person, 
who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime… shall be individually responsible for the 
crime”. In other words, these articles create criminal responsibility and liability upon 
individuals who did not physically take part in the implementation of a genocide policy or 
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
108 See BU Schaefer op cit note 93 at 14. 
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plan. The prosecution would thus have to prove that each individual possessed the dolus 
specialis to commit genocide.  
 
In terms of article 6(3) of the ICTR statute and article 7(3) of the ICTY statute, a “person 
who is in a superior position to a perpetrator will also be liable, if she or he failed to act if 
he knew that the perpetrator was committing a crime”. De Brouwer rightly argues that no 
dolus specialis is needed to prove a superior liable.109 I agree with De Brouwer, as the 
article states that the superior will not be relieved from prosecution if he or she knew or 
had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so 
and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts 
or to punish the perpetrators thereof. This article thus allows that the court may find a 
superior guilty, based on some form of intentional negligence similar to that of luxuria.110 
In terms of luxuria an accused will be found guilty of an offence if “he knew or have 
foreseen that a crime was being committed and he failed to take the reasonable steps to 
prevent the crime from happening”.111 This does not mean that the prosecution will find it 
easier to prove that a superior committed genocide when he knew that his subordinates 
were raping women. The fact that there is only one successful prosecution based on 
luxuria in South Africa gives testimony to this fact.112 In this case the accused was 
charged with culpable homicide for shooting and killing a person. The accused intended 
                                                 
109 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 61. 
110 ‘Luxuria’ is also known as conscious negligence.  
111 See CR Snyman Criminal Law 4ed (2002) 219. 
112 See R v Hedley 1958 (1) SA 362 (N). This case is the only of its kind in South Africa where the accused 
was found to have negligence in the form of luxuria.  
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to shoot a duck on a lake, but instead missed and shot a person. In finding the accused 
guilty of culpable homicide (in the form of luxuria) the court found that he foresaw the 
possibility of shooting someone on the other side of the lake, but dismissed this 
possibility in his mind from happening. Burchell is of the opinion that these cases are rare 
because the accused either has to admit that he or she foresaw a remote possibility of a 
consequence occurring or the prosecution manages to prove that he or she did foresee 
such a possibility, which in itself is fairly difficult to prove.113 It should be remembered 
that the prosecution still has to prove that the subordinates possessed intention in the form 
of dolus specialis.  
 
In the case of The Prosecutor v Kamuhanda,114 the ICTR laid down the following three 
conditions which must be met, when a superior may be held liable: 
“(i) There existed a superior-subordinate relationship between the person against 
whom the charge is directed and the perpetrators of the offence; 
(ii) The superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be 
or had been committed; and 
(iii) The superior failed to exercise effective control to prevent the criminal act or to 
punish the perpetrators thereof.”115 
 
Apart from the above theory of negligence in the form of luxuria, the ICTR only added 
the requirement that a superior-subordinate relationship must have existed. The other two 
requirements both relate to my argument, mentioned above, to establish negligence in the 
form of luxuria. In the case of The Prosecutor v Stakic,116 the ICTY stated that dolus 
                                                 
113 See J Burchell op cit note 94 at 488. 
114 ICTR-95-54A-T, 22 January 2004. (Hereinafter referred to as the Kamuhanda judgment).  
115 Para. 603. 
116 Decision on Rule 98bis Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, IT-97-24-T, 31 October 2002. (Hereinafter 
referred to as the Prijedor judgment). 
 
 
 
 
 51
specialis is required when analysing the criminal prosecution of a superior. I respectfully 
disagree with the ICTY, as dolus specialis requires that the accused posses a special 
intention to annihilate a protected group. Article 7(3) of the ICTY statute clearly states 
that the superior must know or has reason to know that the subordinate is or will commit 
a crime and he fails to act, in stopping the subordinate. Failing to act cannot be a standard 
of intentionally wanting to destroy a protected group.  
 
• The intent of the accomplice 
In terms of the ICTY and ICTR statutes, complicity to commit genocide also constitutes a 
crime which is punishable under the jurisdiction of these institutions.117 In the Akayesu 
judgment, the ICTR stated that complicity to commit genocide can only take place, when 
genocide has taken place.118 The ICTR thus states that complicity to commit genocide is 
not an independent crime. This crime is dependent on the main crime being committed, 
which is genocide.  
 
In the Akayesu judgment, the ICTR also analysed the position of an accomplice. They 
stated that: 
“… the Chamber is of the opinion that an accomplice to genocide need not necessarily 
possess the dolus specialis of genocide, namely the specific intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such. Thus, if for example, an 
accused knowingly aided or abetted another in the commission of a murder, while being 
unaware that the principal was committing such a murder, with the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, the group to which the murdered victim belonged, the accused could be 
prosecuted for complicity in murder, and certainly not for complicity in genocide. 
                                                 
117 See article 2(3) of the ICTR statute and article 4(3)(e) of the ICTY statute, respectively. 
118 Para. 529. 
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However, if the accused knowingly aided and abetted in the commission of such a 
murder while he knew or had reason to know that the principal was acting with genocidal 
intent, the accused would be an accomplice to genocide, even though he did not share the 
murderer’s intent to destroy the group.”119  
 
The ICTR thus made it easier for the prosecution to prove that an accomplice took part in 
the genocide. An accomplice in a rape charge, as a form of genocide, thus need not 
possess intention in the form of dolus specialis, if the main perpetrator acted with dolus 
specialis. An accomplice to a main perpetrator, during rape, is someone who assists the 
perpetrator in committing the crime. Examples of this include: where he holds the victim 
down, while the perpetrator commits the rape; and where he hands the perpetrator the 
weapon to commit the rape.120 Currently no accomplices have been convicted of 
complicity to genocide for rape. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and her son Shalom Ntahobali 
are facing charges of complicity to commit genocide, according to their indictment.121 
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko is also the first woman facing charges of rape as a crime against 
humanity.  
 
• Joint criminal enterprise 
Joint criminal enterprise is where multiple perpetrators committed genocide. In the appeal 
case of The Prosecutor v Tadic,122 the ICTY stated the following three situations in which 
joint criminal capacity can take place: 
 “[1]… co defendants, acting to a common design, posses the same criminal intention.123 
[2] The notion of common purpose was applied to instances where the offences charged 
                                                 
119 Paras 540 and 541. 
120 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 67. 
121 Indictment, ICTR-97-21-I, 10 August 1999 (Hereinafter referred to as the Nyiramasuhuko indictment). 
122 IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999 (Hereinafter referred to as the Tadic appeals judgment) 
123 Para. 196. 
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were alleged to have been committed by members of military of administrative units such 
as those running concentration camps.124 [3] The third category concerns cases involving 
a common design to pursue one course of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits 
an act which, while outside the common design, was nevertheless the natural and 
foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that common purpose.”125 
 
With the first situation all the perpetrators act with a common purpose and the same 
degree of intention. In other words, should sexual violence have taken place during 
genocide, then all the perpetrators that took part in that violence must have possessed 
intention in the form of dolus specialis to commit genocide. The second situation relates 
to where the multiple perpetrators committed rape, as a form of genocide in a camp.126 
This can also amount to a war crime.127 However, if the necessary dolus specialis can be 
proved, then the perpetrators can be prosecuted for committing sexual violence as 
genocide, as joint criminal perpetrators. The third situation is different in the sense that 
the perpetrators acted outside the common design. De Brouwer stated that this ground can 
be seen as an extended form of joint criminal enterprise.128 This ground relates to where 
the perpetrators, although not acting within the common design, could have foreseen that 
their actions would fulfil the necessary elements of a common purpose.  
 
In further analysing these different situations of joint criminal enterprise, the appeals 
chamber in the Tadic appeals judgment stated the following: 
 “With regard to the first category, what is required is the intent to perpetrate a certain 
crime (this being the shared intent on the part of all co-perpetrators). With regards to the 
                                                 
124 Para. 202. 
125 Para. 204. 
126 It should be noted that during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina many camps were set up as part of the 
strategy of ‘ethnic cleansing’. 
127 It can amount to a war crime because it was committed by a militia group. 
128 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 68. 
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second category personal knowledge of the system of ill treatment is required as well as 
the intent to further this common concerted system of ill-treatment. With regard to the 
third category, what is required is the intention to participate in and further the criminal 
activity or the criminal purpose of a group and to contribute to the joint criminal 
enterprise or in any event to the commission of a crime by the group. In addition, 
responsibility for a crime other than the one agreed upon in the common place arises only 
if, under the circumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be 
perpetrated by one or other members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that 
risk.”129  
 
When examining this explanation of the ICTY, it is apparent that the first situation is the 
easiest to prove. This ground requires thus only intent to be proved by all the co-
perpetrators. In other words, when the co-perpetrators committed sexual violence as 
genocide, they must all have had the necessary intention to annihilate a protected group 
under the genocide definition. The second variant is only a little abstract from the first 
situation in that personal knowledge of a system of ill treatment is required, with the 
common purpose. The third category requires an intention to participate and an agreed 
upon common purpose takes on characteristics of dolus eventualis and not of dolus 
specialis, in that it required that the common purpose was foreseeable and the accused 
reconciled himself to this foreseen possibility. In a situation of sexual violence it can thus 
be argued that although the perpetrator did not act with a common purpose, but he 
foresaw that his actions could lead to the same actions perpetrated by the other 
perpetrators, he can be prosecuted as being a joint criminal perpetrator for committing 
sexual violence. It should be remembered that the perpetrator must have foreseen the 
possibility and he should have reconciled himself to this possibility.  
 
                                                 
129 Para. 228. 
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Thus far no cases of sexual violence have been prosecuted as joint criminal enterprise.130 
However, in the indictment in the case of The Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic,131 it is 
stated that certain counts of the charges laid against him “were natural and foreseeable 
consequences of the execution of the object of the joint criminal enterprise and the 
accused was aware that such crimes were the possible outcome of the execution of the 
joint criminal enterprise”.132 In other words, the sexual violence charges laid against him 
can be prosecuted as genocide, but only if he acted with other perpetrators, where he 
could foresee that the crimes would amount to genocide and he reconciled himself to this 
possibility. It is worth noting that the international community will never see the 
finalisation of this case, as the accused has passed away while the trial was still in 
progress.  
 
Once the degree of intention has been proved, the prosecution can go on to establish the 
next requirement needed to successfully prosecute sexual violence as rape. This 
requirement is the destruction of a group.  
 
2.3.2.2 The destruction of a group133 
De Brouwer argues that the definition of genocide is aimed primarily at protecting the 
listed groups mentioned under it.134 She also argues that the victim of the crime of 
                                                 
130 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 70. 
131IT-01-50-I, 8 October 2001(Indictment). (Hereinafter referred to as the Milosevic indictment). 
132 Para. 8. 
133 See also 2.1 above where I specifically analyse the protected groups covered by the definition of 
genocide. 
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genocide is the group and not just the individual who belongs to the protected group.135 
To truly understand the nature of the crime of genocide, a slightly different structure of 
words needs to be used, than this of De Brouwer. Genocide is aimed at protecting 
members of the groups mentioned in the definition and therefore the victim of a genocide 
must be a member of one the groups mentioned. It should be understood from the 
premises that the group’s existence is solely dependent on its members and not vice versa.  
 
As far as sexual violence is concerned, the ICTR in the Akayesu judgment stated that 
these acts were done with the intent to destroy the Tutsi group. 
 “These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their 
families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of 
destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their 
destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.”136 
 
In other words, by committing rape against one person, the perpetrator had the intention 
to destroy the whole group. Quigley thus rightly argues that: 
 “In the context of rape as committed in Rwanda, it has been suggested that those who 
promoted the widespread rape of Tutsi women did so with the understanding that it 
would tear Tutsi society apart. As known to the Hutus, Tutsi men were likely to reject 
Tutsi women who had been raped. Tutsi girls would be ineligible for marriage. Tutsi 
married women might be divorced. Many of the rape victims would contract [HIV] 
AIDS. Raping Tutsi women in large numbers would make it difficult for Tutsis to 
continue their social existence.”137 
 
Therefore a mere understanding that the group would be destroyed constituted an 
intention on the part of the perpetrator. The crimes thus committed must be done by 
                                                                                                                                                 
134 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 72. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Para. 731. 
137 See J Quigley op cit note 10 at 107. 
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keeping the destruction of the group in the back of the mind by the perpetrator. In the case 
of The Prosecutor v Rutaganda,138 the court stated that: 
“The victims were systematically selected because they belonged to the Tutsi group and 
for the very fact that they belonged to the said group. As a result, the Chamber is satisfied 
beyond any reasonable doubt that, at the time of commission of all the above-mentioned 
acts which in its opinion are proved, the Accused had indeed the intent to destroy the 
Tutsi group as such.”139 
 
A way to establish whether the accused had the intention to destroy a listed group is by 
assessing his or her victims. If the victims of the accused all belonged to one group, then 
it can be understood to mean that he had the intention to destroy that group.  
 
Thus in the case of where sexual violence is concerned, two elements need to take place 
in order to establish whether the perpetrator committed genocide. Firstly, an objective 
element, which is the rape or sexual violation of a victim. Secondly, a subjective element 
is required, being the intention to destroy the group to which the victim belongs.  
 
Although the five acts of genocide are considered as methods to destroy a protected 
group, the intention to destroy a group goes beyond these methods. Quigley writes of the 
elimination of the group’s ability to function on the basis of its “customs and 
traditions”.140 In the Karadzic and Mladic rule 61 judgment, the ICTY suggested that the 
indictment be broadened to include the following:  
 “the specific nature of some of the means used to achieve the objective of “ethnic 
cleansing” tends to underscore that the perpetration of the acts is designed to reach the 
very foundations of the group or what is considered as such. The systematic rape of 
                                                 
138 ICTR 96-3-T, 6 December 1999. (Hereinafter referred to as the Rutaganda judgment). 
139 Para. 399. 
140 See J Quigley op cit note 10 at 103. 
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women, to which material submitted to the Trial Chamber attests, is in some cases 
intended to transmit a new ethnic identity to the child. In other cases, humiliation and 
terror serve to dismember the group. The destruction of mosques or Catholic churches is 
designed to annihilate the centuries-long presence of the group or groups; the destruction 
of the libraries is intended to annihilate a culture which was enriched through the 
participation of the various national components of the population.”141 
 
In other words, apart from just committing the physical acts as mentioned in the 
definition of genocide, the ICTY drew an inference from the destruction of religious 
buildings and libraries as a possible intention to destroy a group. It should be remembered 
that these buildings must have been essential in the existence of one of the protected 
groups mentioned. Quigley thus rightly argues that the destruction of cultural objectives 
may provide evidence that such acts were done with intent to destroy the group.  
 
2.3.2.3 The intent [in whole or in part] of the destruction of the group 
In the Akayesu judgment, the court stated that genocide does not require the actual 
destruction of a group, in whole or in part.142 The ICTR stated that as long as the 
perpetrators had the necessary dolus specialis to commit genocide, could they be 
convicted of this crime.143 In the Kayishema and Ruzindana judgment, the ICTR stated 
that “in part” requires the intention to destroy a considerable number of individuals.144 
The courts thus seem to be of the view that the actual annihilation is relative to that of the 
intended annihilation of the group by the perpetrators.  
 
                                                 
141 Para. 94. 
142 Para. 497. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Para. 97. 
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Although this stance by the court is quite subjective, academics have posed the 
questioned as to what constitutes ‘in whole or in part’. Akayesu was the bourgmestre of 
the Taba commune in Rwanda. He was prosecuted for genocide (among other crimes) 
that was committed only within the Taba commune. In the Jelisic judgment, the ICTY 
stated that the goal of the Genocide Convention was to deal with mass crimes and 
therefore a substantial part of the group must have been targeted.145 It can thus be 
concluded that the crime of genocide only requires that the perpetrators intended to 
annihilate a protected group. This argument can be based on what the ICTY calls the 
‘goal’ of the crime. In other words, when genocide is committed, the mental element that 
requires the attack to be ‘in whole or in part’ will be determined by the intention of the 
perpetrator to destroy the group. Schabas stated that the international law commission 
considered that it is not necessary to intend to achieve the complete annihilation of a 
group from every corner of the globe. Nonetheless the crime of genocide by its very 
nature requires the intention to destroy at least a substantial part of a particular group.146 
Therefore in the Akayesu case, if the accused intended to destroy the Tutsi group within 
his commune, it can amount to genocide. The actual destruction of all the Tutsis is not 
required for the act to be in whole or in part.  
 
The ICTY in the Jelisic judgment referred to another way in which the attack constitutes 
in whole or in part. They stated that if the leadership structure of a group is destroyed, so 
                                                 
145 Para. 82. 
146 See WA Schabas op cit note 3 at 236. 
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as to the fact that the group cannot exist because of this incapability, will an attack be in 
whole or in part.147 They called this intention to destroy the group ‘selectively’.148 If a 
group is thus, selectively destroyed, in whole or in part, it is essential that the group 
should not be able to operate after the destruction of the leadership structure.  
 
De Brouwer rightly argues that if the female population of a group is attacked, the 
survival of the group may be at stake, even if the attacks are localised.149 Taking this into 
account, she thus broadens the scope of a ‘selective’ attack to a general group of women. 
I agree with her, as women are essentially the reproductive carriers of a group. If the 
reproductive carriers of the group are destroyed, the group will inevitably be destroyed. 
On reporting on the events with the debates around the definition of genocide at the 
international law commission, Schabas wrote that Bassiouni (who was a member of the 
commission) considered the definition to be “sufficiently pliable to encompass not only 
the targeting of an entire group, as stated in the convention, but also the targeting of 
certain segments of a given group, such as the Muslim elite or Muslim women”.150 Thus, 
in the context of sexual violence portrayed against women, during genocide, it can be 
argued from the viewpoint that women constitute the reproductive vessels of a group. If 
these reproductive vessels are incapacitated, then the group will eventually cease to exist. 
The prosecution will thus have to prove that when women were raped, it was not done for 
sexual or male domination interests, but for the destruction of a group, in whole or in part.  
                                                 
147 Para. 82. 
148 Ibid. 
149 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 43 at 75. 
150 See WA Schabas op cit note 3 at 236-237. 
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When establishing the intention to commit genocide, it becomes clear that the 
requirements overlap each other in many circumstances. Committing genocide by using 
sexual violence towards women of a protected group is certainly possible. As read above, 
the intention needed to prove genocide is quite difficult. In domestic situations, rape (as a 
form of sexual violence) as a crime is also quite difficult to prove. Thus, it will even be 
more difficult for the prosecution to successfully prove that rape was used as a form of 
genocide. However, the case law decided on by the international criminal tribunals 
showed that it is certainly not impossible.  
 
2.3.3 Evidence of the required intent 
Proving that the perpetrator had the required dolus specialis to commit genocide can be 
very difficult to do. Quenivet states that a confession or an admission is the easiest way to 
prove this intention.151 The question that thus needs to be answered is: how did the 
international criminal tribunals go about to establish the dolus specialis in cases where the 
accused was indicted for genocide related crimes? 
 
In the Akayesu judgment, the ICTR stated the following on how it intends to asses the 
dolus specialis of the perpetrator, in the absence of a confession or an admission. 
 “The Chamber considers that it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a 
particular act charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts 
systematically directed against the same group, whether these acts were committed by the 
same offender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities committed, their 
general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and 
systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a particular group, 
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while excluding the members of other groups, can enable the Chamber to infer the 
genocidal intent of a particular act.”152 
 
In other words, in the Akayesu judgment the court relied on the facts of the case. In my 
opinion, the most important factor which the court mentioned is the deliberate and 
systematically targeting of members of a certain group. This factor implies that the 
perpetrator had the intention of targeting his or her victim, because the victim belonged to 
a certain group. 
 
Another method which the ICTR used to assess the intent of the perpetrator to commit 
genocide was by way of his or her speeches and utterances.  
“… regarding Akayesu’s acts and utterances during the period relating to the acts alleged 
in the Indictment, the Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis of all 
evidence brought to its attention during the trial, that on several occasions the accused 
made speeches calling, more or less explicitly, for the commission of genocide.”153 
 
In other words, where the accused did not make a confession or an admission the courts 
should looks at the utterances of the perpetrator. In this case a victim who was raped 
testified that before the Interahamwe militia raped her, they uttered words like: “let us 
now see what the vagina of a Tutsi woman tastes like”.154 They raped the victim because 
she belonged to a certain group and they wanted to destroy this group.  
 
In the case of The Prosecutor v Alfred Musema,155 the ICTR found that while acts of rape 
and sexual violence were committed, phrases such as “the pride of the Tutsis will end 
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today”, were uttered by the perpetrator.156 In this case these utterances portrayed the 
intention that the perpetrator wanted to commit genocide. The ICTR also held that the 
perpetration of rape and sexual violence was “an integral part of the plan conceived to 
destroy the Tutsi group”.157 Thus in this case the ICTR did not only look at speeches and 
utterances made by the perpetrator, but also the underlying plan to commit rape and 
sexual violence in the destruction of a group. The plan to rape and commit sexual 
violence against women of the Tutsi group portrayed the intention that the perpetrator not 
only wanted to rape or sexually violate women, but that these acts would form part of the 
greater plan to destroy the group.  
 
Another example of using the perpetrators’ utterances and speeches as evidence of the 
intention to commit genocide was in the Gacumbitsi judgment. In this case the ICTR 
considered the actions of the perpetrator in relation to his utterances.158 The accused 
urged and motivated Hutu men to rape Tutsi women, who did not want to marry Hutu 
men. He also incited the Hutu population to kill those people of Tutsi ethnic origin.159 
The court stated that these utterances portrayed the intention of the perpetrator to destroy 
a group, in whole or in part.160 The ICTR stated that the sever nature of rape and sexual 
violence perpetrated against Tutsi women portrayed the intention to destroy the Tutsi 
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population.161 In other words, the sexual violence and rape only took place against Tutsi 
women. The Hutu women were not targeted. The dolus specialis could thus be 
established by the fact that the women, raped and sexually violated were Tutsi.  
 
As discussed here, in order to establish the evidence of the required intention or dolus 
specialis depends on the circumstances in which these crimes were committed. I thus 
agree with the ICTR when they investigated the speeches, actions and selective targeting 
of certain people to establish the evidence of the intention by the perpetrator to commit 
genocide. The speeches and actions of the perpetrator are vital in assessing the evidence 
of the intention to commit genocide. They are not the only factors that a court needs to 
take into account therefore they do not constitute a numerus clausus. The court can assess 
other factors too when trying to find the evidence of the intention of the perpetrator to 
commit genocide. The selective targeting of a certain group of people serves as a good 
point of departure when looking at whether the accused had the intention to commit 
genocide. When only women of a certain national, ethnic, racial or religious background 
are sexually violated, it sends out a message that these women are violated because they 
belong to one of the protected groups listed in the definition.  
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2.4 Conclusion 
The Akayesu judgment proved that it is possible that rape (as a form of sexual violence) 
can take place as genocide. Although proving this might be difficult, it is not impossible.  
 
During 2007 the ICC issued a warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (hereinafter referred to as the DRC). The accused was the highest 
ranked commander of a rebel militia, known as the Force de Resistance Patriotique en 
Ituri (hereinafter referred to as the FRPI). According to the warrant of arrest, there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that: 
 “... the accused directed an attack against the village of Bogoro, and that during, and in 
the aftermath, of the attack… committed several criminal attacks against civilians, 
primarily of Hena ethnicity, namely i) the murder of about 200 civilians; ii) causing 
serious bodily harm to civilians; iii) arresting, threatening with weapons and imprisoning 
civilians in a room filled with corpses; iv) pillaging and v) sexual enslavement of several 
women and girls.”162 
 
The facts, as stated within the warrant of arrest, leads to the notion that the accused could 
possibly have also had the intention to commit genocide. Even though he has not been 
charged with committing genocide, there is also the possibility of amending the 
indictment during the trial proceedings when new evidence comes to light. The accused’s 
militia group attacked a village and targeted people belonging to the Hena ethnic group. 
Here it is evident that he intended to attack this group. Although there is no mention of 
rape (as a form of sexual violence) in this warrant, the warrant does state that the accused 
committed a crime by sexually enslaving women and girls. Sexual enslavement is a form 
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of sexual violence, which is possible of falling under the definition of genocide. The Mail 
& Guardian reported that: 
 “Recent conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) Nord-Kivu province 
has been accompanied by an upsurge in brutal rape and often barbaric mutilations of 
women and girls, medical relief worker report.”163 
 
Here again it is evident that women are sexually violated within situations of armed 
conflict.  
 
The Akayesu judgment was hailed for finally acknowledging that women can be sexually 
violated as a form of genocide. Except for crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
sexual violence is sadly not expressly mentioned within the definition of genocide. 
However, the ICTR interpreted rape and sexual violence to form part of any of the other 
acts that are listed within the definition. It is quite interesting to note that post Akayesu 
multiple perpetrators were convicted of committing sexual violence as a form of 
genocide, yet the ICC statute (which came into operation during 2002) still makes no 
express mention of sexual violence as an act to commit genocide.  
 
To alleviate the strenuous onus of proof on the prosecution, I suggest that sexual violence 
be expressly stated as an act perpetrated against a specified protected group, in an attempt 
to annihilate that group. Once this is done it will alleviate the burden on the prosecution 
                                                 
163 See <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2007-10-23-rape-leaves-lifelong-scars-in-drc-conflict-zones> 
(accessed 17 August 2009) the article was reported on Wednesday, 24 October 2007. The article is entitled: 
“Rape leaves life long scares in the DRC conflict zones”. 
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to argue for an extension of the definition of genocide, to include sexual violence. 
However, this should be done, keeping the annihilation of the protected group in mind. 
 
In the next chapter, sexual violence as a crime against humanity will be explored. 
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Chapter 3: 
Sexual Violence as a Crime against Humanity 
 
As mentioned in chapter one,1 crimes against humanity has seen various amendments to 
its definition, which was completely dependent upon the circumstances of the atrocity 
which preceded the definition. Thus, the ICC statute had to make sure that it covers its 
entire basis with regards to the formulation of its definition for crimes against humanity, 
as this definition will be used throughout all the atrocities in which crimes against 
humanity will be committed and prosecuted by this court. As the ICC statute is indeed 
comprehensive, this definition will constitute the foundation of the present analysis, as it 
contains most of the elements which was also included in the definitions of crimes 
against humanity in the statutes establishing the previous international criminal 
tribunals.2 In fact, the ICC statute contains even more elements than the previous statutes 
that established international criminal tribunals.3 Bassiouni argues that the definition in 
the ICC statute is expansive as to the specific crime and adds much needed specification.4 
 
Crimes against humanity in the ICC statute are defined in article 7 as: 
“1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crimes against humanity” means any of the following 
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attacked directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(a) Murder; 
                                                 
1 See 1.2 in chapter 1. 
2 The definitions of a crime against humanity as contained in the Nuremburg Charter, The Tokyo Charter, 
Control Council No. 10, The ICTY statute, The ICTR statute and the SCSL statute.  
3 I.e. The Nuremburg Charter, The Tokyo Charter, Control Council No.10, The ICTY statute, The ICTR 
statute and the SCSL statute. 
4 See M Cherif Bassiouni Crimes against Humanity in International Law 2ed (1999) 202. 
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(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectively on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) The crime of Apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” 
 
 
This definition is somewhat broad as it leaves many alternative approaches open, which 
essentially will be subject to interpretation depending on the circumstances of the 
atrocity.5 At the same time this definition is also somewhat progressive as it even 
explicitly criminalises the crime of apartheid and enforced disappearance of persons, as a 
crime against humanity.  
 
This chapter will analyse the above definition to explain where crimes of a sexually 
violent nature finds itself within this definition. I will first analyse the individual acts of 
the definition, before considering the chapeau element of the crime and, ultimately, the 
required intention to commit the crime. 
 
 
                                                 
5 An example of the so called alternative approached would be article 7(k) which states: “other inhumane 
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health”. 
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 3.1 Individual acts listed which can amount to sexual violence 
As illustrated above the individual acts listed in the definition of crimes against humanity 
are quite extensive and do not constitute a numerus clausus. Article 7(k) is open to 
interpret other acts as a crime against humanity, subject to them causing great suffering, 
or serious injury to body or mental or physical health. Even though article 7(1)(g) 
specifically lists the acts which are of a sexual nature, the international criminal tribunals 
also interpreted sexual violence into the acts of enslavement and torture.6 
 
3.1.1 Enslavement 
Enslavement has been considered a crime against humanity ever since the Nuremberg 
Charter.7 Back then the definition of slavery, as defined in the 1926 Slavery Convention, 
found application. Article 1(1) of the Slavery Convention defines slavery as “the status or 
condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership are exercised”. In terms of this definition, slavery is thus defined as the 
ownership over a person on the basis of the person as an object.  
 
In the case of The Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic8 
the ICTY trial chamber elaborated on the act of enslavement as a crime against humanity. 
                                                 
6 A reason for this can be attributed to the fact that the definitions of crimes against humanity in the ICTR 
and ICTY statutes, respectively, only included rape as an act of sexual violence. This does not apply to the 
SCSL statute, which mentions more than just rape in its definition of a crime against humanity. 
7 See article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. 
8 IT-96-23, 22 February 2001 (Hereinafter referred to as the Foca trial judgment). 
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The accused were charged with, among other, the bad treatment of women and children 
as a result of forced and compulsory tautology.9 The trial chamber acknowledged that: 
“The women were kept in various detention centres where they had to live in intolerable 
unhygienic conditions, where they were mistreated in many ways including, for many of 
them, being raped repeatedly. Serb soldiers or policemen would come to these detention 
centres, select one or more women take them out and rape them. Many women and girls, 
including 16 witnesses, were raped in that way. Some of these women were taken out of 
these detention centres to privately owned apartments and houses where they had to cook, 
clean and serve the residents, who were Serb soldiers. They were also subjected to sexual 
assault.”10 
 
Thus from the findings of the ICTY trial chamber it is evident that women were also 
sexually violated while being enslaved by Serbian soldiers.  
 
The trial chamber further stated that the following elements need to be taken into account 
when considering whether enslavement took place: 
“control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, psychological 
control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, 
duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of 
sexuality and forced labour.”11 
 
The tribunal made a good example of one of the accused, Dragoljub Kunarac, who took 
two girls to a house in Trnova~e, Bosnia, where he detained them. The trial chamber was 
satisfied that Kunarac denied the women control of their lives. They had to obey orders, 
do household chores and were even subjected to sexual violence by being raped by 
Kunarac and one DP 6.12 The trial chamber was satisfied that Kunarac even exercised 
                                                 
9 See counts 18 and 22 respectively of the amended indictment: IT-96-23-PT, 8 November 1999.  
10 Para. 574. 
11 Para. 543. 
12 Para. 742. 
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sexual control and exclusivity over one of the girls by refusing DP 6 to have sexual 
intercourse with her.13  
 
Radomir Kovac, on the other hand, also kept girls in his private apartment where they 
were also continuously sexually violated by him and even sold to soldiers for sexual 
purposes.14 In its factual findings on this matter the trial chamber found that: 
“Kovacs conduct towards the two women was wanton in abusing and humiliating the 
four women and in exercising his de facto power of ownership as it pleased him. Kovac 
disposed of them in the same manner. For all practical purposes, he possessed them, 
owned them and had complete control over their fate, and he treated them as his property. 
The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that Kovac exercised the above powers over the girls 
intentionally. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that many of the acts caused serious 
humiliation, of which the accused was aware.”15 
 
When applying the ICTY’s conception of enslavement, one can certainly conclude that 
control over the victim seems to play an important role. Both Kunarac and Kovac were 
found guilty of committing crimes against humanity as enslavement. More importantly 
for this study is the fact that the trial chamber acknowledged that sexual violence can take 
place while being enslaved. It can also be argued that the respective forms of sexual 
violence can constitute acts under the ICC statute, for example, enforced prostitution. 
Kovac sold women that he kept enslaved to people that bough these women from him for 
sexual purposes. Thus, the ICTY extended enslavement to situations where sexual 
violence is committed as part of the process of and purpose for enslavement.  
 
                                                 
13 Para. 741. 
14 Paras. 749 and 756, respectively. 
15 Para. 781. 
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The Elements of Crimes (Hereinafter referred to as the EoC) annexed to the ICC statute 
describe enslavement as: 
“1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a 
person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.[11] 
 
[11] It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, 
include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as 
defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood 
that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in 
particular women and children.” 
 
 
Prima facie it seems as if this understanding of enslavement makes no mention of the 
situation where the victim(s) are enslaved for the purposes of sexual violence. However, 
it should be kept in mind that the ICC statute creates an expressed act of sexual slavery as 
a form of a crime against humanity.16 On the other hand, De Brouwer argues that this 
definition of enslavement is quite broad and can be interpreted to include crimes such as 
forced labour, forced marriage and trafficking in women and children for the purposes of 
forced prostitution.17 Even though I agree with De Brouwer, I am also of the opinion that 
if a specific act of sexual slavery as a crime against humanity exist (as in the ICC statute), 
then this act should be taken advantage of and should be given jurisprudential recognition 
and interpretation, instead of relying on an addition to the definition that was included 
since the first time that crimes against humanity was defined.  
 
 
                                                 
16 See 3.1.3.2 where sexual slavery is discussed. 
17 See Anne Marie LM De Brouwer Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and 
the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR (2005) 89. 
 
 
 
 
 74
3.1.2 Torture 
The UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment [hereinafter referred to as UNCAT] defines torture as: 
“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed, 
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or any other person acting in an 
official capacity. It does not include pain and suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions.”18 
 
 
This definition of torture comprises of the following elements: (1) intentionally inflicting 
mental or physical pain and/or suffering; (2) to obtain information or a confession; and 
(3) which was administered by a person acting in a public or official capacity. 
  
In the Foca trial judgment the ICTY argued that this definition of torture is insufficient to 
deal with the situation where torture was used as a war crime or a crime against humanity. 
More specifically the Foca trial judgment disagreed with the notion that torture must be 
administered by a person acting in a public or official capacity. They stated that: 
“The Trial Chamber also points out that those conventions, in particular the human rights 
conventions; consider torture per se while the Tribunal’s Statute criminalises it as a form 
of war crime, crimes against humanity or grave breach. The characteristic trait of the 
offence in this context is to be found in the nature of the act committed rather that in the 
status of the person who committed it. The Trial Chamber concludes that the definition of 
torture under international humanitarian law does not comprise the same elements as the 
definition of torture generally applied under human rights law. In particular, the Trial 
Chamber is of the view that the presence of a state official or any other authority-
wielding person in the torture process is not necessary for the offence to be regarded as 
torture under international humanitarian law.”19  
 
                                                 
18 See article 1(1). 
19 Paras. 495-496. 
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The trial chamber went further and stated that elements for torture under international 
humanitarian law are the following: 
“(i)  The infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental. 
(ii) The act or omission must be intentional. 
(iii) The act or omission must be aimed at obtaining information or a confession, or 
at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or 
discriminating, or any ground, against the victim or a third person.”20 
 
Thus, by eliminating the ground that a public official or a person acting in an official 
capacity should commit the torture the ICTY gave somewhat of a new feature to torture, 
as an international crime.  
 
In order for sexual violence to also be considered as torture, it has to comply with the 
elements as set out above. In the case of The Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, 
Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo21 the ICTY found that one of the accused, Delic, had raped 
a woman, because she did not provide him with information on the whereabouts of her 
husband.22 Apart from not wanting to provide the accused with information of her 
husband’s whereabouts, the tribunal also found that she was raped for discriminatory 
purposes, based on her sex.23 Askin rightly argues that the accused tortured the victim by 
means of rape because she was a female of an opposing group. This, she writes, 
constitutes discriminatory treatment under UNCAT.24 
 
                                                 
20 Para. 497. 
21 IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998. (Hereinafter referred to as the Celebici judgment). 
22 Paras. 937 and 941.  
23 Para. 941. 
24 See Kelly Dawn Askin ‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape and other Gender-Related Crimes under International 
Law’ (2003) 21 Berkley Journal of International Law 324.  
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Sexual violence as torture also has to constitute severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental. De Brouwer correctly argues that proving that sexual violence caused severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering is not that difficult at all, as sexual violence often 
inflicts both physical and mental harm.25 In the case of The Prosecutor v Dragoljub 
Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic26 the appeals chamber stated that there are 
no specific criteria by which to determine the degree of pain required for an act to amount 
to torture.27 The appeals chamber went further and thus acknowledged that sexual 
violence can amount to torture as it will satisfy the first element.28 However, it should be 
kept in mind that the first element of the Foca trial judgment is not the only requirement 
to satisfy when committing torture. The torturer will also have to commit sexual violence 
as a means of extracting information (or even a confession) from his or her victim. This 
requirement essentially constitutes a substantial foundation for the existence of the crime 
of torture. 
 
The ICC statute is the most recent treaty that codifies the law on torture as a gross 
violation of international humanitarian law. In terms of this statute torture constitutes: 
“the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a 
person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful 
sanctions.”29 
 
                                                 
25 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 100. 
26 Case No. IT-96-23-A and IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002 (Hereinafter referred to as the Foca appeals 
judgment). 
27 Para. 149. 
28 Para. 150. 
29 See article 7(2)(e). 
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It is evident here that the ICC statute makes no specific mention to who has to commit the 
torture. It also recognises torture as the infliction of severe pain or suffering. The EoC 
annexed to the Statute describes torture as: 
“1.  The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or  
       more persons.  
2. Such person or persons were in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator. 
3. Such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in or incidental 
to, lawful sanctions.” 
 
The EoC contains another essential requirement which was not discussed above. This 
requirement is the custody and control feature, as stated in number two. In terms of this 
requirement the torturer must have exercised control over the victim. In the Foca trial 
judgment the ICTY found that Kunarac and Kovac both exercised control over some of 
the victims which they repeatedly raped and sexually violated.30 This form of control 
would be sufficient to satisfy this requirement of the crime.  
 
As far as the mens rea of proving torture is concerned, article 30 of the ICC statute would 
find application. In other words, sexual violence as torture needs to be committed with 
intent and knowledge.31 
 
3.1.3 The listed acts of sexual violence in the definition of a crimes against humanity 
in the ICC statute 
The ICC statute expressly list five forms of sexual violence that can amount to a crime 
against humanity. These five forms do not constitute a numerus clausus, as other forms of 
                                                 
30 See 3.1.1 above. 
31 See article 30(1). 
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sexual violence are also open to be interpreted as crimes against humanity as long as it is 
of “comparable gravity”.32 In this section I will analyse each listed form of sexual 
violence. 
 
3.1.3.1 Rape 
Rape and enforced prostitution had been recognised as crimes under international 
humanitarian law, though merely as violations of the honour, dignity and reputation of 
women, thus not as crimes in and of themselves.33 Rape as a crime against humanity was 
first established in Control Council Law 10.34 Even though rape was recognised in this 
legislation it was never analysed by a court of law in an international context, until the 
establishment of the criminal tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
respectively. Rape also constituted a crime against humanity in the statutes of these 
tribunals. Rape was also differently conceptualised by these tribunals as both these 
tribunals attempted to create a definition for rape, which takes place in circumstances of 
conflict or unrest. However, the judgments in this regards seem to be in slight 
                                                 
32 See article 7(1)(g) of the ICC statute, which reads as follows: “… rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity”. 
33 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 102. See also article 27 of the Geneva Convention relative to 
the protection of civilian persons in time of war of 12 August 1949 (Hereinafter referred to as Geneva 
Convention IV) and article 76(1) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (Hereinafter referred 
to as Additional Protocol I). 
34 See chapter 1 where this definition was analysed. Article II(c) of the CCL.10 defines crimes against 
humanity as: “Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of 
the country where perpetrated”. 
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contradiction with one another. In the cases of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu,35 
The Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija36 and the Foca trial judgment, the definition of rape, in 
an international context were critically examined.  
 
In the Akayesu judgment the ICTR defined rape as: 
“a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances 
which are coercive. The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as any 
act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are 
coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may 
include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.”37 
 
The trial chamber in this case went further and stated that coercive circumstances need 
not be evidenced by a show of physical force.38 They explained that: 
“Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or 
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain 
circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe among 
refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal.”39 
 
Thus, the ICTR adopted a broad approach, which placed emphasis on sexual violence 
occurring in circumstances which are coercive, instead of emphasising consent as the case 
would be in domestic law.40 This definition, as conceptualised by the ICTR, does not also 
place any emphasis on body parts.41 De Brouwer here rightly argues that “a conceptual 
definition of rape could preclude situations in which victims have to talk about body parts 
                                                 
35 ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998. (Hereinafter referred to as the Akayesu judgment). 
36 IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998. (Hereinafter referred to as the Furundzija judgment). 
37 Para. 688. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 An example of this would be the ‘South African’ Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (Hereinafter referred to as the South African Sexual Offences Act 32 of 2007) 
that defines rape in section 3 as “Any person (“A”) who unlawfully and intentionally commits an act of 
sexual penetration with a complainant (“B”), without the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of rape”. 
41 Para. 597 reads as follows: “The Chamber considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the central 
elements of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts”. 
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in minute detail”.42 In other words, when giving testimony in court, witnesses, who were 
victims of sexual violence, need not discuss the often traumatic technicalities of how they 
were raped. This definition and conceptualisation of rape during an armed conflict or 
unrest should be applauded, as now victims of sexual violence would not need to explain 
the technicalities of how they were raped. 
 
The trial chamber also noted that: 
“coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats, 
intimidation extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may 
constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed 
conflict or the military presence of the Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women at the 
bureau communal.”43 
 
In other words, the ICTR was completely aware of the circumstances in which sexual 
violence took place against women during the Rwandan atrocity. In many other conflicts 
women were also placed in a similar situation in which coercive circumstances were used 
to commit sexual violence.44 Needless to say that feminist lawyers have applauded this 
definition, stating that it was concise and broad enough to be a good guide to enable 
courts to prosecute rape more easily in the future.45 The ICTY, in the Celebici judgment, 
initially applied the definition of rape as formulated in the Akayesu judgment.46  
                                                 
42 See De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 107. 
43 Para. 688. 
44 E.g. in the Balkan conflict many women were forcefully impregnated and in the Asian counterpart of 
World War II women were used as so called “comfort women” who were required to perform sexual 
favours to soldiers under coerced circumstances. 
45 See Noelle NR Quenivet Sexual Offenses in Armed Conflict and International Law (2005) 11. 
46 Paras. 478-479. Para. 479 reads as follows: “This Trial Chamber agrees with the above reasoning [which 
was a quotation taken from the Akayesu judgment in defining rape in an international context] and sees no 
reason to depart from the conclusion of the ICTR in the Akayesu judgment on this issue. Thus, the Trial 
Chamber considers rape to constitute a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances that are coercive”. 
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However, in the Furundzija judgment the ICTY dismissed the broad definition of rape, as 
conceptualised in the Akayesu judgment. This case brought about a new definition for 
rape under international law, which reads as follows: 
“(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any 
other object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.”47 
 
This definition is more of a mechanical definition focusing on the body parts of the 
perpetrator and his or her victims. It is also evident that the prosecution need not prove 
consent (based on this definition), but only coercion or force or threat of force against the 
victim or a third person. This would thus inevitably negate consent. De Brouwer rightly 
argues that if this definition is applied, it would make it more difficult for victims to build 
their case against an accused as they would have to describe the sexual act in graphic 
detail.48 This definition would also negate the possibility of other forms of sexual 
violence to be indicted as crimes against humanity, unlike its Rwandan counterpart that 
made provision for acts of a sexual nature and not just penetration.49 Thus this narrow 
definition would not benefit a victim who was, for example, forced to masturbate for and 
by the accused against her will.  
 
                                                 
47 Para. 185. 
48 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 114. 
49 See footnote 36 above. 
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The ICTY in Furundzija also seemed to be setting double standards when attempting to 
narrow down the Akayesu definition when it conceptualised fellatio as an attack on 
human dignity and thus constituting rape. They stated: 
“The Trial Chamber holds that the forced penetration of the mouth by the male sexual 
organ constitutes a most humiliating and degrading attack upon human dignity. The 
essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as human rights 
law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every person, whatever his or her 
gender. The general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic underpinning and 
indeed the very raison d’etre of international humanitarian law and human rights law; 
indeed in modern times it has become of such paramount importance as to permeate the 
whole body of international law. This principle is intended to shield human being from 
outrages upon their personal dignity, whether such outrages are carried out by unlawfully 
attacking the body or by humiliating and debasing the honour, the self-respect or the 
mental well being of a person. It is consonant with this principle that such an extremely 
serious sexual outrage as forced oral penetration should be classified as rape.”50 
 
Forced masturbation, as an example of other forms of sexual violence, does not amount to 
rape when the accused forced the victim. However, other forms of sexual violence, 
notably forced masturbation, also constitutes an attack on a person’s human dignity. By 
explaining fellatio as an encroachment on a person’s human dignity, and thus as a form of 
rape, the ICTY broadened the definition of rape and did not narrow it down as it intended 
to do.  
 
After taking various countries’ national definition of rape into account, the ICTY in the 
Foca judgment adopted a third definition of rape, which would be applicable in an 
international law context. This definition reads as follows: 
“The Trial Chamber understands that the actus reus of the crime of rape in international 
law is constituted by: the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or the anus 
of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual 
penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be 
                                                 
50 Para. 183. 
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consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of 
the surrounding circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual 
penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”51 
 
This definition is imbedded in the notion of consent. In domestic laws rape is normally 
defined as non-consensual or coerced sexual penetration.52 However, would a definition 
of rape during an atrocity normally boarder around the same circumstances where a 
victim of rape would be required to state that she did not expressly consent to being 
raped? The answer to this question is no. Rape in these circumstances takes place either 
as part of committing genocide, or a crime against humanity or a war crime. Thus the rape 
takes place as part of annihilating a specific listed group (if it is committed as part of a 
genocide) or as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population (if 
it is committed as part of a crime against humanity). 
 
Multiple academics have rightly disagreed with the Foca definition of rape. Mackinnon 
argues that the consequence of this definition means that “rather than non consent being 
presumed corollary of the presence of force, evidence of force became reduced to 
evidence of non consent”.53 Thus proving that the victim did not consent also places an 
unjustified burden of proof on the prosecution to show that she did not consent, even 
                                                 
51 Para. 460. 
52 Once again we can use the South African definition of rape as an example. It reads: “Any person (“A”) 
who unlawfully and intentionally commits an act of sexual penetration with a complainant (“B”), without 
the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of rape.” – Section 3 of the South African Sexual Offences Act 32 
of 2007. Another example would be the Namibian definition of rape. It reads: “Any person (in this Act 
referred to as a perpetrator) who intentionally under coercive circumstances – (a) commits or continues to 
commit a sexual act with another person; or (b) causes another person to commit a sexual act with the 
perpetrator or with a third person, shall be guilty of the offence of rape.” – Section 2(1) of the Combating 
of Rape Act 8 of 2000.  
53 See Catharine A MacKinnon Are Women Human? And other International Dialogue (2006) 242. 
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though she might have been placed under coercion. Thus Schomburg and Peterson rightly 
states that sexual violence that qualifies as genocide or crimes against humanity (and even 
war crimes) occurs under circumstances that are inherently coercive and that will negate 
any possibility of genuine consent.54 De Brouwer states that consent should not be an 
option under supranational criminal law, because: (1) “The definitions of rape in domestic 
law (that requires non-consent) was not codified as part of a larger atrocity in mind”;55 (2) 
“if rape took place as part of a genocide, then one would imply that the victim consented 
to genocide”;56 (3) “including consent in the definition of rape can expose victims of 
sexual violence to painful and humiliating questions, which would not be asked if she was 
coerced”;57 and (4) “victims will only perceive the tribunals and the court as legitimate if 
rape is defined in conformity with the reality of the crime”.58 
 
The debate around the definition of rape did not end with the Foca judgment. The ICTR 
in the case of The Prosecutor v Laurent Semanza59 dismissed the Akayesu definition of 
rape as being too broad and adopted the same non-consent definition as conceptualised by 
the ICTY in the Foca judgment.60 In the case of The Prosecutor v Juvenal Kajelijeli61 the 
                                                 
54 See Wolfgang Schomburg and Ines Peterson ‘Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence under International 
Criminal Law’ (2007) 101 The American Journal of International Law 124. 
55 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 120. 
56 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 121. 
57 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 122. 
58 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 123. 
59 ICTR-97-20-T, 15 May 2003 (Hereinafter referred to as the Semanza judgment). 
60 Para. 345. 
61 ICTR-98-44A-T, 1 December 2003 (Hereinafter referred to as the Kajelijeli judgment). 
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ICTR also adopted an approach of a non-consent definition as defined in the Foca 
judgment.62  
 
In the case of The Prosecutor v Sylvestre Gacumbitsi63 the ICTR stated that: 
“any penetration of the victim’s vagina by the rapist with his genitals or with any object 
constitutes rape, although the definition of rape under Article 3(g) of the Statute is not 
limited to such acts alone.”64 
 
Although this definition does not take the notion of consent into account, it is quite gender 
specific and technical, as a penetration of the women’s vagina is a specific requirement 
needed to commit rape.  
 
It seems that the Akayesu definition, even though as broad as it may be, seems as a 
recommendable conceptualisation of rape that takes place as part of genocide or a crime 
against humanity. This definition seems to be victim centred as it does not require any 
victim to testify about the possibilities of giving consent (within a coerced environment), 
or about the humiliating manner in which an accused performed this crime. It is also 
gender sensitive as it does not assume that the victim could only be a woman.  
 
In conclusion, the EoC of the ICC statute conceptualises rape as follows: 
“1. The perpetrator invaded [15] the body of a person by conduct resulting in 
penetration, however, slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the 
perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with 
any object or any other part of the body. 
                                                 
62 Para. 915. 
63 ICTR-2001-64-T, 17 June 2004 (Hereinafter referred to as the Gacumbitsi judgment). 
64 Para. 321. 
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2.    The invasion was committed by force, or by threat or force or coercion, such as that  
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of 
power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving 
genuine consent. [16] 
3.   The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
 
[15] The concept of ‘invasion’ is intended to be broad enough to be gender-neutral. 
[16] It is understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if 
affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity. This footnote also applies to 
the corresponding elements of article 7(1)(g)-3, 5 and 6.” 
 
 
With this conceptualisation of the definition of rape, the ICC seems to adopt an approach 
that takes into account all three differing opinions by the Akayesu, Furundzija and Foca 
judgments. It borrows the invasion and sex neutrality from Akayesu, while it also 
encompasses the technicality of Furundzija and brings in the notion of consent, where the 
victim is incapable of consenting, by giving recognition to the Foca judgment. 
 
3.1.3.2 Sexual slavery 
Sexual slavery, during an atrocity, has its history imbedded in the Asian counterpart of 
World War II. The so called ‘comfort women’ were recruited, under disguise, to render 
services of a sexual nature to soldiers. Approximately 200 000 women were recruited to 
comfort stations to be sexual slaves to the forces of the Japanese army.65 Women were 
recruited either by way of offering them work, as cleaners or cooks for the soldiers or 
they were brought by way of force and violence to render services to the Japanese army.66 
                                                 
65 See CJ Hung ‘For those that had no voice: The Multifaceted Fight for Redress by and for the “Comfort 
Women”’ (2008) 15 Asian American Law Journal 183. 
66 See CJ Hung op cit note 65 at 185. 
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Keeping that in mind, it should be noted that one ‘comfort woman’ had testified about her 
ordeal, yet the Tokyo Tribunal did not see the need to prosecute the perpetrators for 
sexual slavery.67 Many survivors of sexual slavery only received justice during December 
2000, where the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual 
Slavery found many accused (including Emperor Hirohito) guilty of sexual slavery and 
rape, as a crime against humanity.68 Sadly though, no punishment could be imposed, as 
most of the accused were already dead at the time of the verdict.69 
 
It is quite interesting to note that it was only during 1998 in the ICC statute that sexual 
slavery was codified as a separate crime, under crimes against humanity. Subsequent to 
the ICC statute, sexual slavery was also included, as a crime against humanity, in the 
statute establishing the SCSL.  
 
In the case of The Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie 
Borbor Kanu70 the SCSL, for the first time, had to conceptualise ‘sexual slavery’ as a 
crime against humanity. This court found that the following elements have to exist for 
sexual slavery to take place: 
                                                 
67 See CJ Hung op cit note 65 at 186. 
68 See Claire McEvoy in Jeanne Ward, Christopher Horwoord, Claire McEvoy, Pamela Shipman and 
Lauren Rumble The Shame of War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Conflict (2007) 57.The 
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery was a people’s tribunal, 
set up by Asian Women and Human Rights organisations. The purpose of this tribunal was to acknowledge 
that the ‘comfort stations’ did exist during World War II and that the Japanese government at the time had 
to take responsibility for this. The tribunal was presided over by judges from the United States of America, 
Argentina, the United Kingdom and Kenya.  
69 See C McEvoy in J Ward et al op cit note 68 at 58. 
70 SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007 (Hereinafter referred to as the AFRC judgment). 
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“1.   The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a 
person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty. 
2. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of 
sexual nature; 
3. The perpetrator committed such conduct intending to engage in the act of sexual 
slavery or in the reasonable knowledge that it was likely to occur.”71 
 
It can thus be said that the elements of sexual slavery is concise in its formulation, as it 
covers both the deprivation of a person’s liberty and the right to exercise her sexual 
autonomy. 
 
At the same time, a dissenting opinion by Justice Doherty introduced the notion of 
‘forced marriages’ as constituting part of “other inhumane acts”.72 The majority opinion 
seemed to confuse ‘forced marriages’ as sexual slavery and therefore dismissed this 
charge as duplicity.73 The majority also dismissed the charge of sexual slavery against the 
accused persons, because the prosecutor listed the charge as ‘sexual slavery and other 
forms of sexual violence’. They argued that this also amounted to duplicity and therefore 
had to strike down the entire charge.74 I agree with Oosterveld and Marlowe when they 
argue that “by dismissing the crime against humanity charge of sexual slavery, the 
majority lost the opportunity to hold that gender-based violence was widespread or 
systematic in nature in AFRC-held areas”.75 
                                                 
71 Para. 708. 
72 Forced marriages will be discussed under heading 3.1.3.6 as Justice Doherty introduced this notion under 
“other inhumane acts”, which is comparable to acts “of comparable gravity” as stated in article 7(g) of the 
ICC statute. 
73 Paras. 713 and 714. 
74 Para. 95. 
75 See Valerie Oosterveld and Andrea Marlowe ‘Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara & 
Santigie Borbor Kanu. Case No. SCSL-04-16-T. Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II, June 20, 
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In conclusion, the EoC for the ICC statute states that sexual slavery comprises of the 
following elements. 
“1.   The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending, or bartering such a 
person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty. [18] 
2. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of 
sexual nature. 
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
 
[18] It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances 
include, exacting force labour or otherwise reducing a person to servile status as 
defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood 
that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in 
particular women and children.” 
 
Thus, just apart from covering both the deprivation of liberty of a victim and the right to 
exercise her sexual autonomy, the elements in the ICC statute also requires that the attack 
be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. 
Needless to say that the latter requirement is what will define sexual slavery, as a crime 
against humanity.  
 
3.1.3.3 Enforced prostitution 
Enforced prostitution was first codified as a grave breach of international humanitarian 
law, as this act was inserted as one of the fundamental guarantees of section 75 of 
Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions.76  
                                                                                                                                                 
2007. Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana & Allieu Kondewa. Case No. SCSL-04-14-T. Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Trial Chamber I, August 2, 2007’ (2007) 101 The American Journal of International Law 854. 
76 See section 75(2)(b) of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating 
to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts of 8 June 1977. This article reads as follows: 
“The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether 
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This act was subsequently codified as a crime against humanity in the ICC statute and the 
statute that established the SCSL. According to the EoC for the ICC statute, enforced 
prostitution is conceptualised as follows: 
“1.   The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more acts of a 
sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear 
of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent. 
2. The perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary or other 
advantage in exchange for or in connection with the acts of sexual nature. 
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.” 
 
For the first actus reus of enforced prostitution, emphasis should be placed on the fact 
that the perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in acts of a sexual nature. The 
second actus reus requires that the perpetrator receive some form of benefit for the act of 
the person mentioned in the first actus reus. The third and fourth elements are specific to 
a crime against humanity.  
 
Werle argues that enforced prostitution will in all probability fit the definition of 
enslavement during an armed conflict, as the creation of ‘brothels’ during armed conflict 
does not frequently serve to make a profit, but to boost the morale of the troops.77 I 
disagree with Werle as caution should be taken not to confuse sexual slavery with 
enforced prostitution, as the elements, as contained in the EoC, is fundamentally different 
in the following respect: sexual slavery requires that the perpetrator attach ownership over 
                                                                                                                                                 
committed by civilian or by military agents: … (b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”. 
77 See Gerhard Werle Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) 251. 
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the victim, while enforced prostitution only requires that the perpetrator receive some 
form of compensation or benefit for allowing the victim to take part in acts of a sexual 
nature. I thus agree with De Brouwer who argues that it is important “not to read the 
commercial aspect into the elements of sexual slavery and thus lift the distinction 
between sexual slavery and enforced prostitution”.78  
 
Thus far there has been no judgment on the interpretation of enforced prostitution as a 
crime against humanity. 
 
3.1.3.4 Forced pregnancy 
Forced pregnancy is one of the offences (of a sexual nature) of crimes against humanity 
that can only take place against women. This act is not a new emergence during atrocities 
as it was reported to take place in both Rwanda and the Balkan conflicts. No charge for 
this offence has been brought to the tribunals, as it does not have the jurisdiction to 
prosecute forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity. However, Beltz is correct when 
she states that “forced pregnancy is a new aspect of modern warfare and prevalent where 
racial and ethnic purity are valued”.79 She further explains that forced pregnancy takes 
place by the raping of women until they are pregnant and detaining them so that they 
cannot undergo an abortion.80 
 
                                                 
78 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 143. 
79 See Amanda Beltz ‘Prosecuting Rape in International Criminal Tribunals: The Need to Balance Victim’s 
Rights with the Due Process Rights of the Accused’ (2008) 23 St. Johns Journal of Legal Commentary 172. 
80 Ibid at 79.  
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The EoC of the ICC statute explains the elements of forced pregnancy as: 
“1.   The perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made pregnant, with the 
intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other 
grave violations of international law. 
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.” 
 
The important features of these elements are that a woman must be (1) confined; (2) made 
pregnant; and (3) with the intention of affecting the ethnic composition. This does not 
mean that the perpetrator cannot also be charged with rape. If the prosecution can prove 
that the accused raped the woman with the intention of making her pregnant, then the 
perpetrator can also be charged with forced pregnancy, as a crime against humanity. 
  
The only problematic feature of these elements is that it requires that a woman be forcibly 
made pregnant.81 This seems to imply that if the woman did not object by force to being 
made pregnant, then the perpetrator did not impregnate her with force. The context in 
which this crime takes place is one in which a woman would be placed under extreme 
coercion. Therefore, the coercion, in this context, would negate the notion of force. 
 
As with enforced prostitution, there has yet been no judgment that interprets force 
pregnancy. It will thus be interesting to see how a court will interpret this crime, 
especially in relation to the use of force.  
 
                                                 
81 My emphasis added. 
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3.1.3.5 Enforced sterilization 
Enforced sterilization is the last of the expressly listed acts of sexual violence mentioned 
under the definition of crimes against humanity in the ICC statute, apart from acts of 
comparable gravity.  
 
The EoC of the ICC statute states that enforced sterilization occurs when: 
“1.  The perpetrator deprived one or more persons of biological reproductive capacity. 
[19] 
2. The conduct was neither justified by the medical or hospital treatment of the person 
or persons concerned nor carried out with their genuine consent. [20] 
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
 
[19] The deprivation is not intended to include birth-control measures which have a 
non-permanent effect in practice. 
[20] It is understood that ‘genuine consent’ does not include consent obtained 
through deception.” 
 
Enforced sterilization becomes a crime when the second actus reus is completed. In other 
words, enforced sterilization becomes a crime when the treatment was not medically 
prescribed, nor carried out with the consent of the victim.  
 
De Brouwer argues that enforced sterilization may also include instances “where women 
have been raped so viciously that their reproductive system had been destroyed 
completely”.82 Even though this may indeed be the case, the prosecution will have the 
                                                 
82 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 147. 
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huge burden of proving that the perpetrator intended and knew that the victim’s 
reproductive system will be destroyed by continuously raping her.83 
 
Thus far enforced sterilization has not been interpreted by an international tribunal or the 
ICC. 
 
3.1.3.6 Any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity 
As a starting point, it seems interesting to note the differences in terminology adopted in 
the ICTY and ICTR statutes, the ICC and the statute establishing the SCSL. The ICC and 
the SCSL statutes use the term ‘any other form of sexual violence’, while the ICTY and 
ICTR statutes use the term ‘other inhumane acts’.  
 
The EoC attached to the ICC statute describes this section to contain the following 
elements: 
“1.   The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or 
cause such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by 
threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or 
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or 
persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent. 
2. Such conduct was of a gravity comparable to the other offences in article 7, 
paragraph 1(g), of the Statute. 
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of 
the conduct. 
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.” 
 
 
                                                 
83 This being in conformity with article 30 of the ICC statute. 
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The first element requires that the act be of a sexual nature, while the second element 
requires that it be comparable to the other acts of sexual violence listed in the definition 
of crimes against humanity. De Brouwer argues that this seems to imply that the act 
should involve some form of penetration.84 She further reminds us that the statutes 
establishing the ICTY and the ICTR only require that the act be ‘inhumane’ and therefore 
these criminal tribunals could have convicted accused persons like Akayesu for forcing a 
Tutsi victim to undress in public and Tadic for sexual mutilation.85 These acts that 
Akayesu and Tadic were convicted of did not involve sexual penetration.  
 
Unfortunately I have to disagree with De Brouwer, as crimes involving sexual slavery and 
enforced sterilization do not necessarily involve penetration. The former act punishes the 
person who deprived the liberty of a victim for sexual purposes.86 The perpetrator in this 
instance can be convicted of sexual slavery for depriving the victim of her liberty and 
sexual autonomy, even though he himself did not sexually penetrate the victim. As for 
enforced sterilization, the perpetrator can perform a medical procedure on the victim, for 
the reasons which are not medically required while the victim is coerced into it. This act 
also does not necessarily infer that sexual penetration takes place. I also disagree with De 
Brouwer when she argues that the nullum crimen sine lege principle as expressed in this 
article restricts the crime of sexual violence too much.87 
                                                 
84 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 148. 
85 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 149. 
86 My emphasis added. 
87 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 150. 
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In her dissenting opinion in the AFRC judgment, Justice Doherty dismissed the majority 
argument about not convicting the accused for sexual slavery. She argues that even 
though the accused persons’ actions might not have constituted sexual slavery, it did 
amount to forced marriages, which caused serious mental and physical harm to the 
victim.88 The fact that forced marriages caused serious mental and physical harm to the 
victim is a strong enough argument to interpret it as ‘other inhumane acts’.89 The 
fundamental reason why sexual slavery cannot be considered as forced marriages is 
because the EoC for sexual slavery does not make provision for the perpetrator to take 
ownership of the victim by way of (putative) marriage.90 Forced marriages cannot also 
amount to enforced prostitution as the perpetrator does not receive some form of 
remuneration or benefit from a third person for sexual services by the victim. Based on 
the fact that in most forced marriages the victim is required to provide services of a sexual 
nature to the accused (which does not necessarily mean sexual penetration and therefore 
also does not fall under EoC for rape), it can thus be correctly argued that forced 
marriages can amount to ‘any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’. This 
act would thus amount to an act of a sexual nature; of comparable gravity to the other acts 
mentioned in article 7(1)(g) of the ICC statute where the perpetrator was aware of the 
                                                 
88 Para. 57 of Justice Doherty’s dissenting opinion. 
89 Para. 51 of Justice Doherty’s dissenting opinion. 
90 I thus agree with Jain who argues that the distinguishing characteristic of forced marriages is the 
imposition of a marital status on one or both parties, against their will, or in circumstances that vitiate their 
consent, resulting in the involuntary assumption of obligations arising from a marriage-like relationship, as 
the concomitant physical and psychological suffering caused to the victim of the marriage. She states that 
sexual slavery may be present in these circumstances, but it is not the dominant feature. See Neha Jain 
‘Forced Marriages as a Crime against Humanity: Problems of Definition and Prosecution’ (2008) 6 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 1030. 
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gravity of his conduct. This therefore negates the nullum crimen sine lege principle. Thus 
it meets all the necessary elements as listed in the EoC.91 
 
3.1.4 Persecution based on the ground of gender 
Even though the focus of this study is to place emphasis on sexual violence, and not 
gender or sex, it is important to analyse persecution based on the ground of gender, as 
most crimes of a sexual nature take place against women, because of their gender. The 
ICC statute is quite clear that gender refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the 
context of society.92 
 
As a starting point, it is interesting to note that the ICC statute is the first international 
criminal law statute that creates a ground for persecution based on gender.93 The statutes 
establishing the ICTY and the ICTR only make provision for persecutions based on 
political, racial and religious grounds,94 while the statute establishing the SCSL makes 
provision for persecutions based on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds.95 
 
The EoC of the ICC statute stipulates the following elements for persecution: 
“1.  The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, [21] one or more 
persons of fundamental rights. 
                                                 
91 The crime should obviously take place within a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian 
population or the perpetrator knew or intended that the act take place as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population. 
92 See article 7(3). 
93 See article 7(1)(h). 
94 See article 5(h) of the ICTY statute and article 3(h) of the ICTR statute. 
95 See article 2(h) of the SCSL statute. 
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2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group 
or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such. 
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, of the Statute, or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law.  
4. The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in article 7, 
paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. [22] 
5. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
6. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
 
[21] This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction 
to the Elements of Crimes. 
[22] It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary for this element 
other than that inherent in element 6.” 
 
The first element requires that the perpetrator deprive a victim of his/her fundamental 
rights. In the case of The Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic et al96 the ICTY defined 
persecution as “the gross and blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental 
right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the same level of 
gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5”.97 The ICTY is thus more specific in 
stating that the fundamental right must have been stipulated either in treaty law or 
international customary law. The tribunal was not prepared to stipulate which rights 
constituted fundamental rights and which do not, as excluded rights can be fundamental 
rights in another sense.98 The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women99 stipulates that women are entitled to the enjoyment of equal human rights, 
which, inter alia, include: the right to life; the right to liberty and security of person; and 
the right not to be subjected to torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
                                                 
96 IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000. (Hereinafter referred to as the Kupreskic et al judgment). 
97 Para. 621. 
98 Para. 623. 
99 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/104 of 20 December 1993. (Hereinafter referred to as 
DEVAW). 
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punishment.100 These rights constitute fundamental rights of women. As stipulated above, 
sexual violence can amount to torture, while sexual slavery can amount to a deprivation 
of liberty. Thus broadly interpreted, sexual violence can amount to a breach of protection 
offered to women.  
 
The ICTY also added the requirement that the act must be of comparable gravity as that 
of the other forms of crimes against humanity. In other words, the act of persecution must 
contain similar elements as the crimes stipulated in articles 5(a)-(i) of the ICTY statute.  
 
By stating that the perpetrator targeted the victim, because of his or her identity to a 
group, implies that the second and third elements contain some form of discrimination. 
As stated above, the ICC statute is the only treaty that creates a grouping for gender as a 
discriminatory ground. In the Kupreskic et al judgment the ICTY stated that the deliberate 
and systematic killing of Bosnian Muslims constituted persecution.101 Thus, in this 
conflict, Muslims were targeted, because of their religion. De Brouwer thus rightly argues 
that with the dawn of the ICC statute a perpetrator can be prosecuted for persecution if he 
raped a woman solely for her being a woman.102  
 
The fourth actus reus requires that the act be of similar gravity as to that of the other acts 
of a crime against humanity, as stipulated in article 7 of the ICC statute. As stated above, 
                                                 
100 See articles 3(a), (c) and (h). 
101 Para. 629. 
102 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 17 at 160. 
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the ICTY in the Kupreskic et al judgment applied this element by stating that the act of 
persecution should be of comparable gravity to that of one of the acts listed in article 5 of 
the ICTY statute.103  
 
In conclusion, I thus agree with Mettraux that stresses an important point, by arguing that 
acts of persecution cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be considered in their context 
by analysing their cumulative effect.104 
 
3.2 The chapeau elements of crimes against humanity 
The true identity of crimes against humanity is contained in the phrase “widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population”. In other words, all of the acts mentioned 
above acts must take place as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population.  
 
In order to have a substantial discussion about how sexual violence fits into this phrase, I 
will break it down into the following three elements in this chapter:  
(1) An attack; 
(2) Against a civilian population; and 
(3) Widespread or systematic in nature 
 
                                                 
103 See also footnote 93 above. 
104 See Guenael Mettraux International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (2005) 184. 
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3.2.1 An attack 
In the Foca trial judgment the ICTY described an attack to be “a course of conduct 
involving the commission of acts of violence”.105 In other words, the individual acts listed 
above form the basis for an attack. Thus, sexual violence is used as a tool to implement an 
attack.  
 
Even though the ICTY definition for crimes against humanity requires that there be a 
conflict annexed to the commission of this crime, the judges in the Foca trial judgment 
stated that this attack is not limited to the conduct of hostilities.106 This seems to imply 
that an attack as part of the conduct of hostilities is not necessarily at attack when 
committed as a crime against humanity. By conceptualising an attack in this broad 
manner, the ICTY made provision for the instances where an attack was not carried out 
by the armed forces only (during the Yugoslavia conflict), but also by civilians against 
other civilians, subject to the existence of an armed conflict. Thus, civilians who 
committed or even aided and abetted in the commission of sexual violence as a crime 
against humanity can be prosecuted. According to this judgment the following 
requirements should be met when committing an attack: 
“(i)        the commission of an act which, by its nature or consequences, is objectively 
part of the attack; couple with 
(ii) knowledge on the part of the accused that there is an attack on the civilian 
population and that his act is part of the attack.”107 
 
                                                 
105 Para. 415. 
106 Para. 416. 
107 Para. 418. 
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The first requirement only states that an act takes place. In other words, as Mettraux 
correctly argues “the perpetrator need not have committed a series of crimes for his acts 
to be part of the attack; a single act is sufficient in principle”.108 This attack should 
obviously be coupled with the notion that the accused had the required knowledge that he 
was committing this act as part of a broader attack. Therefore, for example, one rape can 
constitute an act which takes place as part of a broader armed attack upon a civilian 
population. 
  
In the rule 61 decision of The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolic109 the trial chamber suggested 
the following factors when determining if an attack took place, ex post facto. 
“(i)       whether there has been an authoritarian takeover of the region where the crime 
has been committed; 
(ii)         whether a new authoritarian power structure has been established; 
(iii) whether discriminatory measures, such as restrictions on bank accounts held by 
one group of citizens, or laissez-passer requirements have been imposed; 
(iv) whether summary arrests, detention, torture, and other crimes have been 
committed; 
(v) whether massive transfers of civilian camps have taken place; and 
(vi) whether the enemy population has been removed from the area.”110 
 
These are factors that play a determining role in establishing whether crimes against 
humanity occurred. However, these factors do not adequately address whether sexual 
violence occurred in a certain geographical area, as part of an attack against a civilian 
population. It can thus be argued that the following factors can aid in assessing whether 
sexual violence took place as an attack: (1) the detention of women who were forcefully 
                                                 
108 See G Mettraux op cit note 104 at 162. 
109 IT-94-2-R61, 20 October 1995. (Hereinafter referred to as the Nikolic rule 61 decision). 
110 Para. 27 of the rule 61 decision. 
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impregnated; (2) the separation of partners and family members; and (3) the creation of 
detention facilities for members of a certain sex and or gender. 
 
3.2.2 Against a civilian population 
This phrase implies that a crime against humanity can only take place against a civilian 
population, thus making the civilian population the primary object of the crime. Geneva 
Convention IV of 1949 defines civilians as “persons taking no active part in the 
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those 
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause”.111 A civilian 
population has been interpreted to include the following 2 elements: (1) the constituent 
acts must be directed against non-combatants; and (2) a large number of victims must be 
targeted.112 
 
The Foca trial judgment reiterated the decision in the Tadic judgment by stating that the 
fact that the attacks are rendered against a civilian population means that no random acts 
can constitute a crime against humanity.113 This should not be confused with one act that 
can constitute an attack. In the latter instance, the accused must have the knowledge of 
committing a crime against humanity, while in the former this knowledge can be absent. 
 
                                                 
111 See article 3(1) of Geneva Convention IV of 1949. 
112 See Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman ‘The Road from Rome: The Developing Laws of Crimes against 
Humanity’ (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 361. 
113 Para. 422 of the Foca trial judgment. 
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Feminists such as Gardam and Charlesworth argue that by incorporating men and women 
into the general category of a civilian population, the different experiences that men and 
women face during such an atrocity are ignored.114 Women do bear the brunt of 
experiencing sexual violence during armed conflict, but that does not mean that men 
cannot or do not fall victim to this crime.115 I agree with Quenivet when she argues that a 
distinction between men and women would not provide better protection for women.116 
By using the term civilian population, both men and women are protected against sexual 
violence (among other crimes), as a crime against humanity is there to prosecute accused 
persons who coordinated and carried out an attack against a civilian population, and not 
just against women. Quenivet rightly argues that it is by time that the discussion about 
gender and more particularly about sexual offences be inclusive rather that exclusive.117 
 
 
3.2.3 Widespread or systematic in nature118 
Widespread or systematic in nature does not refer to the civilian population (the term 
population already refers to broad scope of people), but to the attack instead. In other 
words, the attack against the civilian population should be widespread or systematic in 
                                                 
114 See Judith Gardam & Hilary Charlesworth ‘Protection of Women in Armed Conflict’ (2000) 22 Human 
Rights Quarterly 150. 
115 In the case of The Prosecutor v Stevan Todorovic IT-95-9/1-S, 31 July 2001, the accused pleaded guilty 
to sexual violence by forcing a man to perform fellatio on another man. See paras. 37-40. 
116 See NNR Quenivet op cit note 45 at 117. 
117 See NNR Quenivet op cit note 45 at 113. 
118 I will not venture into the debate about the cumulative or alternative use of the words widespread and 
systematic, as I will follow the ICC formulation of this crime, which has an alternative use. For a summary 
of this debate, the reader is welcome to read: McAuliffe deGuzman, Margaret; The Road from Rome: The 
Developing Law of Crimes against Humanity; Human Rights Quarterly 22; (2000); 335-403. 
 
 
 
 
 105
nature.119 The ICTR statute was the first statute to include this element into its definition. 
Widespread refers to the quantitative nature of the attack and can be derived from the 
amount of victims of the crime, while systematic refers to the qualitative nature of the 
attack. The latter can be deduced from the organised nature of the attack.120 
 
3.2.3.1 Sexual violence as being widespread 
In order for sexual violence to be widespread in nature, it has to constitute a mass crime. 
Thus, there should be evidence that it was committed against vast numbers of victims. In 
the Akayesu judgment the ICTR found that multiple Tutsi women who sought refuge at 
the bureau communal of the Taba commune were subjected to rape.121 The ICTR found 
Akayesu guilty for the rape of the women at the bureau communal, because he knew that 
these women were raped and did nothing to stop it and in some instances encouraged the 
rape of Tutsi women.122 
 
Quenivet highlights that many feminists complain that sexual violence are only 
prosecuted when they occur on a large scale.123 The widespread nature of a crime against 
humanity would unfortunately require that it be perpetrated on a large scale. However, 
this does not mean that a perpetrator who committed one rape only will not be prosecuted 
for this crime. In the latter instance the perpetrator can be prosecuted for committing a 
                                                 
119 My emphasis added. 
120 See G Werle op cit note 77 at 225. 
121 Para. 449. 
122 Para. 452. 
123 See NNR Quenivet op cit note 45 at 132. 
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war crime.124 This distinction does not necessarily mean that the raping of one woman is 
less serious or reprehensible compared to the raping of hundreds of women. The latter 
instance will serve as better evidence for the prosecution to produce to have a conviction 
for a crime against humanity, when the perpetrator intended to launch an attack against a 
civilian population.  
 
3.2.3.2 Sexual violence as being systematic 
One of the methods in which the systematic nature of sexual violence can be proved is by 
establishing that there was a policy or a plan behind the sexual violence, as a means to 
attack a civilian population. Proving that such a policy or plan was in place before the 
sexual violence took place is a difficult task faced by the prosecution.125 However, in the 
Akayesu judgment the court found that the accused had made statements in public that 
motivated the raping of Tutsi women. For example, the ICTR found that he made 
statements to the Interahamwe militia saying: “Never ask me again what a Tutsi woman 
tastes like” after the militia raped a witness.126 On another occasion the accused also 
supervised the raping of Tutsi women.127 All these actions can be used as circumstantial 
evidence to prove that there was a plan or policy in place to rape Tutsi women, even 
though the prosecutor might not have been in possession of such plan or policy.  
 
                                                 
124 See NNR Quenivet op cit note 45 at 129. 
125 See NNR Quenivet op cit note 45 at 135. 
126 Para. 452. 
127 Para. 122. 
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In the Foca trial judgment the ICTY was convinced that the accused committed attacks 
on the Muslim civilian population and that these attacks were carried out with the 
involvement of the local authorities.128 The ICTY even found that the local head of the 
Foca police force was even identified as one of the men who took women out of detention 
centres and raped them.129 
 
Thus in both these cases the criminal tribunals were convinced that there must have been 
a plan or policy annexed to the raping of Tutsi and Muslim women, based on the actions 
of the accused persons and not necessarily on the prosecution bringing evidence of the 
plan or policy to court. 
 
‘Widespread’ and ‘systematic’ are not mutually exclusive notions, as they often overlap 
in practice. However, the prosecution is only required to prove one of these two notions, 
as the ICC statute requires either a widespread or a systematic attack on a civilian 
population.130 Mettraux has compiled a list of the following factors which could be 
considered when establishing whether an attack was indeed widespread or systematic in 
nature: 
“(i)  The number of criminal acts; 
(ii) The existence of criminal patterns; 
(iii) The logistics and financial resources involved; 
(iv) The number of victims; 
(v) The existence of public statements or political views underpinning the events; 
(vi) The existence of a plan or policy targeting a specific group of individuals; 
(vii) The means and methods used in the attack; 
                                                 
128 Para. 576. 
129 Para. 124. 
130 See article 7(1) of the ICC statute. My emphasis added. 
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(viii) The inescapability of the attack; 
(ix) The foreseeability of the criminal occurrences; 
(x) The involvement of political or military authorities; 
(xi) Temporally and geographically repeated and coordinated military operations 
which all led to the same result or consequences; 
(xii) Alteration of the ethnic, religious, or racial composition of the population; 
(xiii) The establishment and implementation of autonomous political or military 
structures at any level of authority in a given territory; 
(xiv) Adoption of various discriminatory measures.”131 
 
These factors serve as a good indication to establish whether an attack was widespread or 
systematic in nature. These factors are furthermore broad enough to include acts of sexual 
violence as a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population. 
 
3.3 Establishing the intention to commit sexual violence as a crime against humanity 
Article 30 of the ICC statute stipulates the mental element needed to commit crimes under 
the jurisdiction of the ICC. The requirements needed to establish an intention on the part 
of the perpetrator, in terms of the ICC statute, is merely a declaratory reference of what 
was required in terms of rulings by the ICTY and the ICTR132 and customary 
international law.133 
 
Article 30 of the ICC statute is worded as follows: 
“1.  Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material 
elements are committed with intent and knowledge. 
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; 
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence 
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
                                                 
131 See G Mettraux op cit note 104 at 171. 
132 See G Mettraux op cit note 104 at 172-174.  
133 See G Werle op cit note 77 at 230. 
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3. For the purposes of this, “knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance exists or 
a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. “Know” and “knowingly” 
shall be construed accordingly.” 
 
Thus, in terms of article 30, an accused must have the knowledge and the intention to 
commit a crime against humanity. For purposes of sexual violence, the accused person 
must commit the act (i.e. sexual violence) knowing that (s)he will commit sexual violence 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.  
 
The extent as to which the perpetrator must be aware of an attack against a civilian 
population was the topic of debate at the drafting of the ICC statute. Von Hebel and Kelt 
states that: 
 “On the one hand, several delegations though it would be sufficient if the perpetrator had 
knowledge of the existence of an attack, even though it could not be required that he 
knew of its exact nature or of all its implications. On the other hand, several delegations 
though that it should also be required that the perpetrator knew that the attack was 
widespread or systematic. The latter interpretation finds some support in Article 7 of the 
Statute, where the chapeau refers to “knowledge of the attack”, referring back to “a 
widespread or systematic attack.””134 
 
One can only presume that the delegations that opted for the approach of knowledge of a 
widespread or systematic attack did so on the basis of the nullum crimen sine lege 
principle. In other words, it is the attack, and not the acts of the accused, which must be 
directed at targeting the civilian population in order to prove that the accused committed a 
crime against humanity. 
 
                                                 
134 See Herman von Hebel & Maria Kelt ‘Some Comments on the Elements of Crimes for the Crimes of the 
ICC Statute’ (2000) 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 284. 
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On the other hand, the accused must only know that his acts form part of his intention to 
launch an attack on the civilian population.135 Thus, when a perpetrator commits sexual 
slavery, for example, he must only have the knowledge that this act of sexual violence 
forms part of his (or his superiors’) larger plan to attack the civilian population.  
 
Even though a prosecutor might have the burden of establishing both an intention and 
knowledge on the part of the perpetrator for committing a crime against humanity, (s)he 
only need to prove that the perpetrator had knowledge that he will be committing acts of 
sexual violence as part of a greater scheme to attack civilians. 
  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter contains an in-depth analysis of how sexual violence can be committed as a 
crime against humanity. Even though article 7 of the ICC statute only stipulates rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and enforced sterilization, as 
expressed acts of crimes against humanity, the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR 
revealed that enslavement and torture can also constitute acts of sexual violence. The 
international criminal tribunals have obviously opted for such an interpretation, as these 
statutes only included rape as an express crime against humanity (as far as sexual 
violence is concerned). One should bear in mind that these acts are not the only forms of 
sexual violence constituting crimes against humanity. As I mentioned above,136 forced 
                                                 
135 See G Mettraux op cit note 104 at 173. 
136 See 3.1.3.6 above. 
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marriages can also amount to acts of sexual violence. There are also other acts that can 
amount to sexual violence, such as forced masturbation or forced nudity. Thus, one 
should always be mindful that article 7(g) does not constitute a numerus clausus. 
 
At the time of writing, the prosecutor had closed his case against Charles Taylor in the 
SCSL. In the indictment, Taylor is also charged with committing rape and sexual slavery 
as a crime against humanity.137 I sincerely hope that the SCSL does not follow its 
precedent in the AFRC judgment by dismissing charges of sexual violence unfairly and 
incorrectly against the former president of Liberia, if admissible evidence of such acts 
were to be proved by the prosecutor. 
 
In the next chapter a comparative analysis will be drawn between sexual violence as a 
crime against humanity and genocide, respectively. Due to space constraints, only 4 
similarities and differences will be explored. 
 
 
                                                 
137 See counts 4 and 5 respectively of The Prosecutor v Charles Taylor SCSL-03-01-PT, 2nd amended 
indictment. 
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Chapter 4: 
 
Comparative Approaches to Sexual Violence: The Intersection of Genocide and 
Crimes against Humanity 
 
 
“One of the problems in adequately labelling crimes of sexual violence committed on a 
vast scale is that genocide requires proof of an ulterior, or specific intent. The acts of rape 
must be committed with the intent of destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group. Just because the rapes occur contemporaneously to, or within 
the general environment of, genocide does not mean that it will fit that crime’s 
definition.”1 
 
“The major difference between genocide and crimes against humanity is that genocide 
requires the specific “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group.” Accordingly, genocide is often considered a sub-set of crimes against 
humanity because acts of genocide also generally constitute crimes against humanity.”2 
 
“Genocide overlaps with crimes against humanity only when certain specified conditions 
exist as to mens rea, the victim at issue, and the context in which the crimes are 
committed.”3 
 
 
The above quotations highlight the problem within which genocide and crimes against 
humanity can be compared. On the one hand, crimes of sexual violence may take place 
within an environment of genocide, while not legally constituting genocide, in terms of 
the definition of the crime. On the other hand, major legal differences exist between 
crimes against humanity and genocide. Based upon this perplexed conceptualisation, this 
chapter will seek to investigate the extent of the similarities and differences in committing 
sexual violence as genocide and as a crime against humanity. 
 
                                                 
1 See Claire De Than and Edwin Shorts International Criminal Law and Human Rights 1st Ed (2003) 355. 
2 See Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman ‘The Road from Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes against 
Humanity’ (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 349. 
3 See David L. Nersessian ‘Comparative Approaches to Punishing Hate: The Intersection of Genocide and 
Crimes against Humanity’ (2007) 43 Stanford Journal of International Law 251. 
 
 
 
 
 113
There exist multiple legal differences between crimes against humanity and genocide. 
Genocide has a narrow application as it only protects the four specified groups (national, 
ethnic, religious or racial), while crimes against humanity find application when any of 
the specified acts have been committed against a civilian population. Another difference 
can be found in the different onuses placed on the prosecution. For genocide the 
prosecutor will have to prove that the accused possessed dolus specialis, while for crimes 
against humanity this standard is not required. Of more direct interest to this study, the 
specific acts that can amount to crimes against humanity are listed of which sexual 
violence forms a large part, while with genocide crimes of sexual violence need to be 
interpreted into the specific acts.  
 
On the other hand, based on the context within which these crimes are usually committed, 
the jurisdictional regime would be of an international nature for both genocide and crimes 
against humanity. Genocide and crimes against humanity are also individual acts 
committed by persons with the knowledge that their acts form part of a greater purpose, 
being either to annihilate a protected group in terms of genocide or a broader attack 
against a civilian population in terms of crimes against humanity. Both genocide and 
crimes against humanity can also take place in the absence of an armed conflict. 
 
This chapter will also thus seek to outline the legal similarities and differences and its 
possible practical consequences. These will mainly be drawn from the success of 
prosecution of sexual violence as genocide and crimes against humanity for which an 
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accused was indicted. This chapter will first assess the differences of sexual violence as 
genocide and crimes against humanity in more detail before investigating the similarities 
and the effect this could possibly have on the prosecution of these crimes. As a third point 
this chapter discusses the importance of taking precaution against arbitrarily cumulating 
charges of sexual violence as genocide and crimes against humanity. 
 
4.1 The differences  
This section will highlight four legal differences in sexual violence as genocide and 
crimes against humanity. These four differences relate to: (1) the scope of application; (2) 
the degree of intention; (3) the burden of proof and (4) the interpretation of the acts of 
sexual violence. 
 
4.1.1 The scope of application 
The scope of genocide can be found in its definition that states: “…genocide means any 
of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group…”4 The scope for crimes against humanity can also be 
found within its definition: “… crimes against humanity means any of the following acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population…”5 Thus while genocide seems to adopt a narrow approach to the groups of 
                                                 
4 See article 6 of the ICC statute. 
5 See article 7 of the ICC statute. 
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people that it protects,6 crimes against humanity grants protection to the civilian 
population.  
 
As argued in chapter 2 of this thesis, the groups that the genocide definition protects are 
identified as traits that define a person’s identity.7 Even though women bear the brunt of 
sexual violence while genocide is being committed, the reason why they are targeted is 
more often than not based on their identification as forming part of a certain national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, instead of their sex.8 
 
Similar can be argued with regards to the extent of protection provided by the definition 
of a crime against humanity. Feminist scholars have been arguing for a break-away from 
including women and men into the broad protection provided to civilians, as it ignores the 
brunt of sexual violence perpetrated against women.9 Once again it should be noted that 
the protection offered to civilians, as a whole, grants protection to women and men who 
fall victim to sexual violence in the context of a crime against humanity.10 Article 7(1)(g) 
of the ICC statute gives recognition to this. 
 
                                                 
6 It only protects national, ethnic, racial and religious groups of people. It does not protect any other group 
of people, as it does not state so within its definition. See also 1.3 in chapter 1 for a history of the 
definition. 
7 See 2.1. in chapter 2. 
8 See 2.1.2. in chapter 2. 
9 See Judith Gardam & Hilary Charlesworth ‘Protection of Women in Armed Conflict’ (2000) 22 Human 
Rights Quarterly 150. See also 3.2.2. in chapter 3. 
10 See 3.2.2. in chapter 3. 
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The scope of application does not just only apply to groups protected under the 
definitions of genocide and crimes against humanity, but also to the acts specified under 
these definitions.  
 
The definition of genocide only list five acts of how this crime can be committed.11 Even 
though some of the acts do not need further specification of how genocide can be 
committed, other acts are fairly vague and are completely depended on how they are 
interpreted. For example, killing persons of a protected group can be done in many ways, 
but the result of actions of killing always amount to human remains. However, causing 
serious bodily harm to members of a group can amount to a phenomenon that is 
completely subjective, which in the end requires a judge to skilfully interpret such a 
provision.12 More relevant to the issue of sexual violence, the ICTR conceptualised sexual 
violence, in the form of rape, as an example of causing serious bodily or mental harm to a 
person.13 Another abstract act of genocide are conditions to bring about the destruction of 
a group, as such conditions are not defined and no examples are given of the type of 
conditions to bring about the destruction of a group.  
 
Both the ICTR and the ICTY have given various examples of measures intended to 
prevent births within a group. In the Akayesu judgment the trial chamber stated that 
                                                 
11 These five acts are: “(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily harm to members of 
the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) 
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”. 
12 See 2.2.2. in chapter 2 
13 See the Akayesu judgment at para. 731 and the Muhimana judgment at para. 302. 
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“sterilization, forced birth control, prohibition on marriages and segregation of the sexes” 
all amounted to ways in which one can prevent births within a group.14 In the Karadzic 
and Mladic rule 61 judgment the ICTY proclaimed that “some camps were especially 
devoted to the raping of women, with the aim of forcing then birth of Serbian offspring. 
The women were held in captivity until it was too late for them to undergo an abortion”.15 
There is thus also no clear specified understanding of the ways in which this act can be 
performed.  
 
In chapter 2 I have argued that sexual violence can amount to all five acts of genocide. 
This clearly sheds light on my argument that these acts are very abstract in nature, and to 
establish whether it was the intention of the perpetrator to commit genocide by way of 
one of these acts in mind is thus difficult.  
 
On the other hand, a crime against humanity, as defined in the ICC statute, lists a number 
of acts that can amount to a crime against humanity.16 An important difference between 
genocide and crimes against humanity is that the latter has a specific section that only 
                                                 
14 Para. 507. 
15 Para. 64. 
16 Article 7(1) of the ICC statute list the following ways in which a crime against humanity can be 
committed: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of 
population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental 
rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against 
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as 
defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) the crime of apartheid; (k) Other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health. 
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deals with crimes of a sexual nature.17 Even though rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy and enforced sterilization can take place in many ways, it 
is much easier to distinguish the intention of the perpetrator to commit these crimes. In 
other words, the prosecutor is not left to prove to a court that the perpetrator committed 
one of the acts of a crime against humanity, with a broader purpose in mind. The 
prosecutor is thus left with only having to prove that the accused had the intention to 
commit a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. With genocide 
the prosecutor would thus have to prove that the accused committed rape as part of the 
attack to cause serious bodily or mental harm to members of a protected group, with the 
intention of annihilating the whole group.  
 
4.1.2 The degree of intention 
In order to establish the intention that an accused possess to commit genocide, one would 
have to assess the criminal act committed (e.g. rape) and how this would influence on the 
destruction of a group. On the other hand, for crimes against humanity, to establish the 
intention of the accused, one would have to assess the criminal act committed (e.g. sexual 
slavery) and how this would influence the attack against a civilian population. Article 30 
of the ICC statute regulates the mental element needed to commit a crime in terms of this 
statute.18 This article regulates the mental element needed for all the crimes committed 
                                                 
17 See article 7(1)(g) of the ICC statute in comparison to article 6(a)-(e) of the ICC statute that deals with 
the acts of genocide. 
18 Article 30 reads: “1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with 
intent and knowledge. 2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: (a) In relation to 
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under the ICC statute, therefore it would apply both to genocide and crimes against 
humanity. 
 
The definition of genocide states that “genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part…”19 Thus a perpetrator has to 
commit one of the acts of genocide, with the intention of destroying the group. Whether 
he or she succeeds in destroying a protected group is irrelevant at this stage, as the 
definition states that the protected group can be destroyed in whole or in part. The 
intention component to commit genocide is divided into two: (1) the general intent to 
commit an act (e.g. rape) and (2) the special intent to commit genocide (destroy a 
protected group).20 Thus, for the prosecution to prove that an accused committed 
genocide by way of, for example, raping women, they would have to prove that the 
accused possessed dolus directus or dolus eventualis when he committed the rape,21 and 
that he possessed dolus specialis to destroy the targeted group in whole or in part.22 The 
prosecution is thus left with the difficult evidential burden of not just establishing that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to 
cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of event. 3. For the purposes of 
this article, “knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the 
ordinary course of events. “Know” and “knowingly” shall be construed accordingly”. 
19 See article 6 of the ICC statute. My emphasis added. 
20 See Bettina Ulrike Schaefer Genocidal Intent at the ICTR and ICTY – Problems to indict for Genocide at 
the two Ad Hoc Tribunals (2006) Unpublished LL.M Dissertation; University of Stellenbosch 8. 
21 In other words, he must have intended to rape the victim. 
22 In other words, the prosecution would have to prove that by raping the victim, the accused intended to 
destroy the targeted group that is also protected under the definition of genocide. 
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accused committed rape,23 but that he had done so with the overall intention of destroying 
a protected group.24 
 
Article 30 of the ICC statute would find application to establish the intention of an 
accused to commit a crime against humanity.  Thus, a person accused of committing a 
crime against humanity would need to commit the act (e.g. sexual slavery) with the 
intention and with the knowledge that the act takes place as part of a broader attack 
against a civilian population.   
 
Article 30 further explains what is required in order to establish intention and knowledge. 
In terms of article 30(2) an accused would possess intention if: (1) he means to engage in 
the conduct; and (2) if he means for that consequence to occur or is aware that the 
consequence would occur because of his conduct. An accused person would thus possess 
the intention of committing a crime against humanity if he commits sexual slavery (the 
conduct) and knows that it would form part of a greater attack against a civilian 
population (the consequence).  
 
In terms of article 30(3) of the ICC statute knowledge “means awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events”. The 
                                                 
23 As rape on its own is a crime not punishable by the ICC. 
24 It should be noted that the prosecutor also has the burden of proving to the court that the act of rape 
amounted to one of the five listed acts that can be committed in terms of the genocide definition. I.e. killing 
members of a group, causing serious bodily harm, deliberately conflicting conditions to bring about the 
physical destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent birth and forcibly transferring children. 
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first part of this explanation is quite clear that an accused must be aware of the attack 
against a civilian population (in order to commit a crime against humanity). However, in 
order to assess whether a consequence will occur, as part of a broader attack against a 
civilian population, seems somewhat relative. In order to successfully prove this, the 
prosecutor is left with the complex task of proving that the accused knew that a 
consequence would occur.  
 
In conclusion, for the prosecutor to successfully argue that an accused committed sexual 
violence as a crime against humanity, he or she would have to prove the intention by: (1) 
proving that an accused meant to commit sexual violence; and (2) that the accused knew 
of the consequence of this act. The prosecution would also have to prove that by 
committing sexual violence, the accused had the knowledge of the broader context within 
which he committed these crimes, i.e. an attack against the civilian population. 
DeGuzman thus correctly argues that: 
“The mental element of crimes against humanity under customary international law 
consists of a requirement that the perpetrator have knowledge of the nexus between his or 
her act and a widespread or systematic attack against civilians. This knowledge 
requirement stands in contradistinction to the specific intent required for the crime of 
genocide.”25 
 
4.1.3 The burden of proof 
The third legal difference between genocide and crimes against humanity can be found in 
the burden of proof. The burden of proof is closely linked to the degree of intention, as it 
sets the standard at which a crime should be proved by the prosecution. In criminal trials 
                                                 
25 See M McAuliffe deGuzman op cit note 2 at 378. 
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a prosecutor should by default prove that an accused committed a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.26 This is obviously different to what is required for civil law standards, 
being that the party who institutes a dispute should be able to prove that the opposing 
party did something or lacked to do something on a preponderance of probabilities. 
 
In order to prove that an accused committed genocide, the prosecutor would have to 
prove that the accused possessed a special intention. On a broader level than sexual 
violence, Werle states that the following factors would suffice in proving that the accused 
possessed a special intention to destroy a protected group: “the existence of a plan, a large 
number of victims, choice of victims based on their membership in the group, and the 
perpetrator’s bearing when committing the crime”.27 
 
Examples of sexual violence that can be used in order to establish that an accused 
possessed a special intention to destroy a protected group can be found in various 
decisions by the ICTR. The first example can be found in the Akayesu judgment. In this 
case the trial chamber found that: 
“The acts of rape and sexual violence … were committed solely against Tutsi women, 
many of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation, mutilated, and raped 
several times, often in public, in the Bureau Communal premises or in other public 
places, and often by more than one assailant.”28  
                                                 
26 See Jonathan Burchell and John Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3rd Ed (2005) 11. 
27 See Gerhard Werle Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) 210. 
28 Para. 731. 
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The ICTR also relied on testimony from witnesses who heard Akayesu tell the 
Interahamwe militia “don’t ever ask again what a Tutsi woman tastes like”29 before 
giving them permission to rape these women. 
 
In the Musema judgment the court stated the following: 
 “… on the basis of the evidence presented, it emerges that acts of serious bodily and 
mental harm, including rape and other forms of sexual violence were often accompanied 
by humiliating utterances, which clearly indicated that the intention underlying each 
specific act was to destroy the Tutsi group as a whole. The Chamber notes, for example, 
that during the rape of Nyiramusugi Musema declared: ‘The pride of the Tutsis will end 
today’. In this context, the acts of rape and sexual violence were an integral part of the 
plan conceived to destroy the Tutsi group… Witness N testified before the Chamber that 
Nyiramusugi, who was left for dead by those who raped her, had indeed been killed in a 
way. Indeed, the Witness specified that what they did to her is worse than death.”30 
 
Thus, by making discriminatory and humiliating utterances while specifically raping 
Tutsi women, the court established that Musema possessed the special intention needed to 
commit sexual violence as a form of genocide.  
 
Similar to what Musema did, the accused in the Gacumbitsi judgment also possessed the 
special intention needed in order to satisfy the burden of proof needed to prove genocide. 
Gacumbitsi incited Hutu men to rape Tutsi women who refused to marry Hutu men, 
stating that the Tutsi women’s refusal to marry Hutu men should be punished by way of 
inserting sticks into their genitals.31  
 
                                                 
29 Para. 732. 
30 Para. 933. 
31 Paras. 200-202. 
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 However, it should be remembered that the above acts of sexual violence had to be 
argued by the prosecution as constituting either: “(a) killing members of the group; or (b) 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; or (c) deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction 
in whole or in part; or (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
or (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”.32 
 
With crimes against humanity the position is slightly different. In terms of article 7(1) of 
the ICC statute the perpetrator must have knowledge of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population.33 Werle rightly argues that the perpetrator’s actions must 
form part of the attack.34 He also states that is not necessary for the perpetrator to be 
aware of a government or organization’s plan or policy.35 This is a major difference with 
genocide where the perpetrator has to be aware of the policy or plan to annihilate a 
specific group in order to comply with the special intention standard.  
 
Another major difference between genocide and crimes against humanity in establishing 
the burden of proof is that, with crimes against humanity the prosecutor would not have 
to prove that an act of sexual violence formed part of a broader attack directed at a 
civilian population. If the prosecutor thus proved that the accused, for example, 
committed sexual slavery with his victim, it will suffice to show evidence of this sexual 
                                                 
32 See article 2(2)(a) - (e) of the ICTR statute. 
33 My emphasis added. 
34 See G Werle op cit note 27 at 231. 
35 Ibid at 33. 
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slavery and not that it formed part of causing serious bodily or mental harm. The latter 
would be required in order for a prosecutor to succeed with proving sexual violence as 
forming part of a genocide charge.  
 
4.1.4 Interpreting the acts of sexual violence 
This section highlights the last difference between the crimes that will be investigated in 
this chapter. As argued under 4.1.3, the interpretation of the acts of sexual violence would 
have an effect on the burden of proof standard that the prosecutor would have to meet.  
 
The Akayesu judgment laid the foundation for the interpretation of sexual violence as one 
of the five acts of genocide. In terms of killing members of a group, the ICTR found in 
Akayesu that “in most cases, the rapes of Tutsi women in Taba, were accompanied with 
the intent to kill those women. Many rapes were perpetrated near mass graves where the 
women were taken to be killed”.36 In the Akayesu judgment the ICTR also found that 
sexual violence constitutes serious bodily or mental harm.37 In the Kayishema and 
Ruzindana judgment the court argued that “rape, the starving of a group of people, 
reducing required medical services below a minimum, and withholding sufficient living 
accommodation for a reasonable period”38 constitutes conditions of life calculated to 
bring about a group’s physical destruction in whole or in part. In the ICTY, the trial 
                                                 
36 Para. 733. 
37 Para. 731: “…rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm 
on the victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the worst ways of inflict harm on the victim 
as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm”. 
38 Para. 116. 
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chamber in the Karadzic and Mladic rule 61 judgment established that “some camps were 
specially devoted to rape, with the aim of forcing the birth of Serbian offspring, the 
women often being interned until it was too late for them to undergo an abortion”.39 Thus 
sexual violence was interpreted as a form of imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within a group.  
 
Thus, the precedent set down by the international criminal tribunals sheds light on the fact 
that it possible for sexual violence to form one of the five acts of genocide. This then 
places an added burden on the prosecutor to prove that an act of sexual violence, 
committed as part of genocide, constituted one of the five acts of genocide.  
 
As discussed in chapter 1, the definition of a crime against humanity has evolved with 
time40 and is currently comprehensively explained in the provisions of the ICC statute.41 
The ICTY and ICTR statutes both only make provision for the act of rape to form part of 
the definition of a crime against humanity.42 Thus, rape could be prosecuted as a crime 
against humanity in the conflict that preceded both the establishment of these statutes. In 
the Akayesu judgment the ICTR attempted to by-pass the restrictive conditions placed in 
the ICTR statute by just mentioning rape as a crime against humanity. They did this by 
                                                 
39 Para. 64. 
40 See 1.2. in chapter 1. 
41 See article 7 of the ICC statute. 
42 See article 5(g) of the ICTY statute and article 3(g) of the ICTR statute. 
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defining rape broadly.43 Thus, even though other forms of sexual violence were not 
specifically mentioned in the ICTR statute, it could have been interpreted broadly using 
the Akayesu judgment as precedence.  
 
Subsequent to the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR statutes, the statute establishing 
the SCSL went further and included sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and forced 
pregnancy as specific forms of sexual violence that can be committed as a crime against 
humanity.44 The ICC statute added enforced sterilization as another form of sexual 
violence to the above specific forms.45 
 
In order for the prosecutor to thus successfully prosecute a charge of sexual violence as a 
crime against humanity, mere proof of the act will suffice, as the various forms of sexual 
violence are specifically prohibited as a crime against humanity. Only once an act of 
sexual violence is not specifically mentioned, like in the case of forced marriages, would 
the prosecutor have to prove that this constitutes a crime against humanity.  
 
As can be determined from the above legal differences between sexual violence as 
genocide and crimes against humanity, the former would place a more stringent burden 
on the prosecutor to prove that an act of sexual violence constitutes genocide. With 
                                                 
43 Para. 688 reads: “The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which include rape, as any act of a sexual 
nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive”. 
44 See article 2(g) of the SCSL statute. 
45 See article 7(1)(g) of the ICC statute. 
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crimes against humanity, a less severe burden of proof is needed. The next section would 
investigate the similarities between these crimes, especially in relation to sexual violence.  
 
4.2 The similarities 
This section will highlight four similarities in genocide and crimes against humanity. 
They are: (1) the jurisdictional regime; (2) the knowledge of a broader context; (3) the 
element of persecution; and (4) the punishment of the crime.46 
 
4.2.1 The jurisdictional regime 
The following five theoretical principles govern the conceptualisation of jurisdiction. 
Firstly, the territorial principle requires that a suspect be in a country and physically 
detained by that country’s authorities.47 De Than and Shorts here rightly argues that this 
is the strongest claim to exercise jurisdiction.48 Secondly, the nationality principle allows 
for a country to prosecute its own citizen for crimes committed in a foreign country.49 
Thirdly, the protective principle allows a state to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a 
                                                 
46 As a point of interest, it would be best to also mention the views of Cassese, who states that genocide and 
crimes against humanity are similar in the following context: “(i) they encompass very serious offenses that 
shock our sense of humanity in that they constitute attacks on the most fundamental aspects of human 
dignity; (ii) they do not constitute isolated events but are instead normally part of a larger context, either 
because they are large-scale and massive infringements of human dignity or because they are linked to a 
broader practice of misconduct; and (iii) although they need not be perpetrated by State officials or by 
officials of entities such as insurgents, they are usually carried out with the complicity, connivance or at 
least the toleration of authorities.” - See Antonio Cassese as quoted in DL Nersessian op cit note 3 at 246. 
Thus apart from the above technical legal similarities that will be investigated in this chapter, Cassese 
correctly highlights broader similarities based on the perceptions of human dignity. 
47See Malcom N Shaw International Law 2nd Ed (1986) 349. 
48 See C De Than and E Shorts op cit note 1 at 38. 
49 See MN Shaw op cit note 47 at 353. 
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foreign national to protect the state’s interest.50 Fourthly, from a universality principle, 
any country is allowed to exercise jurisdiction over any perpetrator who committed an 
international crime.51 The last theory of jurisdiction is called the passive personality 
principle. In terms of this principle a country can exercise jurisdiction over a foreign 
national even though the crime did not take place within its borders, however, some of the 
victims must be citizens of the country.52 
 
The most written about theory that currently applies with crimes of an international 
character is the universal jurisdiction principle. Werle states that: “the principle of 
universal jurisdiction applies to crimes under international law”.53 Since both genocide 
and crimes against humanity form part of crimes of an international character, the 
principle of universal jurisdiction would apply to both these crimes. In other words, any 
country where a perpetrator may find him within can exercise jurisdiction over him and 
prosecute if he committed sexual violence as a form of one of genocide or crimes against 
humanity.  
 
Another international feature of genocide and crimes against humanity is that the ICC has 
the competence to deal with such crimes. With that it should also be noted that the ICTY, 
ICTR and the SCSL have an international character within the constitution of these 
tribunals. Thus, the international community is left with the impression that crimes of 
                                                 
50 See MN Shaw op cit note 47 at 358. 
51 See MN Shaw op cit note 47 at 359. 
52 See MN Shaw op cit note 47 at 357. 
53 See G Werle op cit note 27 at 59. 
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such magnitude, like genocide and crimes against humanity are quite serious as it requires 
a court or tribunal of an international character to prosecute these crimes.  
 
It should also be noted that there are instances where national courts have prosecuted 
offenders of crimes of an international character. An example of this would be the 
‘Gacaca Tribunals’ established in Rwanda to prosecute perpetrators that took part in the 
1994 conflict.54 
 
It can thus be concluded that since the conceptualisation of sexual violence as genocide 
and a crime against humanity, together with giving sexual violence recognition under 
various international treaties, sexual violence developed into a crime of an international 
character.  
 
4.2.2 The knowledge of a broader context 
When the differences between genocide and crimes against humanity were investigated, a 
clear argument was made that in order for the perpetrator to commit genocide, he must 
have knowledge of a plan or policy that is being implemented to destroy a protected 
group. Under the same heading the argument was also made that if a perpetrator commits 
a crime against humanity he only needs to have knowledge of the attack upon a civilian 
                                                 
54 See William A. Schabas ‘Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts’ (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 881. 
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population.55 Even though there exist a big difference between having knowledge of a 
plan or policy and having knowledge of an attack upon the civilian population, the 
common feature here remains that the perpetrator need to possess knowledge.56 
 
In the case of The Prosecutor v Krstic57 the ICTY discussed the relationship between 
genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in the ICTY statute.58 While doing this, 
the trial chamber argued that: 
 “The requirement in Article 5 [the article that defines crimes against humanity] that the 
crimes be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population is 
comprised within the genocide requirement that there be an intent to destroy a specified 
type of group… acts of genocide must be committed in the context of a manifest pattern 
of similar conduct, or themselves constitute a conduct that could in itself effect the 
destruction of the group, in whole or in part, as such. Thus, Article 5’s exclusion of 
random or isolated acts also characterises genocide.”59 
 
Put differently, the ICTY thus argued that within the construction of an intention to 
destroy a protected group (which is ultimately required to commit genocide), an element 
that justifiably acknowledged that the perpetrator knew of an attack (which is also 
required to prove that an accused committed a crime against humanity) is located. This 
element of knowing of an attack should also be present when a crime against humanity is 
committed against a civilian population.  
 
Therefore, if sexual violence is being committed under circumstances of mayhem, it may 
not necessarily mean that a perpetrator intends to annihilate a protected group, when in 
                                                 
55 See 4.1.2. above. 
56 My emphasis added. 
57 IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001 (Hereinafter referred to as the Krstic judgment). 
58 Paras. 682 – 686. 
59 Para. 682. 
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actual fact he commits sexual violence by staging an attack against a civilian population. 
Put differently; if sexual violence is being committed under circumstances of mayhem, it 
may not necessarily mean that a perpetrator is staging an attack against a civilian 
population, when in actual fact he intends to annihilate a protected group under the 
definition of genocide. The knowledge under which these circumstances are articulated is 
thus commonly found within the context of both genocide and crimes against humanity.  
 
4.2.3 The element of persecution 
Persecution is listed as an act of a crime against humanity.60 In terms of the ICTR and 
ICTY statutes persecution can only take place based on political, racial or religious 
grounds.61 The statute establishing the SCSL makes provision for persecution to take 
place on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds.62 The ICC statute is the most 
progressive statute which not only makes provisions for the grounds stipulated in the 
SCSL statute, but also expressly creates grounds of persecution based on nationality, 
culture and gender.63 It also leaves a backdoor open for interpretation by also recognising 
“grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in 
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court”.64 Thus, similar to the acts of sexual violence stipulated in the ICC statute,65 
                                                 
60 See article 7(1)(h) of the ICC statute; article 5(h) of the ICTY statute; article 3(h) of the ICTR statute and 
article 2(h) of the SCSL statute. 
61 See article 5(h) of the ICTY statute and article 3(h) of the ICTR statute. 
62 See article 2(h) of the SCSL statute. 
63 See article 7(1)(h) of the ICC statute. 
64 Ibid. 
65 See article 7(1)(g) of the ICC statute. 
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the drafters of this act ensured that no loopholes are created by covering their basis by 
way of an open ended ground.  
 
The EoC annexed to the ICC statute list the following elements for persecution to be 
committed: 
 “1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or more persons 
of fundamental rights. 
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by way of the identity of a group or 
collectively or targeted the group or collectively as such. 
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3 of the Statute, or other grounds that are 
universally recognised as impermissible under international law.  
4. The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in article 7, 
paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.  
5. The conduct was conducted as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population, 
6. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”66 
 
The ground of persecution thus requires that a victim be targeted based on her ethnicity, 
race, religious beliefs, cultural beliefs, nationality or political views. This is in stark 
similarity to what a victim of genocide is targeted upon. Genocide victims are targeted 
based on their nationality, ethnical grouping, race or religious views. In actual fact, the 
ground of persecution as a crime against humanity opens the door to groups that are not 
covered in the definition of genocide, like cultural beliefs, political views and gender. 
Even though, one can argue that political grounds does not constitute an inherently 
permanent group (as what Lemkin intended for the application of genocide67), in modern 
day and age religion is also not considered to be an inherently permanent group, as the 
freedom of choice of religion is guaranteed as a fundamental human right. 
                                                 
66 See article 7(1) of the EoC annexed to the ICC statute. 
67 See 1.3. in Chapter 1. 
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In the Krstic judgment the ICTY stated that the accused was a perpetrator of persecution 
because he participated in: 
 “a. the murder of thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians, including men, women, 
children, and elderly persons; 
b. the cruel and inhumane treatment of Bosnian Muslim civilians, including severe 
beatings; 
c. the terrorizing of Bosnian Muslim civilians; 
d. the destruction of personal property of Bosnian Muslims; and 
e. the deportation or forcible transfer of Bosnian Muslims from the Srebrenica enclave.”68 
 
These grounds in themselves appear fairly similar to what would have been required had 
the ICTY found that the accused participated in a genocide plan against Bosnian Muslim 
civilians. Firstly, he murdered Bosnian Muslims and people from no other religious 
group. Secondly, he also treated Bosnian Muslims inhumanely and cruelly, which can 
amount to causing serious bodily or mental harm or deliberate conditions calculated to 
bring about a Muslim group’s destruction. Thirdly, he participated in the deportation or 
transfer of Bosnian Muslims which, provided that the circumstances allowed, could 
amount to forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  
 
On the other hand, in the Tadic trial judgment the ICTY defined persecution as: “… some 
form of discrimination that is intended to be and results in an infringement of an 
individual’s fundamental rights. Additionally, this discrimination must be on specific 
grounds, namely race, religion or politics”.69 Thus, the ICTY in this judgment argued that 
the victim, who was targeted based on her race, religion or political views must have been 
deprived of a fundamental right. The only slight difference between this definition of 
                                                 
68 Para. 533. 
69 Paras. 697 and 715. 
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persecution and genocide is found in the action required. Persecution requires that a 
fundamental right be denied, while genocide requires the destruction, wholly or partially, 
of a protected group. However, at the same time, it can be argued that the right to sexual 
autonomy constitutes a fundamental right. Sexual violence against members of a certain 
group thus constitutes both an infringement of a fundamental right (to sexual autonomy) 
and an action that causes serious bodily or mental harm of a victim, as required for 
genocide.  
 
In this regard, De Brouwer correctly argues that: 
 “Kupreskic [an accused before the ICTY] clearly attacked his Muslim neighbours solely 
on the ground of their ethnicity and with the aim of cleansing the village of Muslim 
inhabitants. Blaskic [also an accused before the ICTY] was found guilty of persecutions 
against Muslim civilians of Bosnia on the basis of the following acts: attacks on towns 
and villages; murder and serious bodily injury; the destruction and plunder of property 
and, in particular, of institutions dedicated to religion or education; inhuman or cruel 
treatment of civilians and, in particular, their being taken hostage and used as human 
shields; and the forcible transfer of civilians.”70 
 
She goes further and again rightly argues that: “Following the interpretation of acts as 
discussed above, sexual violence crimes can thus also be seen as acts – when committed 
on any of the discriminatory grounds – that can constitute persecution”.71  
 
The only distinction between persecution and genocide lies in the mens rea required to 
commit these crimes. As mentioned above72 the prosecution would have to prove that a 
perpetrator possessed a special intention to destroy in part or in whole a protected group 
                                                 
70 See Anne-Marie LM De Brouwer Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and 
the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR (2005) 157. 
71 Ibid. 
72 See 4.1.2. above. 
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by committing sexual violence against his victim.73 With persecution the prosecution 
would only have to prove that the perpetrator directed an attack against a civilian 
population based on some form of discrimination against the group, which was staged by 
sexually violating a victim who belonged to a protected group. De Brouwer broadly states 
this as follows: “in the crime of persecution, the criminal intent is to forcibly discriminate 
against a group or members of a group by grossly and systematically violating their 
fundamental human rights”.74 
 
In conclusion, Mettraux rightly argues that persecution can be seen as a “first step in a 
genocidal enterprise and it may serve from a prosecutorial point of view as a gap-filling 
criminal prohibition between other crimes against humanity which are not otherwise 
motivated by a persecutory agenda, and genocide, the mens rea of which may be difficult 
to prove”.75 Thus, even though a legal difference exists between genocide and 
persecution, the circumstances within which these crimes take place are so similar that the 
prosecution can possibly charge a perpetrator for persecution as a crime against humanity, 
by committing a sexual offence, even though the perpetrator intended to commit 
genocide.  
 
 
 
                                                 
73 See also AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 70 at 152 – 162 for a discussion on persecution on the ground of 
gender and Guenael Mettraux International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (2005) 334. 
74 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 70 at 161-162. 
75 See G Mettraux op cit note 73 at 336. 
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4.2.4 The punishment of the crimes 
In order to ensure that punitive justice prevail a perpetrator would normally be sentenced 
to prison once he was convicted of committing an offence. The international criminal 
tribunals possess a huge discretion when deciding on an appropriate sentence once an 
accused has been convicted.76 In sentencing proceedings two main factors would be 
considered by a judge before handing down an appropriate sentence. These are: (a) the 
gravity of the acts of the accused;77 and (b) mitigating and aggravating factors78 and the 
general practice of handing down prison sentences in the domestic court of the accused.79 
Even though sentences are handed down for each crime that an accused has committed 
(where he was convicted of committing multiple offences), concurrent sentences are 
normally favoured among judges.80 However, in some instances the ICTY also handed 
down one sentence for all the offences that an accused was convicted of.81  
 
Considering that only the ICTY and ICTR have convicted accused persons of both 
genocide and crimes against humanity, only the similarities found in these tribunals’ 
jurisprudence will be assessed.  
 
                                                 
76 See G Mettraux op cit note 73 at 347. 
77 Ibid. 
78 See G Mettraux op cit note 73 at 350. 
79 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 70 at 323. 
80 For example, in the Akayesu, Gacumbitsi and Kayishema and Ruzindana judgments the ICTR handed 
down a concurrent sentence after delivering a sentence for each offence the accused committed. Similarly 
in the ICTY the trial chamber handed down a concurrent sentence in the Tadic judgment. 
81 See the Kvocka judgment and the Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic judgment. 
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Firstly it should be noted that article 23 of the ICTR statute and article 24 of the ICTY 
statute both provide the same provisions for punishment of convicted persons. These 
provisions are worded as follows: 
 “1. The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. In 
determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chamber shall have recourse to the 
general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of [Rwanda or the former 
Yugoslavia depending on the Statute applicable]. 
2. In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers should take into account such factors as 
the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. 
 
3. In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may order the return of any property 
and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their 
rightful owners.” 
 
Both these tribunals are thus given the same guidelines that judges should take into 
account when considering an appropriate sentence that a convicted accused should serve.  
 
In the sentencing judgment of The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolic82 the ICTY rightly 
argued that, apart from the taking the above factors into account, the main purpose of 
sentencing is to: 
 “… influence the legal awareness of the accused, the surviving victims, their relatives, 
the witnesses and the general public in order to reassure them that the legal system is 
implemented and enforced. Additionally, the process of sentencing is intended to convey 
the message that globally accepted laws and rules have to be obeyed by everybody.”83 
 
A main component of the similarity argument is found within this purpose. If a legal 
awareness is created within the accused, the victims, their relatives, the witnesses and 
general public that crimes of a sexually violent nature (whether it be found within 
genocide or crimes against humanity) are seriously punished, it would serve as a deterrent 
for these crimes to be committed.  
                                                 
82 IT-94-2-S, 18 December 2003 (Hereinafter referred to as the Nikolic sentencing judgment). 
83 Para. 139. 
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When studying the sentences handed down for sexual violence as a form of genocide, one 
can conclude that in the ICTR convicted accused persons received a sentence ranging 
from 30 years imprisonment to life imprisonment.84 For committing sexual violence as a 
crime against humanity the prison sentences ranged from 12 years to life imprisonment.85 
 
It is thus evident that the ICTR has handed down more severe prison sentences than the 
ICTY, notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing provisions for both these tribunals are 
the same. However, the ICTR has proved that it is possible for an accused to be given a 
life imprisonment sentence for committing sexual violence as a crime against humanity, 
just as it would order an accused a life imprisonment sentence for committing genocide.  
 
4.3 Cumulative charges and convictions 
Crimes against humanity and genocide are always committed in the form of another 
crime being committed. For example, rape can be committed as both a crime against 
humanity and genocide. Thus, when indicting an accused for committing rape as a crime 
against humanity or genocide (or even war crimes) the prosecution would not always be 
                                                 
84 Gacumbitsi received a 30 year imprisonment sentence for sexual violence as a form of genocide, while 
Akayesu, Muhimana and Musema received life imprisonment sentences. 
85 In the Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic judgment, Vukovic was given a 12 year sentence for raping a 15 
year old girl, while in cases such as Akayesu, the accused was sentenced to 15 years imprison for 
committing rape as a crime against humanity. Muhimana received a life imprisonment sentence for 
committing rape as a crime against humanity. 
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sure whether the accused indeed committed one of crimes covered under the jurisdiction 
of the court.86  
 
In this instance one would either have “true concurrences of offences or apparent 
concurrence of offences”.87 A true concurrence of an offence would be defined as that 
which factually happened, while an apparent concurrence would be offences that the 
perpetrator commit which can fall under various crimes, while in reality it only falls 
under one crime.88 
 
In the case of The Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, 
Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic89 the ICTY highlighted various tests 
applied by other courts regarding the accumulation of offences.90 In the end the trial 
chamber found that the prosecutor is allowed to charge an accused for an accumulation of 
offences by stating that: 
“If… a Trial Chamber finds that by a single act or omission the accused has perpetrated 
two offences under two distinct provisions of the Statute, and that the offences contain 
elements uniquely required by each provision, the Trial Chamber shall find the accused 
guilty on two separate counts. In that case the sentences consequent upon the convictions 
for the same act shall be served concurrently, but the Trial Chamber may aggravate the 
sentence for serious offence if it considers that the less serious offence committed by the 
same conduct significantly adds to the heinous nature of the prevailing offence.”91 
 
                                                 
86 See G Werle op cit note 27 at 180 where he states: “Prior to the presentation of all the evidence, it is not 
possible to determine to a certainty which of the charges brought against an accused will be proven.” 
87 See Fulvio Maria Palombino ‘The overlapping between war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
international criminal law’ (2002) 12 Italian Yearbook of International Law 130. 
88 Ibid. 
89 IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000 (Hereinafter referred to as the Kupreskic et al judgment). 
90 Paras. 678 et al for a discussion on these tests. 
91 Para. 718. Emphasis in the original. 
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The trial chamber thus stated that when assessing the sentencing of a cumulative offence, 
the heinous nature of the broader offence would find application, instead of a less serious 
offence that could have been committed. The ICTY went further and stated that: 
“On the other hand, if a Trial Chamber finds… that by a single act or omission the 
accused has not perpetrated two offences under two distinct provisions of the Statute but 
only one offence, then the Trial Chamber will have to decide on the appropriate 
conviction for that offence only.”92 
 
The trial chamber therefore covered all its bases by also providing for an interpretation of 
sentencing, should another court find that no cumulative offence was charged for and 
convicted.  
 
However, thus far the cumulative offences charges have been developed by subsequent 
judgments in the ICTY. One of the cases in which the ICTY has laid down a test for 
cumulative offences was The Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic 
and Esad Landzo.93 In this case the appeals chamber laid down the following test in order 
for a prosecutor to be successful in bringing cumulative charges against an accused: 
“Multiple criminal convictions entered under different statutory provisions but based on 
the same conduct are permissible only if each statutory provision involved has a 
materially distinct element not contained in the other. An element is materially distinct 
from another if it requires proof of a fact not required by the other. Where this test is not 
met, the Chamber must decide in relation to which offence it will enter a conviction. This 
should be done on the basis of the principle that the conviction under the more specific 
provision should be upheld. Thus, if a set of facts is regulated by two provisions, one of 
which contains an additional materially distinct element, then a conviction should be 
entered only under that provision.”94 
 
                                                 
92 Para. 719. 
93 IT-96-21-A, 20 February 2001 (Hereinafter referred to as the Celebici appeals judgment based on the 
place where the crimes were committed). 
94 Paras. 412 and 413. 
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The appeals chamber first stated the obvious, that cumulative offences can be convicted 
under different crimes, if it is proved by the prosecution under the different crimes. On 
the other hand, the appeals chamber stated that, should the prosecutor be unsuccessful in 
charging the accused for cumulative offences under different crimes, then the court 
should only convict the accused under one of the crimes for which it found the 
prosecution brought sufficient evidence. As an example, should the prosecutor bring 
charges of rape under both genocide and crimes against, but lack evidence for the former, 
then a conviction can be secured based on rape as a crime against humanity, should the 
prosecution be successful in proving it.  
 
When assessing this in terms of whether a prosecutor should charge an accused for 
committing a sexually violent act in terms of genocide or a crime against humanity, the 
accumulation of offences could serve as an advantage to the prosecutor. This advantage is 
located in the fact that should the prosecutor, for example, fail in proving a sexually 
violent crime as genocide, he or she might still succeed with another serious charge, like 
a crime against humanity. However, Mettraux (a former Associate Legal Officer of the 
ICTY Chambers) alludes us to the reality that the prosecution “established an unfortunate 
practice of simply charging all possible crimes (and forms of liability for them), without 
any attempt to ascertain the most appropriate ones based on evidence”.95 He thus criticise 
                                                 
95 See G Mettraux op cit note 73 at 316. Evidence of his previous position as an associate legal officer at 
the ICTY can be found on the inside cover of his book called: International Crimes and the ad hoc 
Tribunals. 
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the prosecution for not using an effective strategy when bringing charges against an 
accused. 
  
Therefore, even though it might be easier for the prosecution to bring crimes of a sexual 
nature as both genocide and crimes against humanity, it has to be strategically thought 
through and not just listed under an indictment as both crimes, as it can amount to a 
serious waste of time and money, as the prosecutor would have to argue sexual violence 
as both crimes before the court. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to highlight the differences and similarities in sexual violence 
as a form of genocide and a crime against humanity. In doing this, three ultra invisible 
components were discussed, being: (1) the legal effect; (2) the surrounding 
circumstances; and (3) how this would impact on the prosecution.  
 
In assessing the first point, the differences clearly identified the legal effect that charging 
sexual violence has on genocide and crimes against humanity. When studying the legal 
definitions of these crimes, one can come to a remarkable conclusion that indeed there 
exists a difference in sexual violence as a crime against humanity as opposed to genocide.  
In assessing the second point, the similarities pointed out a palpable recognition of the 
surrounding circumstances within which sexual violence takes place as a crime against 
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humanity and genocide.96 Thus, the conclusion in this regard would point out that indeed 
similarities exist in sexual violence as genocide and crimes against humanity. 
 
In assessing the third point, it became evident that at these differences and similarities do 
indeed have an impact on the prosecution, by way of bringing cumulative charges against 
an accused for committing sexual violence as both forms of genocide and crimes against 
humanity. Therefore, even though the prosecution is allowed to charge one crime under 
multiple offences, it is also cautioned against not blindingly charging accused persons for 
multiple offences.  
 
This chapter thus highlights an interesting challenge that the differences and similarities 
in sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity pose for the prosecution. 
Even though charging an accused for cumulative offences might seem as a plausible 
solution, the consequence thereof inherently threatens the development of sexual violence 
as a form of genocide. This is due to the fact that a significant difference between 
genocide and crimes against humanity is found in proving the high degree of intention for 
the former. 
 
The next chapter will outline the concluding remarks in the conceptualisation of sexual 
violence as a crime against humanity and genocide. It will discuss whether the 
                                                 
96 It points out this recognition of surrounding circumstances with the exception of the jurisdictional 
regime. 
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differences between the crimes are so significant, as to ignore it when a prosecutor should 
consider prosecution against an accused for committing sexual violence as genocide and 
instead charge an accused with committing sexual violence as a crime against humanity.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 4 outlined the various differences and similarities in sexual violence as both 
genocide and a crime against humanity. In chapter 4 the conclusion was drawn that even 
though there indeed exists various legal differences between sexual violence as crimes 
against humanity and genocide, at the same time, various factual similarities can be 
drawn from sexual violence as both these crimes.1  
 
In drawing a concrete conclusion it is necessary to revisit the central research question 
posed in chapter 1 and to provide an answer for it. The question was posed as: What are 
the essential and practical differences between sexual violence as crimes against 
humanity and genocide, and what is the legal effect of the differences, should there be 
any?2 
 
Before answering this question, it is important to draw the context within which sexual 
violence is charged, and whether such charge would constitute one of the two crimes or 
not. Jean Paul Akayesu was the first accused who was charged with committing sexual 
violence during the Rwandan genocide. It should be noted that the prosecutor did not 
initially charge Jean Paul Akayesu with sexual violence and that the indictment was 
amended after the ICTR heard testimony about the involvement of Akayesu in sexually 
                                                 
1 See pages 143-145 in chapter 4. 
2 See 1.5 in chapter 1. 
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violating witnesses.3 In the rule 61 decision of The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolic4 the 
ICTY judges advised the prosecutors as follows: 
“From multiple testimony and the witness statements submitted by the Prosecutor to this 
Trial Chamber, it appears that women (and girls) were subjected to rape and other forms 
of sexual assault during their detention at Susica camp. Dragan Nikolic and other persons 
connected with the camp are alleged to have been directly involved in some of these 
rapes or sexual assaults. These allegations do not seem to relate solely to isolated 
instances. 
 
The Trial Chamber feels that the Prosecutor may be well-advised to review these 
statements carefully with a view to ascertaining whether to charge Dragan Nikolic with 
rape and other forms of sexual assault, either as a crime against humanity or as grave 
breaches or war crimes.”5 
 
In the ICTY there thus also seemed to be some form of reluctance by the prosecution to 
charge the accused persons for crimes of a sexual nature. The prosecution could possibly 
have a plethora of reasons for why they did not charge the accused for crimes of a sexual 
nature.6  
 
Of more interest to this study, in the quote above by the ICTY in the Nikolic rule 61 
judgment, is the last portion where the judges advise to either charge the accused with 
committing sexual violence as a crime against humanity, grave breach or war crime. It is 
interesting to note that the judges did not advise the prosecution to charge the accused 
with sexual violence as a form of genocide. They did this knowing that the rapes and 
sexual assaults took place in the Susica camp where Muslim civilians were interned7 and 
being well aware that the ICTY has the jurisdiction to try cases of genocide.8 
                                                 
3 See Fiona de Londras ‘Prosecuting sexual violence in the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia’ (2009) University College Dublin Working Papers in Law, 
Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 06/ 2009 11. 
4 IT-94-2-R61, 20 October 1995 (Hereinafter referred to as the Nikolic rule 61 judgment). 
5 Para. 33. 
6 Due to space restrictions, this thesis cannot venture into the reasons why the prosecution decided not to 
initially indict the accused for sexual violence.  
7 Para. 33. 
8 See article 4 of the ICTY statute. 
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In order to attempt to remedy this quandary resulting in a lack of sexual violence charges 
as a form of genocide, this thesis saw it fit to investigate the extent of the differences and 
similarities of sexual violence as a crime against humanity and genocide.  
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis outlined four differences and similarities in sexual violence as a 
crime against humanity and genocide. The four differences were: 1) the scope of 
application;9 2) the degree of intention;10 3) the burden of proof;11 and 4) interpreting acts 
of sexual violence.12 On the other hand, the four similarities were: 1) the jurisdictional 
regime;13 2) the knowledge of a broader context;14 3) the element of persecution;15 and 4) 
the punishment of the crimes.16 It should be noted that due to technical constraints and 
limitations, only four similarities and differences could be discussed, even though there 
may exist many more.  
 
Following on the first part of the question, the second part of the research question 
enquires into the extent of the legal effect that the differences have upon sexual violence. 
After extensive investigation in chapter 4, it is concluded that the extent between 
charging sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity, on the other hand, is 
to be welcomed.  
 
                                                 
9 See pages 114 – 118 of chapter 4. 
10 See pages 118 – 121 of chapter 4. 
11 See pages 121 – 125 of chapter 4. 
12 See pages 125 – 128 of chapter 4. 
13 See pages 128 – 130 of chapter 4. 
14 See pages 130 – 132 of chapter 4. 
15 See pages 132 – 137 of chapter 4. 
16 See pages 137 – 139 of chapter 4. 
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In proving that the accused committed sexual violence as genocide, the prosecution 
would first have to show that the act the accused was charged with, constitutes sexual 
violence. After this is proved, the prosecution would have to convince the court that those 
acts of sexual violence constitute one of the five acts of genocide.17 Once this is done, the 
prosecution is left with the daunting (and nearly impossible) task of proving that those 
acts of sexual violence were committed with the (special) intention of annihilating one of 
the protected groups, catered for by the definition of genocide.  
 
In proving that the accused committed sexual violence as a crime against humanity, the 
prosecution is also called upon to show that the act the accused was charged with 
constitutes sexual violence, as various acts of sexual violence are catered for under the 
definition of a crime against humanity.18 Once this is done, the prosecution would have to 
prove that the acts of sexual violence were committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population.  
 
A prosecutor can thus charge and possibly convict an accused for committing sexual 
violence as a crime against humanity, where in fact the accused possibly committed 
sexual violence as a form of genocide.19 The level of intention would not be that high, as 
the prosecutor would only have to prove that the accused possessed dolus and not dolus 
specialis, as would be required for genocide. With that, the prosecutor would also only 
                                                 
17 These five acts being: “(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births with the group; 
and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”. 
18 In the ICC statute, the following acts of sexual violence are provided for under article 7(1)(g): rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity. 
19 See the Nikolic rule 61 judgment above, on page 147, as an example. 
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have to prove that the accused committed a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population and not that the accused targeted a specific group, protected by the 
definition of genocide.  
 
This, therefore, brings us to a perplexed conclusion that a scenario that prima facie might 
constitute sexual violence as genocide would stand a better chance of conviction if the 
accused is charged with committing sexual violence as a crime against humanity. 
Margaret Lyons thus correctly argues that:  
“A crime against humanity is sufficiently serious without adding the crime of genocide. 
A legal creation to produce a crime of genocide only trivializes the crime and confuses 
the international community responsible for implementing the tribunal’s [ICTR] 
decision.”20  
 
In formulating this argument, Lyon made the following correct observation, regarding the 
extent of rape charges as genocide in the ICTY: “There are still many cases of genocide 
pending in the ICTY. Yet, indictments served for rape continue to fall under crimes 
against humanity”.21 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
As pointed out above,22 the extent to which sexual violence as genocide can be overruled 
as a crime against humanity is quite vast. In order to remedy this injustice, concrete 
recommendations are needed to ensure that sexual violence, as genocide, is recognised, 
charged, correctly applied and convicted in future. 
 
                                                 
20 See Margaret A. Lyons ‘Hearing the cry without answering the call: rape, genocide and the Rwandan 
tribunal’ (2001) 28 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 123. 
21 See MA Lyons op cit note 20 at 120. 
22 See the argument formulated directly preceding the recommendations. 
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De Brouwer calls for an amended definition of genocide that expressly includes sexual 
violence as an act.23 Her proposed definition will amend article 6 of the ICC statute as 
follows: 
“Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, an identifiable groups, as such, including a national, ethnical, racial, religious or 
gender group: 
 
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or 
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. 
 
…”24 
 
Based on the fact that the definition of genocide was formulated into law during 1948, 
one could certainly propose that the definition be re-examined to explore whether it 
would still find exact application in the 21st century.25 By expressly stating acts of a 
sexual nature in the definition, the prosecution is not left with the burden of proving that 
acts of a sexual nature constituted one of the existing five grounds of genocide.26 
 
However, De Brouwer’s proposal does not sufficiently address the reason why the 
prosecution would not charge an accused for sexual violence, as genocide, but rather as a 
crime against humanity. This reason lies in the difficulty of proving that an act of sexual 
violence was perpetrated with the special intention to annihilate one of the protected 
groups covered by the definition. If a well structured amendment of the definition of 
genocide includes addressing the high standards imposed by the current definition, it 
                                                 
23 See Anne-Marie LM De Brouwer Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and 
the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR (2005) 83. 
24 See AMLM De Brouwer op cit note 23 at 84 (my emphasis added). 
25 Apart from the fact that 61 years have lapsed since the Genocide Convention was signed as a treaty, the 
nature in which genocide is committed, has changed to the extent that sexual violence plays an enormous 
role in attempting to annihilate a protected group, covered by the definition. 
26 See footnote 17 above for the five acts of genocide. 
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could be seen as a possible solution to ensure more charges being brought against 
accused for committing sexual violence as genocide. 
 
Apart from seeking such an amendment, it should be noted that the current definition of 
genocide forms part of customary international law and the jus cogens.27 Jus cogens is 
defined as “peremptory norms… from which no derogation is permitted”28 by States. In 
other words, States may not create laws contrary to those established by jus cogens 
norms. Therefore, a proposed amendment of article 6 of the ICC statute would meet 
extreme difficulty, especially in light of the fact that genocide forms part of customary 
international law and norms that States cannot derogate from. 
 
Quenivet asks an important question, which has thus far not been answered in writing in 
any academic research. She writes that:  
“The real question is whether we want sexual offenses to become a specific category of 
crime or whether it is appropriate to enumerate them as a type of crime that falls under 
the purview of a big crime.”29 
 
In other words, she is questioning whether it would not be more beneficial to have sexual 
violence conceptualised as a separate crime and not as either genocide, or crimes against 
humanity, or war crimes.  
 
This recommendation could possibly serve as a solution when one is confronted with the 
prospect of a comparative analysis between sexual violence as genocide and crimes 
against humanity. By ‘removing’ sexual violence from these crimes and adding it as a 
                                                 
27 See Gerhard Werle Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) 191. 
28 See John Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 2nd Ed. (2000) 40. 
29 See Noelle NR Quenivet Sexual Offenses in Armed Conflict and International Law (2005) 176. 
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separate crime, the prosecution would not have to face the prospect of considering how to 
approach and successfully prosecute sexual violence as either genocide or crimes against 
humanity. In the end, this could be seen as an easier method to ensure justice for victims 
of sexual violence during mass atrocities and armed conflict circumstances, where both 
genocide and crimes against humanity were committed. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 (extract) 
 
Article 5 
Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
1.         The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in 
accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:  
(a)     The crime of genocide;  
(b)     Crimes against humanity;  
(c)     War crimes;  
(d)     The crime of aggression. 
Article 6 
Genocide 
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such:  
(a)     Killing members of the group;  
(b)     Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c)     Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;  
(d)     Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
(e)     Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  
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Article 7 
Crimes against humanity 
1.         For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:  
(a)     Murder;  
(b)     Extermination;  
(c)     Enslavement;  
(d)     Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
(e)     Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law;  
(f)     Torture;  
(g)     Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;  
(h)     Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, 
in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court;  
(i)     Enforced disappearance of persons;  
(j)     The crime of apartheid;  
(k)     Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
2.         For the purpose of paragraph 1:  
(a)     "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy to commit such attack;  
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(b)     "Extermination" includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter 
alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the 
destruction of part of a population;  
(c)     "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in 
the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children;  
(d)     "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced displacement 
of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in 
which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international 
law;  
(e)     "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of 
the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only 
from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;  
(f)     "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly 
made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any 
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This 
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to 
pregnancy;  
(g)     "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental 
rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or 
collectivity;  
(h)     "The crime of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character similar to 
those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized 
regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any 
other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that 
regime;  
(i)     "Enforced disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention or 
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a 
State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that 
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those 
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a 
prolonged period of time. 
3.         For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term "gender" refers to the 
two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term "gender" does not 
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indicate any meaning different from the above.  
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Appendix B: Elements of Crimes annexed to Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court 1998 (extract) 
 
Article 6 Genocide 
Introduction  
With respect to the last element listed for each crime:  
– The term “in the context of” would include the initial acts in an emerging pattern;  
– The term “manifest” is an objective qualification;  
– Notwithstanding the normal requirement for a mental element provided for in article 
30, and recognizing that knowledge of the circumstances will usually be addressed in 
proving genocidal intent, the appropriate requirement, if any, for a mental element 
regarding this circumstance will need to be decided by the Court on a case-by-case basis.  
Article 6 (a) Genocide by killing  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator killed 2 one or more persons.  
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group.  
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such.  
4. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed 
against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.  
Article 6 (b) Genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator caused serious bodily or mental harm to one or more persons. 3  
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group.  
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such.  
4. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed 
against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.  
__________________  
2 The term “killed” is interchangeable with the term “caused death”.  
3 This conduct may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, 
sexual  
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violence or inhuman or degrading treatment. 6 
 
Article 6 (c) Genocide by deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to  
bring about physical destruction  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator inflicted certain conditions of life upon one or more persons.  
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group.  
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such.  
4. The conditions of life were calculated to bring about the physical destruction of that 
group, in whole or in part. 4  
5. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed 
against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.  
Article 6 (d) Genocide by imposing measures intended to prevent births  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator imposed certain measures upon one or more persons.  
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group.  
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such.  
4. The measures imposed were intended to prevent births within that group.  
5. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed 
against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.  
Article 6 (e) Genocide by forcibly transferring children  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator forcibly transferred one or more persons. 5  
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group.  
__________________  
4 The term “conditions of life” may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, deliberate 
deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, such as food or medical services, or 
systematic expulsion from homes.  
5 The term “forcibly” is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or  
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by 
taking advantage of a coercive environment. 7 
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3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such.  
4. The transfer was from that group to another group.  
5. The person or persons were under the age of 18 years.  
6. The perpetrator knew, or should have known, that the person or persons were under the 
age of 18 years.  
7. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed 
against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction. 8 
Article 7 Crimes against humanity  
Introduction  
1. Since article 7 pertains to international criminal law, its provisions, consistent with 
article 22, must be strictly construed, taking into account that crimes against  
humanity as defined in article 7 are among the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole, warrant and entail individual criminal  
responsibility, and require conduct which is impermissible under generally applicable 
international law, as recognized by the principal legal systems of the  
world.  
2. The last two elements for each crime against humanity describe the context in which 
the conduct must take place. These elements clarify the requisite participation in and 
knowledge of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. However, 
the last element should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had 
knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of 
the State or organization. In the case of an emerging widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population, the intent clause of the last element indicates that this 
mental element is satisfied if the perpetrator intended to further such an attack.  
3. “Attack directed against a civilian population” in these context elements is understood 
to mean a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in 
article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. The acts need not 
constitute a military attack. It is understood that “policy to commit such attack” requires 
that the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a 
civilian population. 6  
Article 7 (1) (a) Crime against humanity of murder  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator killed 7 one or more persons.  
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
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3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.  
__________________  
6 A policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would be 
implemented by  
State or organizational action. Such a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be 
implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed at 
encouraging such attack.  
The existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of 
governmental or organizational action.  
7 The term “killed” is interchangeable with the term “caused death”. This footnote 
applies to all  
elements which use either of these concepts. 9  
 
Article 7 (1) (b) Crime against humanity of extermination  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator killed 8 one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life 
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population. 9  
2. The conduct constituted, or took place as part of, 10 a mass killing of members of a 
civilian population.  
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
Article 7 (1) (c) Crime against humanity of enslavement  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a 
person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty. 11  
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
__________________  
8 The conduct could be committed by different methods of killing, either directly or 
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indirectly.  
9 The infliction of such conditions could include the deprivation of access to food and 
medicine.  
10 The term “as part of” would include the initial conduct in a mass killing.  
11 It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include 
exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described 
in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and children. 10 
 
Article 7 (1) (d) Crime against humanity of deportation or forcible transfer  
of population  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator deported or forcibly 12 transferred, 13 without grounds permitted 
under international law, one or more persons to another State or location, by expulsion or 
other coercive acts.  
2. Such person or persons were lawfully present in the area from which they were so 
deported or transferred.  
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the lawfulness 
of such presence.  
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
Article 7 (1) (e) Crime against humanity of imprisonment or other severe  
deprivation of physical liberty  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator imprisoned one or more persons or otherwise severely deprived one or 
more persons of physical liberty.  
2. The gravity of the conduct was such that it was in violation of fundamental rules of 
international law.  
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of 
the conduct.  
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
__________________  
12 The term “forcibly” is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force 
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or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another person, or by 
taking advantage of a coercive environment. 13 “Deported or forcibly transferred” is 
interchangeable with “forcibly displaced”. 11 
 
Article 7 (1) (f) Crime against humanity of torture 14  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more 
persons.  
2. Such person or persons were in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator.  
3. Such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in or incidental to, 
lawful sanctions.  
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
Article 7 (1) (g)-1 Crime against humanity of rape  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator invaded 15 the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, 
however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual 
organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of 
the body.  
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of 
power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of  
giving genuine consent. 16  
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
__________________  
14 It is understood that no specific purpose need be proved for this crime.  
15 The concept of “invasion” is intended to be broad enough to be gender-neutral.  
16 It is understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if affected 
by natural, induced or age-related incapacity. This footnote also applies to the 
corresponding elements of article 7 (1) (g)-3, 5 and 6. 12 
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Article 7 (1) (g)-2 Crime against humanity of sexual slavery 17  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a 
person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty. 18  
2. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a 
sexual nature.  
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
Article 7 (1) (g)-3 Crime against humanity of enforced prostitution  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual 
nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, 
duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or 
persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such 
person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.  
2. The perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary or other 
advantage in exchange for or in connection with the acts of a sexual nature.  
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
__________________  
17 Given the complex nature of this crime, it is recognized that its commission could 
involve more than one perpetrator as a part of a common criminal purpose. 18 It is 
understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include exacting 
forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described 
in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and children. 13 
 
Article 7 (1) (g)-4 Crime against humanity of forced pregnancy  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made pregnant, with the intent 
of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave 
violations of international law.  
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
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3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
Article 7 (1) (g)-5 Crime against humanity of enforced sterilization  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator deprived one or more persons of biological reproductive capacity. 19 
2. The conduct was neither justified by the medical or hospital treatment of the person or 
persons concerned nor carried out with their genuine consent. 20  
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
Article 7 (1) (g)-6 Crime against humanity of sexual violence  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or 
caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat 
of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another 
person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ 
incapacity to give genuine consent.  
2. Such conduct was of a gravity comparable to the other offences in article 7, paragraph 
1 (g), of the Statute.  
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of 
the conduct.  
__________________  
19 The deprivation is not intended to include birth-control measures which have a non-
permanent effect in practice. 20 It is understood that “genuine consent” does not include 
consent obtained through deception. 14 
 
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
Article 7 (1) (h) Crime against humanity of persecution  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, 21 one or more  
persons of fundamental rights.  
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2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or 
collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.  
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, 
gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, of the Statute, or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law.  
4. The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in article 7, 
paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 22  
5. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
6. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
Article 7 (1) (i) Crime against humanity of enforced disappearance of persons 23,24  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator:  
(a) Arrested, detained 25,26 or abducted one or more persons; or  
(b) Refused to acknowledge the arrest, detention or abduction, or to give information on 
the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons.  
2. (a) Such arrest, detention or abduction was followed or accompanied by a refusal to 
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the  
fate or whereabouts of such person or persons; or  
__________________  
21 This requirement is without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the General Introduction to the 
Elements of Crimes. 22 It is understood that no additional mental element is necessary 
for this element other than that inherent in element 6. 23 Given the complex nature of this 
crime, it is recognized that its commission will normally involve more than one 
perpetrator as a part of a common criminal purpose. 24 This crime falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Court only if the attack referred to in elements 7 and 8 occurs after the 
entry into force of the Statute. 25 The word “detained” would include a perpetrator who 
maintained an existing detention. 26 It is understood that under certain circumstances an 
arrest or detention may have been lawful. 15 
 
(b) Such refusal was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom.  
3. The perpetrator was aware that: 27  
(a) Such arrest, detention or abduction would be followed in the ordinary course of events 
by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate 
or whereabouts of such person or persons; 28 or  
(b) Such refusal was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom.  
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4. Such arrest, detention or abduction was carried out by, or with the authorization, 
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization.  
5. Such refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the 
fate or whereabouts of such person or persons was carried out by, or with the 
authorization or support of, such State or political organization.  
6. The perpetrator intended to remove such person or persons from the protection of the 
law for a prolonged period of time.  
7. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
8. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
Article 7 (1) (j) Crime against humanity of apartheid  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator committed an inhumane act against one or more persons.  
2. Such act was an act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute, or was an act of 
a character similar to any of those acts. 29  
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the character of 
the act.  
4. The conduct was committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic 
oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial  
group or groups.  
5. The perpetrator intended to maintain such regime by that conduct.  
6. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
__________________  
27 This element, inserted because of the complexity of this crime, is without prejudice to 
the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes. 28 It is understood that, in the case 
of a perpetrator who maintained an existing detention, this element would be satisfied if 
the perpetrator was aware that such a refusal had already taken place.  
29 It is understood that “character” refers to the nature and gravity of the act. 16 
 
7. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
Article 7 (1) (k) Crime against humanity of other inhumane acts  
Elements  
1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health, by means of an inhumane act.  
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2. Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, 
of the Statute. 30  
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the character of 
the act.  
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.  
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.  
30 It is understood that “character” refers to the nature and gravity of the act. 17 
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Appendix C: The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (extract) 
 
Article 2 
Genocide 
 
1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons 
committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article or of committing any of 
the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this Article. 
 
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
 
a. Killing members of the group;  
 
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
 
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions to life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
 
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
 
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
3. The following acts shall be punishable: 
 
a. Genocide; 
 
b. Conspiracy to commit genocide; 
 
c. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
 
d. Attempt to commit genocide; 
 
e. Complicity in genocide. 
 
 
Article 3 
Crimes against Humanity 
 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or 
religious grounds: 
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a. Murder; 
 
b. Extermination; 
 
c. Enslavement; 
 
d. Deportation; 
 
e. Imprisonment; 
 
f. Torture; 
 
g. Rape; 
 
h. Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
 
i. Other inhumane acts. 
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Appendix D: The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (extract) 
 
Article 4 
Genocide 
 
1. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing 
genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other 
acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article. 
 
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
 
a. killing members of the group; 
 
b. causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
 
c. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
 
d. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
 
e. forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
3. The following acts shall be punishable: 
 
a. genocide; 
 
b. conspiracy to commit genocide; 
 
c. direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
 
d. attempt to commit genocide; 
 
e. complicity in genocide. 
 
 
Article 5 
Crimes against Humanity 
 
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the 
following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in 
character, and directed against any civilian population: 
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a. murder; 
 
b. extermination; 
 
c. enslavement; 
 
d. deportation; 
 
e. imprisonment; 
 
f. torture; 
 
g. rape; 
 
h. persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
 
i. other inhumane acts. 
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Appendix E: Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (extract) 
 
Article 3 
Crimes against Humanity 
The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the 
following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population: 
a. Murder; 
b. Extermination;  
c. Enslavement;  
d. Deportation;  
e. Imprisonment;  
f. Torture;  
g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form 
of sexual violence;  
h. Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds;  
i. Other inhumane acts. 
 
 
 
 
 
